The Consistency of the Vedanta Texts

The word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution;

not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon;

for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing

Brahman) is not of that nature[51]. Nor has the word 'then' the sense of

auspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning could not be

properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word 'then' rather

acts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and heard merely, while

it denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution

as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows moreover from the

circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the

previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from

the relation of immediate consecution.[52]

If, then, the word 'then' intimates immediate consecution it must be

explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends;

just as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject

of the Purva Mima/m/sa) specially depends on the antecedent reading of

the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for

those who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for

those desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to

the enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the

understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means

of the Purva Mima/m/sa). To this question we reply in the negative,

because for a man who has read the Vedanta-parts of the Veda it is

possible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in

the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word

'then' to indicate order of succession; a purport which it serves in

other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off

of pieces from the heart and other parts of the sacrificial animal.[53]

(For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the

agent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), because

there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the

enquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and

subordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act)

on the part of the person qualified[54]; and because the result as well

as the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of

active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that

again depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into

Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss, and does

not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not

yet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to

be accomplished (in the future); for they depend on the activity of man.

In the Brahma-mima/m/sa, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i.e.

Brahman, is something already accomplished (existent),--for it is

eternal,--and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ

moreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental

texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious

duty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on

him their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the

fundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without laying on

him the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their

immediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information

regarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are

approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something

should be stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is

proposed.--Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent conditions are

the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the

renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both

here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and

the other means[55], and the desire of final release. If these

conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into

active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman

and come to know it; but not otherwise. The word 'then' therefore

intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition

of the above-mentioned (spiritual) means.

The word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while

declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which

are means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance. Ch. Up. VIII,

1, 6, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so

perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious

duty'), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised

by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who

knows Brahman attains the highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman

is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned

By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be

given in the next Sutra (I, 1, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed

that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance,

the brahminical caste. In the Sutra the genitive case ('of Brahman;' the

literal translation of the Sutra being 'then therefore the desire of

knowledge of Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally

supplementary (/s/esha[56]); for the desire of knowledge demands an

object of desire and no other such object is stated.--But why should not

the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary

relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it

might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the

general relation may base itself on the more particular one.--This

assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the

direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an

altogether needless procedure.--Not needless; for if we explain the

words of the Sutra to mean 'the desire of knowledge connected with

Brahman' we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of

discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.--This reason also, we

reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the

statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary

matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all

objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those

objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those

objects need therefore not be mentioned, especially in the Sutra.

Analogously the sentence 'there the king is going' implicitly means that

the king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation

(according to which the Sutra represents Brahman as the direct object of

knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents

Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance,

the passage, 'That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to

know that. That is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). With passages of this

kind the Sutra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the

object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is

the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires

having reference to results[57]. Knowledge thus constitutes the means by

which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained.

For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man,

since it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of

the entire Sa/m/sara. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be

But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the

enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry

concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.

We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and

endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity,

intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of

the word 'Brahman,' from the root b/ri/h, 'to be great,' we at once

understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman[58].

Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being

the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of

(his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the existence of the Self

were not known, every one would think 'I am not.' And this Self (of

whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is

generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it!

Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special

nature. Unlearned people and the Lokayatikas are of opinion that the

mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others

that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain

that the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a

mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again

(to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the

Veda), maintain that there is a transmigrating being different from the

body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of

action); others teach that that being is enjoying only, not acting;

others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an

all-knowing, all-powerful Lord[59]. Others, finally, (i.e. the

Vedantins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i.e. of

the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the

product of Nescience).

Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound

arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and

scriptural texts misunderstood[60]. If therefore a man would embrace

some one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar

himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this

reason the first Sutra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry

into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with

the help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim the highest

So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The

question now arises what the characteristics of that Brahman are, and

the reverend author of the Sutras therefore propounds the following

subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).

The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is

mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture

as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares

the order of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the

passage, Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And

with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of

qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered,

through origination, on the state of existence. The words 'of this'

denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by

perception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case

indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words 'from which'

denote the cause. The full sense of the Sutra therefore is: That

omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence,

and dissolution of this world--which world is differentiated by names

and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits

of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and

causes[61], and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived

by the mind,--that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of

existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination,

subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in

the Sutra. As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yaska[62] are

possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it

might--were they referred to in the Sutra--be suspected that what is

meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as

dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to

be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from

Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into

The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot

possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated

qualities; not either from a non-intelligent pradhana[63], or from

atoms, or from non-being, or from a being subject to transmigration[64];

nor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously,

without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects)

special places, times, and causes have invariably to be employed.

(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world[65],

think that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating

beings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without

recourse being had to Scripture at all).--But, it might be said, you

yourself in the Sutra under discussion have merely brought forward the

same argument!--By no means, we reply. The Sutras (i.e. literally 'the

strings') have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of

the Vedanta-passages. In reality the Vedanta-passages referred to by the

Sutras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected

by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the

Vedanta-texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right

knowledge. While, however, the Vedanta-passages primarily declare the

cause of the origin, &c., of the world, inference also, being an

instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the

Vedanta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the

meaning ascertained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation;

for the passages, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5 ('the Self is to be heard, to be

considered'), and Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man, &c., having been

informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhara,

in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge'),

declare that human understanding assists Scripture[66].

Scriptural text, &c.[67], are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only

means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in

the Purva Mima/m/sa), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and

intuition[68], &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to

according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final

result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the

enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the

knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be

no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of

knowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished depends,

moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent

on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different

way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by

means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to

quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture

with sentences such as the following: 'At the atiratra he takes the

sho/d/asin cup,' and 'at the atiratra he does not take the sho/d/asin

cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen,' and, 'he

makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the

quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional

procedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would

have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing

to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to

whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All

option depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real

nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the

thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a

man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it

is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, 'it

is a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of

true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on

the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends

altogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself.--But, it might be said, as

Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other

means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a

discussion of the Vedanta-texts is purposeless.--This we deny; for as

Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those

other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their

nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman

were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is

connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the

world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception)

whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the

Sutra under discussion is not meant to propound inference (as the means

of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedanta-text.--Which,

then, is the Vedanta-text which the Sutra points at as having to be

considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?--It is the

passage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father

Varu/n/a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence

these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into

which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The

sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6:

'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into

bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also are to be adduced

which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature

is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.

That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being

shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the

Sutrakara continues as follows:

Brahman is the source, i.e. the cause of the great body of Scripture,

consisting of the /Ri/g-veda and other branches, which is supported by

various disciplines (such as grammar, nyaya, pura/n/a, &c.); which

lamp-like illuminates all things; which is itself all-knowing as it

were. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of

omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is

generally understood that the man from whom some special body of

doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for

instance, grammar from Pa/n/ini possesses a more extensive knowledge

than his work, comprehensive though it be; what idea, then, shall we

have to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great

Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his

breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the

/Ri/g-veda, &c., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of manifold

branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and

conditions of gods, animals, and men! See what Scripture says about him,

'The /Ri/g-veda, &c., have been breathed forth from that great Being'

(B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 10).

Or else we may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture consisting of

the /Ri/g-veda, &c., as described above, is the source or cause, i.e.

the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of

Brahman. So that the sense would be: through Scripture only as a means

of knowledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c., of the

world. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the

preceding Sutra 'from which these beings are born,' &c.--But as the

preceding Sutra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is

the source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sutra?--The words

of the preceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the

scriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the

origin, &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining an

inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the

Sutra under discussion has been propounded.

But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing

Brahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action

(according to the Purva Mima/m/sa Sutra I, 2, 1, 'As the purport of

Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not

action are purportless'), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not

action are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they

must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the

action, form supplements to the passages enjoining actions, or serve the

purpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout

meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying

information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the

latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which

give sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised

object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from

other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be

connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to

man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as 'he howled, &c.,'

which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in

so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. I, 2, 7,

'Because they stand in syntactical connection with the injunctions,

therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions'). In the same way

mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far

as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are

accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, 'For strength thee (I cut;'

which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the

dar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can

be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action.

And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects

cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the

Vedanta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin

actions; notifying the agents, divinities, and results connected with

those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its

involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the

Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmaka/nd/a of the Veda),

we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above viz.)

that the Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and similar

actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta) texts. The result of

all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows:

connected (with the Vedanta-texts) as their purport.

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the prima facie view

as urged above). That all-knowing, all-powerful Brahman, which is the

cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known

from the Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the

Vedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their

purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for

instance, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second'

(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only' (Ait.

Ar. II, 4, 1, 1); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect,

without anything inside or outside; this Self is Brahman perceiving

everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19); 'That immortal Brahman is before'

(Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in

these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their

purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to

have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning

the direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can

we conclude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the

nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious

duty); for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all

actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13,

'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there

is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor

again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing,

be the object of perception and the other means of knowledge; for the

fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without

the aid of the scriptural passage 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7).

Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not

connected with something either to be striven after or shunned; for from

the mere comprehension of Brahman's Self, which is not something either

to be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain,

and thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying

certain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of

devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be

admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous

relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the knowledge of

absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be

desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to

which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the

conception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute

unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman

being looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of

devotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far

as they are connected with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn

on that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge

of the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can

the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so

that it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all

which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right

knowledge of Brahman.

Here others raise the following objection:--Although the Veda is the

means of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it intimates Brahman

only as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which

the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other

objects not known from the practice of common life is merely

supplementary to certain injunctions[69]. Why so? Because the Veda has

the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For

men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following

declaration, 'The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of

actions' (Bhashya on Jaimini Sutra I, 1, 1); 'Injunction means passages

impelling to action' (Bh. on Jaim. Su. I, 1, 2); 'Of this (viz. active

religious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction' (part of Jaim. Su.

I, 1, 5); 'The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with

(the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose purport is action'

(Jaim. Su. I, 1, 25); 'As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever

does not refer to action is purportless' (Jaim. Su. I, 2, 1). Therefore

the Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man

with regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others;

other passages (i.e. all those passages which are not directly

injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions

and prohibitions. Hence the Vedanta-texts also as likewise belonging to

the Veda can have a meaning in the same way only. And if their aim is

injunction, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are

enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the

knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of

immortality.--But--somebody might object--it has been declared that

there is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the

object of enquiry in the karma-ka/nd/a (that part of the Veda which

treats of active religious duty) being something to be accomplished,

viz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely

accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the

knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the

knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of actions[70].--We

reply that it must not be such because the Vedanta-texts give

information about Brahman only in so far as it is connected with

injunctions of actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind,

'Verily the Self is to be seen' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which

is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which

we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man worship him

as Self' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Let a man worship the Self only as his

true state' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 15); 'He who knows Brahman becomes

Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire

to know what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the

Vedanta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they perform that task

by teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely

self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent and free, pure knowledge,

absolute bliss. From the devout meditation on this Brahman there results

as its fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned in the

ordinary way, is discerned by means of the /s/astra. If, on the other

hand, the Vedanta-texts were considered to have no reference to

injunctions of actions, but to contain statements about mere

(accomplished) things, just as if one were saying 'the earth comprises

seven dvipas,' 'that king is marching on,' they would be purportless,

because then they could not possibly be connected with something to be

shunned or endeavoured after.--Perhaps it will here be objected that

sometimes a mere statement about existent things has a purpose, as, for

instance, the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the

purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and

that so likewise the Vedanta-passages making statements about the

non-transmigrating Self, have a purport of their own (without reference

to any action), viz. in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of

the Self being liable to transmigration.--We reply that this might be so

if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the

fear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true

nature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being

subject to transmigration. But this is not the case; for we observe that

even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to

be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities attaching to the

transmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from the passage, /Bri/. Up.

II, 4, 5, 'The Self is to be heard, to be considered, to be reflected

upon,' that consideration and reflection have to follow the mere

hearing. From all this it results that the sastra can be admitted as a

means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with

To all this, we, the Vedantins, make the following reply:--The preceding

reasoning is not valid, on account of the different nature of the fruits

of actions on the one side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other

side. The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind,

which are known from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti, and are comprised under the

name 'religious duty' (dharma), is carried on in the Jaimini Sutra,

which begins with the words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty;' the

opposite of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c., which is

defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to

the end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and

its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic

statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which

make themselves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the

contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all animate

beings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with

observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure

of all embodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From those

differences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of

the merit acquired by actions in accordance with religious duty;

therefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those

qualified to perform acts of religious duty. Those latter differences

are moreover known to be affected by the desire of certain results

(which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain religious acts),

worldly possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture

that those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the

pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of

the sun; Ch. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings, works of public

utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the

southern path. And that there also (viz. in the moon which is finally

reached by those who have passed along the southern path) there are

degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from the

passage 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed.' Analogously

it is understood that the different degrees of pleasure which are

enjoyed by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the inmates of

hell and to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as

defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different

degrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, there is

inferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious demerit as

defined in the prohibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This

difference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its

antecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of

degree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as

ignorance and the like, is well known--from /S/ruti, Sm/ri/ti, and

reasoning--to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature

(sa/m/sara). The following text, for instance, 'As long as he is in the

body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1),

refers to the sa/m/sara-state as described above. From the following

passage, on the other hand, 'When he is free from the body then neither

pleasure nor pain touches him,' which denies the touch of pain or

pleasure, we learn that the unembodied state called 'final release'

(moksha) is declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined

by Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not be

denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said that

the very circumstance of its being an unembodied state is the effect of

merit, we reply that that cannot be, since Scripture declares that state

to be naturally and originally an unembodied one. 'The wise who knows

the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing

things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve' (Ka. Up. II, 22);

'He is without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That

person is not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 15)[71]. All

which passages establish the fact that so-called release differs from

all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially

disembodied state. Among eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal,

although changing' (pari/n/aminitya), viz. those, the idea of whose

identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo changes; such, for

instance, are earth and the other elements in the opinion of those who

maintain the eternity of the world, or the three gu/n/as in the opinion

of the Sa@nkhyas. But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e.

eternal without undergoing any changes (ku/ta/sthanitya), omnipresent as

ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not

composed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in

fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold

time do not apply, is called release; a definition agreeing with

scriptural passages, such as the following: 'Different from merit and

demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and

future' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It[72] (i.e. moksha) is, therefore, the same

as Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged. If

Brahman were represented as supplementary to certain actions, and

release were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it would be

non-eternal, and would have to be considered merely as something holding

a pre-eminent position among the described non-eternal fruits of actions

with their various degrees. But that release is something eternal is

acknowledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching concerning

Brahman can therefore not be merely supplementary to actions.

There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which declare

release to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and which

thus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening between the two;

for instance, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2,

9); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher and

the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman fears

nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached

fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4); 'That Brahman knew its Self only,

saying, I am Brahman. From it all this sprang' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10);

'What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity?'

(Is. Up. 7.) We must likewise quote the passage,--B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10,

('Seeing this the /Ri/shi Vamadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the

sun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between

one's seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal Self; for that

passage is analogous to the following one, 'standing he sings,' from

which we understand that no action due to the same agent intervenes

between the standing and the singing. Other scriptural passages show

that the removal of the obstacles which lie in the way of release is the

only fruit of the knowledge of Brahman; so, for instance, 'You indeed

are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore'

(Pr. Up. VI, 8); 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the

Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of

mine' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'To him after his faults had been rubbed out,

the venerable Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness' (Ch. Up.

VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sutra, supported by

arguments, of (Gautama) Akarya, 'Final release results from the

successive removal of wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain,

the removal of each later member of the series depending on the removal

of the preceding member' (Nyay. Su. I, i, 2); and wrong knowledge itself

is removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with the Self of

Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman a mere

(fanciful) combination[73], as is made use of, for instance, in the

following passage, 'For the mind is endless, and the Vi/s/vedevas are

endless, and he thereby gains the endless world' (B/ri/. Up. III, 1,

9)[74]; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription

(superimposition)[75], as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as

Brahman,' and 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Ch. Up. III,

18, 1; 19, 1), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the

mind, Aditya and so on; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of

identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical)

with some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the

absorber; breath is indeed the absorber[76]' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1; 3); nor

is it a mere (ceremonial) purification of (the Self constituting a

subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c.,

Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the

sacrificial butter[77]. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self

and Brahman were understood in the way of combination and the like,

violence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose

object, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of

Brahman and the Self being really identical; so, for instance, in the

following passages, 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman'

(B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19).

And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman

is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby; so, for

instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved'

(Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it be possible, in that case,

satisfactorily to explain the passages which speak of the individual

Self becoming Brahman: such as 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman'

(Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the

Self cannot be of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The

knowledge of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of

man, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the

objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on the

object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is

impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions.

Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by representing it as the

object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly

declared in two passages, viz. 'It is different from the known and again

above (i.e. different from) the unknown' (Ken. Up. I, 3); and 'How

should he know him by whom he knows all this?' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13.)

In the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of

the act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, Ken.

Up. I, 5, whose first half declares it not to be an object (of speech,

mind, and so on), 'That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which

speech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which

people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if

Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the sastra can

impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that

the aim of the sastra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously

created by Nescience. The sastra's purport is not to represent Brahman

definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that

Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagatman, the inward Self) is never

an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known,

knowers, acts of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by

Nescience. Accordingly the sastra says, 'By whom it is not thought by

him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; unknown by

those who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (Ken. Up.

II, 3); and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not

hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception,

nor know the knower of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2). As thereby

(i.e. by the knowledge derived from the sastra) the imagination of the

transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and

Release is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self, it

cannot be charged with the imperfection of non-eternality. Those, on the

other hand, who consider Release to be something to be effected properly

maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech, or body. So,

likewise, those who consider it to be a mere modification.

Non-eternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two

opinions; for we observe in common life that things which are

modifications, such as sour milk and the like, and things which are

effects, such as jars, &c., are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said

that there is a dependance on action in consequence of (Brahman or

Release) being something which is to be obtained[78]; for as Brahman

constitutes a person's Self it is not something to be attained by that

person. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's

Self still it would not be something to be obtained; for as it is

omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every

one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be

maintained that Release is something to be ceremonially purified, and as

such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sa/m/skara)

results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal

of some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it

is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added; nor,

again, does the latter alternative apply, since Release is of the nature

of Brahman, which is eternally pure.--But, it might be said, Release

might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes

manifest on the Self being purified by some action; just as the quality

of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by

means of the action of rubbing.--This objection is invalid, we reply,

because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot

exist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were

modified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and

texts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called,' would thus be

stultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to

assume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the

Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it

stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to

point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (dehin, the

individual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in

the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial

thread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self

merely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is

under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of perception that

bathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the

body, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions

only that something is purified which is joined to the body. If a person

thinks 'I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity

only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the

harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from

appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the 'I'

constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied

Self). Analogously that I which predicates of itself, that it is

purified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to

the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity

(aha/m/kart/ri/), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in

all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results.

Thus the mantras also declare, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the

other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); and 'When he is in

union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him

the Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. III, 1, 4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two

following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any

accretion and eternally pure, 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings,

all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works,

dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one; free

from qualities' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright,

incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil'

(I/s/. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore

Release is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show

any other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is

impossible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to

any action, excepting knowledge.

But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind.

By no means, we reply; since the two are of different nature. An action

is that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing

things and dependent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for

instance, the following passages, 'To whichever divinity the offering is

made on that one let him meditate when about to say vasha/t/' (Ait.

Brahm. III, 8, 1); and 'Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.'

Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the

(meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be

performed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of

the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their

objects existing things; knowledge can therefore not be either made or

not made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not

either on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it

thus widely differs from meditation and the like.

The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded

on Ch. Up. V, 7, 1; 8, 1, 'The fire is man, O Gautama; the fire is

woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic

statement, merely an action and dependent on man; that conception of

fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is

neither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real

thing which is an object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and

not an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the

objects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that

knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not

dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar

forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic

texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which

cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is

applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can

neither be endeavoured after nor avoided.--But what then, it will be

asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the

appearance of injunctions; such as, 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard

about?'--They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the

objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external

things, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to

eschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the

highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it; such texts as the

one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the

stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him

who is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self

is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn

from texts such as the following: 'This everything, all is that Self'

(B/ri/, Up. II, 4, 6); 'But when the Self only is all this, how should

he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the

knower?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II,

5, 19). That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a

thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit

or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit; for just

that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all

our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus /S/ruti says,

'If a man understands the Self, saying, "I am he," what could he wish or

desire that he should pine after the body?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 12.) And

similarly Sm/ri/ti declares, 'Having understood this the understanding

man has done with all work, O Bharata' (Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore

Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions.

We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there

is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about

mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition,

or supplementary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul

(purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a

complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended

from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman,

different in nature from the four classes of substances[79], which forms

a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that

soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; for

the passage, 'That Self is to be described by No, no!' (B/ri/. Up. III,

9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied.

The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul

is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of

self-consciousness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the

Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i.e. of the object of

self-consciousness, viz. the jivatman). For neither from that part of

the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that

soul which, different from the agent that is the object of

self-consciousness, merely witnesses it; which is permanent in all

(transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of

everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be represented as the

mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny

it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be

striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because

they are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul. But the

soul is imperishable[80], as there is no cause why it should perish; and

eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any

modification; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And

from passages, such as 'Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the

goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in

the Upanishads, I ask thee' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26), it appears that the

attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as

it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no

portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold

With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with

the purport of the /S/astra (who alone were stated to have declared that

the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to

do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the /S/astra which

consists of injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other

passage quoted ('as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not

refer to action is purportless') we remark that if that passage were

taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those

words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all

information about existent things is meaningless[81]. If, on the other

hand, the Veda--in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation

of activity--does give information about existent things as being

subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not

give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self?

For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become

an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).--But, it will

be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are

instrumental to action, the information given about such things is

merely subservient to action.--This, we reply, does not matter; for

although the information may be subservient to action, the things

themselves about which information is given are already intimated

thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain

actions. Their final end (prayojana) indeed may be subserviency to some

action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given

about them, intimated in themselves.--Well, and if they are thus

intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose[82]? We reply that

the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not

comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the

information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of

the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of

transmigration, and thus a purpose is established which renders the

passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give

information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are

found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such

passages as 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' which teach abstinence

from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor

instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages

which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it

would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach

abstinence from action, are devoid of purport--a consequence which is of

course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word

'not' stands with the action expressed by the verb 'is to be

killed'--which action is naturally established[83]--be used as a reason

for assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established elsewhere[84],

different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence

from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not'

is to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is

connected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be

done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected

that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of

passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself

passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse

prompting to the murder of a Brahma/n/a, &c., just as a fire is

extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel). Hence we

are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a

Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting

in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special

cases, such as the so-called Prajapati-vow, &c.[85] Hence the charge of

want of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the

Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as

are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose

The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing

not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless

(as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvipas)

has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist

in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a

rope.'--But how about the objection raised above that the information

about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the

statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard

about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory world?--We

reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once

understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world

in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to

the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who

imagines the body, and so on, to constitute the Self, is subject to fear

and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after

having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and

thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same

manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In

the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of

his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we

do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has

once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And,

again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings

derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has

lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure

derived from them vanishes. Thus /S/ruti also declares, 'When he is free

from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up.

VIII, 12, 1). If it should be objected that the condition of being free

from the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man

being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to

establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong

knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account

of its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The

objection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit

effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that

as the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself

not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the

action of the Self is likewise not established; for (if we should try to

get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as

caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of

making embodiedness dependent on merit and demerit, and again merit and

demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive

chain (of embodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than

a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the

Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate

relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be

considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people

are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere

presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance; for kings may

become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by

giving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to imagine anything,

analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the

Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination,

on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be

joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two

(which is not based on any assumption). This explains also in how far

the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar

acts[86]. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the

body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be

understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate

by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of

words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of

things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a

certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the

exclusive primary object of the idea and word 'lion,' and we are

likewise acquainted with persons possessing in an eminent degree certain

leonine qualities, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well

settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name 'lion' are

applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those

cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well

established, the transfer of the conception and name of the one to the

other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for

instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern

that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception

and designation of a man; such is likewise the case of the conception

and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl

somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the

application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c.,

which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the

Not-Self, is figurative (rather than simply false)? considering that

even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self

confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do.

As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on

the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the

body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness

of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that

the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even

while still alive. The same is declared in the /S/ruti passages

concerning him who knows Brahman: 'And as the slough of a snake lies on

an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that

disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (B/ri/. Up.

IV, 4, 7); and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears

without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a

mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it

were.' Sm/ri/ti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are

enumerated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that

he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore

the man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not

belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other

hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not

comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved

contradictions.

With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not fully

determined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary relation to

injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by

consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and

reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of

Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a

subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely

supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and

reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It

follows that the /S/astra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in

so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on

account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta-texts, an independent

Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is

room for beginning the new /S/astra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then

therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the

Vedanta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new /S/astra would

either not be begun at all, since the /S/astra concerned with

injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of

the Purva Mima/m/sa, 'Then therefore the enquiry into duty;' or if it

were begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then therefore the

enquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new portion of the Purva

Mima/m/sa Sutras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the

enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what

subserves the purpose of man' (Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 1, 1). But as the

comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been

propounded (in the previous /S/astra), it is quite appropriate that a

new /S/astra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence

all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition

expressed in the words, 'I am Brahman;' for as soon as there supervenes

the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to

be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing

agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In

accordance with this, they (i.e. men knowing Brahman) have made the

following declaration:--'When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the

knowledge, "I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to

the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the

(imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an

end[87]; how should then the effect[88] (of that wrong imagination)

exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture

tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing

subject; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz.

(the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of

the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all

the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid

only until the one Self is ascertained.'

(Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is finished[89].)

So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages, whose purport is

the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object

therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions.

And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent

cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now

the Sa@nkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is

to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer

different causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and thereupon

interpret the Vedanta-passages as referring to the latter. All the

Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the

world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be

concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be

inferred is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha). The

followers of Ka/n/ada again infer from the very same passages that the

Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its

material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on

passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments

raise various objections. For this reason the teacher

(Vyasa)--thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means

of proof--proceeds to state as prima facie views, and afterwards to

refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious

arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the

Vedanta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

The Sa@nkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pradhana consisting of

three constituent elements (gu/n/a) is the cause of the world argue as

follows. The Vedanta-passages which you have declared to intimate that

the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be

consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhana being the

general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all

powers) can be ascribed to the pradhana in so far as it has all its

effects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it,

viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in

reality an attribute of the gu/n/a of Goodness[90], according to the

Sm/ri/ti passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gita XIV, 17).

By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men

endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhana) are known as

all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with

the very highest degree of 'Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which

is isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure

(undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either

all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhana, on the other hand,

because consisting of the three gu/n/as, comprises also in its pradhana

state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The

Vedanta-passages therefore in a derived (figurative) sense ascribe

all-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself

non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedantin) also who assume an

all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as

that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be

actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there

would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would

involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the

activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's

cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of

the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is

possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you

assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is

without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c.

which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in

any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as consisting

of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may

therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances;

while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyasa) replies in the following Sutra.

Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhana) is not (to be

identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not

founded on Scripture.

It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the

non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas; because it is

not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e.

thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch.

Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the

beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw),

may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that

this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by

the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of

that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or

'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having

thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this

was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He

thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait.

Ar. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its

antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the

person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra/n/a.' By

'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant

that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense;

just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering.

Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an

all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as,

for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows

all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that

Brahman, name and form and food.'

The argumentation of the Sa@nkhyas that the pradhana may be called

all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the

gu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the

three gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality

of Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation

that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for

all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we

term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge

residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with

reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and

Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a

witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and

the non-intelligent pradhana is destitute of such a principle. It is

therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhana all-knowingness. The

case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under

consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an

excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].--Well then

(say those Sa@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us

assume that the pradhana possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the

witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is

imparted to an iron ball by fire.--No, we reply; for if this were so, it

would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the

pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary

Brahman itself is the cause of the world.

The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense

cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent,

Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we

refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sa@nkhya, is Brahman's

all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To

maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light

on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge

were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he

would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not

all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's

knowledge to be permanent.--But, it may be objected, on this latter

alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with

reference to the act of knowing.--Why not? we reply; the sun also,

although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as

independent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93].'--But, it will

again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he

stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman,

on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no

relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not

parallel.--This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter

of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even

without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman

also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,'

&c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an

object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb

while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman

will fit all the better.--What then is that object to which the

knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the

world?--Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being

identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to

be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-/s/astra assume, the

Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through

the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the

eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the

creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that

Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think

because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for

Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition--as the sun's nature is

eternal luminousness--can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of

knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa/m/sarin) indeed, which is under

the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge

may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments

of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does

not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions.

'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like

unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent,

acting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping without hands, hasting without

feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be

known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person'

(/S/v. Up. VI, 8; III, 19).

But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul

different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for

/S/ruti expressly declares that 'there is no other seer but he; there is

no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23). How then can it be said

that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on

a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?--True, we

reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the

Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts,

consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether

to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars,

pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of

the latter kind such conceptions and terms as 'the hollow (space) of a

jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not

really different from universal space, and just as in consequence

thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are

different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails

likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are

different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal)

connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the

body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence,

imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like which are

Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong

conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception.

And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the

transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements,

can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while

the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the

pradhana not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to

establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the

pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the

second Adhyaya (II, 1, 4, &c.).

Here the Sa@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty

stated by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhana cannot be

the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the

sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground

that non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as

intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a

river-bank about to fall, 'the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),'

and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed

intelligence. So the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when

about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in

ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined,

and formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village,

necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhana also acts by

the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the

so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may

therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.--But what reason

have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word 'thought' and

for taking it in a figurative sense?--The observation, the Sa@nkhya

replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as

intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, 'That fire

thought; that water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). We therefrom

conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there also

where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter

where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense[94].

To this argumentation of the Sadkhya the next Sutra replies:

deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of

Your assertion that the term 'Being' denotes the non-intelligent

pradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only,

as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On account of the term

'Self.' For the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2, which begins 'Being only, my

dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of

fire, water, and earth ('it thought,' &c.; 'it sent forth fire,' &c.),

goes on--denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter

treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the

term--'divinities'--as follows, 'That divinity thought: Let me now enter

those three divinities with this living Self (jiva. atman) and evolve

names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent

pradhana is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to

assume that the same pradhana--as once constituting the subject-matter

of the chapter--is referred to by the term 'that divinity.' But in that

case the divinity would not speak of the jiva as 'Self.' For by the term

'Jiva' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the

etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the

body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self

of the non-intelligent pradhana? By 'Self' we understand (a being's) own

nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Jiva cannot constitute the

nature of the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we refer

the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to which thought in its

primary sense belongs, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the

Jiva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, 'That

which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is

the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O /S/vetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,

7, &c.). Here the clause 'It is the Self' designates the Being of which

the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word 'Self,' and

the concluding clause, 'that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' declares the

intelligent /S/vetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water,

on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the

mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of

names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for

ascribing to them thought in its primary sense--while the employment of

the word 'Self' furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat--the

thought attributed to them must be explained in a figurative sense, like

the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of

fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled

over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on

account of the word 'Self,' not to be understood in a figurative

Here the Sa@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The word 'Self,'

he says, may be applied to the pradhana, although unintelligent, because

it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects

all purposes of another;' as, for instance, a king applies the word

'Self' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions,

'Bhadrasena is my (other) Self.' For the pradhana, which effects the

enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the

same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war.

Or else, it may be said, the one word 'Self' may refer to

non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that

such expressions as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the

senses,' are made use of, and as the one word 'light' (jyotis) denotes a

certain sacrifice (the jyotish/t/oma) as well as a flame. How then does

it follow from the word 'Self' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause

of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense?

To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies:

release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).

The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the term 'Self'

because in the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2 ff., where the subtle Sat which is

under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, 'That is the

Self,' and where the subsequent clause, 'That art thou, O /S/vetaketu,'

declares the intelligent /S/vetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a

passage subsequent to the two quoted (viz. 'a man who has a teacher

obtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not

delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the

non-intelligent pradhana were denoted by the term 'Sat' and did

comprehend--by means of the phrase 'That art thou'--persons desirous of

final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be

'Thou art non-intelligent;' so that Scripture would virtually make

contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus

cease to be a means of right knowledge. But to assume that the faultless

/s/astra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason.

And if the /s/astra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should

point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a

non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he would--comparable to the blind

man who had caught hold of the ox's tail[96]--cling to the view of that

being the Self, and thus never be able to reach the real Self different

from the false Self pointed out to him; hence he would be debarred from

what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore

conclude that, just as the /s/astra teaches the agnihotra and similar

performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of

the heavenly world, so the passage 'that is the Self, that art thou, O

/S/vetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that

condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means

of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man

grasping the heated axe (Ch. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the

doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only,

the cognition founded on the passage 'that art thou' would be of the

nature of a fanciful combination only[97], like the knowledge derived

from the passage, 'I am the hymn' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead

to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey

the doctrine of release. Therefore the word 'Self' is applied to the

subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful

servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self' can--in such phrases as

'Bhadrasena is my Self'--be taken in a figurative sense, because the

difference between master and servant is well established by perception.

Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in

figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of

those things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means

of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that

nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that

the word 'Self' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well

as what is intelligent, just as the word 'jyotis' signifies a certain

sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to

attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume

that) the word 'Self' in its primary meaning refers to what is

intelligent only and is then, by a figurative attribution of

intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such

phrases as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses.' And

even if we assume that the word 'Self' primarily signifies both classes

of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two

meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading

under which it stands, or some determinative attributive word. But in

the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word

refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat

distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and /S/vetaketu,

i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity.

That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with /S/vetaketu, who

possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances

determine the object of the word 'Self' here to be something

intelligent. The word 'jyotis' does moreover not furnish an appropriate

example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of

'light' only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of

the arthavada assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.

A different explanation of the Sutra is also possible. The preceding

Sutra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word 'Self'

having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sutra is to be

explained as containing an independent reason, proving that the doctrine

of the pradhana being the general cause is untenable.

Hence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by the word 'Self.'

This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.

is no statement of its having to be set aside.

If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term 'Being'

(Sat), and if the passage 'That is the Self, that art thou, O

/S/vetaketu,' referred to the pradhana; the teacher whose wish it is to

impart instruction about the true Brahman would subsequently declare

that the pradhana is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be

considered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction

about the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it

as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a

friend the (small) star Arundhati at first directs his attention to a

big neighbouring star, saying 'that is Arundhati,' although it is really

not so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out

the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his

pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end

definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But

no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapa/th/aka arrives at a

conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is

The word 'and' (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that the contradiction

of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected

interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a

contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhana is

to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapa/th/aka it is

intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes

known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked

for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we

perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be

known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all

that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being

a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it

is clay merely,' &c. Now if the term 'Sat' denoted the pradhana, which

is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its

knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never

lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the

latter is not an effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not

denoted by the term 'Sat.'--For this the Sutrakara gives a further

cannot be the pradhana).

With reference to the cause denoted by the word 'Sat,' Scripture says,

'When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat,

he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, "he sleeps"

(svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apita).' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,

1.) This passage explains the well-known verb 'to sleep,' with reference

to the soul. The word, 'his own,' denotes the Self which had before been

denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e.

into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i,

which means 'to be resolved into.' The individual soul (jiva) is called

awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by

means of the modifications of the mind--which thus constitute limiting

adjuncts of the soul--it apprehends those external objects, and

identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external

objects[98]. When, modified by the impressions which the external

objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind[99].'

When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and

the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modifications due

to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self

as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A

similar etymology of the word 'h/ri/daya' is given by /s/ruti, 'That

Self abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he

is in the heart (h/ri/di ayam).' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words

a/s/anaya and udanya are similarly etymologised: 'water is carrying away

what has been eaten by him;' 'fire carries away what has been drunk by

him' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the

resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 'Sat,' by

means of the etymology of the word 'sleep.' But the intelligent Self can

clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhana. If, again,

it were said that the pradhana is denoted by the word 'own,' because

belonging to the Self (as being the Self's own), there would remain the

same absurd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a

non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. 'embraced

by the intelligent--praj/n/a--Self he knows nothing that is without,

nothing that is within,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in

the condition of dreamless sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity.

Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an

intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word 'Sat,' and not the

pradhana.--A further reason for the pradhana not being the cause is

is to be considered the cause).

If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedanta-texts

also, there were set forth different views concerning the nature of the

cause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being

the cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhana doctrine,

and others again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps

be possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the

cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in

with the pradhana theory. But the stated condition is absent since all

the Vedanta-texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the

intelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, 'As from a burning fire

sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pra/n/as

proceed each towards its place; from the pra/n/as the gods, from the

gods the worlds' (Kau. Up. III, 3). And 'from that Self sprang ether'

(Taitt. Up. II, 1). And 'all this springs from the Self' (Ch. Up. VII,

26, 1). And 'this pra/n/a is born from the Self' (Pr. Up. III, 3); all

which passages declare the Self to be the cause. That the word 'Self'

denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.

And that all the Vedanta-texts advocate the same view as to an

intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be

considered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims

of the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a

uniform character regarding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman

is therefore to be considered the cause of the world, 'on account of the

uniformity of view (of the Vedanta-texts).'--A further reason for this

conclusion is advanced.

all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).

That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in

a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the

following passage of the mantropanishad of the /S/veta/s/vataras (VI, 9)

where the word 'he' refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord,

'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of

him neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore finally settled that the

all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent

pradhana or anything else.

In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate

arguments, that the Vedanta-texts exhibited under Sutras I, 1-11, are

capable of proving that the all-knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause

of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have

explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view (I, 10),

that all Vedanta-texts whatever maintain an intelligent cause. The

question might therefore be asked, 'What reason is there for the

subsequent part of the Vedanta-sutras?' (as the chief point is settled

To this question we reply as follows: Brahman is apprehended under two

forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to

the multiformity of the evolutions of name and form (i.e. the

multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the

opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatever.

Compare the following passages: B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15, 'For where there

is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only

is all this, how should he see another?' Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1, 'Where one

sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is

the greatest. Where one sees something else, hears something else,

understands something else, that is the little. The greatest is

immortal; the little is mortal;' Taitt. Up. III, 12, 7, 'The wise one,

who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the

things by their names[100]);' /S/v. Up. VI, 19, 'Who is without parts,

without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest

bridge of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' B/ri/.

Up. II, 3, 6, 'Not so, not so;' B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is neither

coarse nor fine, neither short nor long;' and 'defective is one place,

perfect the other.' All these passages, with many others, declare

Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either

of Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is the object of Nescience,

there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion,

and the like[101]. The different modes of devotion lead to different

results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to

success in works; those modes are distinct on account of the distinction

of the different qualities and limiting conditions[102]. And although

the one highest Self only, i.e. the Lord distinguished by those

different qualities constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits

(of devotion) are distinct, according as the devotion refers to

different qualities. Thus Scripture says, 'According as man worships

him, that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his thought is in this

world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14,

1). Sm/ri/ti also makes an analogous statement, 'Remembering whatever

form of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters,

being impressed with it through his constant meditation' (Bha. Gita

Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well

as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds

which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares

that the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals

itself[103] in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of

various dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Ar. II, 3, 2, 1),

'He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him[104],' &c.

Similarly Sm/ri/ti remarks, 'Whatever being there is of power, splendour

or might, know it to have sprung from portions of my glory' (Bha. Gita,

X, 41); a passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power

and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly here (i.e. in

the Sutras) also the teacher will show that the golden person in the

disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on account of an indicating sign,

viz. the circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (Ved. Su.

I, 1, 20); the same is to be observed with regard to I, 1, 22 and other

Sutras. And, again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the

meaning of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached

concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instantaneous

release; for although that knowledge is conveyed by means of various

limiting conditions, yet no special connexion with limiting conditions

is intended to be intimated, in consequence of which there arises a

doubt whether it (the knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for

its object; so, for instance, in the case of Sutra I, 1, 12[105]. From

all this it appears that the following part of the /S/astra has a

special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedanta-texts teach, on

the one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming

an object of devotion, and on the other hand, as being free from the

connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge.

The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different from

Brahman, which in I, 1, 10 was based on the uniformity of the meaning of

the Vedanta-texts, will be further detailed by the Sutrakara, who, while

explaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude all

causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.

the repetition (of the word 'bliss,' as denoting the highest Self).

The Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enumerated the Self

consisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self

consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says,

'Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner

Self which consists of bliss.' Here the doubt arises whether the phrase,

'that which consists of bliss,' denotes the highest Brahman of which it

had been said previously, that 'It is true Being, Knowledge, without

end,' or something different from Brahman, just as the Self consisting

of food, &c., is different from it.--The purvapakshin maintains that the

Self consisting of bliss is a secondary (not the principal) Self, and

something different from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of

Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the

principal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of

bliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be

the innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because

the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and

because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary

Self, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text expressly says

'Joy is its head;' and about its being embodied we read, 'Of that former

one this one is the embodied Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that

former Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self.

And of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be

prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the

transmigrating Soul.

To this reasoning we make the following reply:--By the Self consisting

of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, 'on account of

repetition.' For the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest

Self. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause 'That is

flavour'--which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and

declares it to be of the nature of flavour--we read, 'For only after

having perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could

breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether

(of the heart)? For he alone causes blessedness;' and again, II, 8, 'Now

this is an examination of Bliss;' 'He reaches that Self consisting of

Bliss;' and again, II, 9, 'He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears

nothing;' and in addition, 'He understood that Bliss is Brahman' (III,

6). And in another scriptural passage also (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28),

'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman,' we see the word 'bliss' applied just

to Brahman. As, therefore, the word 'bliss' is repeatedly used with

reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is

Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only

denote the secondary Self (the Sa/m/sarin), because it forms a link in a

series of secondary Selfs, beginning with the one consisting of food, is

of no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the

innermost of all. The /S/astra, wishing to convey information about the

primary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first

refers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is

by very obtuse people identified with it; it then proceeds from the body

to another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just

as the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten

brass had been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first

representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier

comprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self[106],

which consists of bliss, is the real Self. Just as when a man, desirous

of pointing out the star Arundhati to another man, at first points to

several stars which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati, while only the

star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhati; so here also the Self

consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of its being the

innermost (i.e. the last). Nor can any weight be allowed to the

objection that the attribution of joy and so on, as head, &c., cannot

possibly refer to the real Self; for this attribution is due to the

immediately preceding limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of

understanding, the so-called vij/n/anakosa), and does not really belong

to the real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to

the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain

of bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and is not

ascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is predicated of the

transmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of bliss is the highest

can) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word

denoting a modification (or product); (we declare the objection to be)

not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed

by the affix maya.)

Here the purvapakshin raises the objection that the word anandamaya

(consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest Self.--Why?--Because the

word anandamaya is understood to denote something different from the

original word (i.e. the word ananda without the derivative affix maya),

viz. a modification; according to the received sense of the affix maya.

'Anandamaya' therefore denotes a modification, just as annamaya

(consisting of food) and similar words do.

This objection is, however, not valid, because 'maya' is also used in

the sense of abundance, i.e. denotes that where there is abundance of

what the original word expresses. So, for instance, the phrase 'the

sacrifice is annamaya' means 'the sacrifice is abounding in food' (not

'is some modification or product of food'). Thus here Brahman also, as

abounding in bliss, is called anandamaya. That Brahman does abound in

bliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 8), where, after the

bliss of each of the different classes of beings, beginning with man,

has been declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the

immediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed

to be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance.

therefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.)

Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason also that

Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, 'For he alone

causes bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For he who causes bliss must himself

abound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who

enriches others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, therefore,

maya may be taken to mean 'abundant,' the Self consisting of bliss is

the highest Self.

which had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i.e. proclaimed in

the Brahma/n/a passage as the anandamaya.)

The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the following

reason also[107]. On the introductory words 'he who knows Brahman

attains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), there follows a mantra

proclaiming that Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter,

possesses the qualities of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after

that it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and

then all other moving and non-moving things, and that, entering into the

beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all;

thereupon, for its better comprehension, the series of the different

Selfs ('different from this is the inner Self,' &c.) are enumerated, and

then finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed, is again

proclaimed in the passage under discussion, 'different from this is the

other inner Self, which consists of bliss.' To assume that a mantra and

the Brahma/n/a passage belonging to it have the same sense is only

proper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which results

therefrom); for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome inference

that the text drops the topic once started, and turns to an altogether

Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the Self

consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self consisting of food,

&c.[108] On the same (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded,

'This same knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a; he understood that bliss

is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss

is the highest Self.

(i.e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the

latter assumption).

And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the

highest Self only, not the other, i.e. the one which is other than the

Lord, i.e. the transmigrating individual soul. The personal soul cannot

be denoted by the term 'the one consisting of bliss.' Why? On account of

the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self

consisting of bliss, 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He

brooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever

there is.' Here, the desire arising before the origination of a body,

&c., the non-separation of the effects created from the creator, and the

creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self

different from the highest Self.

anandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul).

The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating

soul, for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of

bliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly

represented as different; Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'It (i.e. the Self

consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour

can this (soul) perceive bliss.' For he who perceives cannot be that

which is perceived.--But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or

attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the

following /S/ruti- and Smr/ri/ti-passages, 'The Self is to be sought;'

'Nothing higher is known than the attainment of the Self[109]?'--This

objection, we reply, is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute

truth). Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is

never anything but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the

truth, identified with the Non-Self, i.e. the body and so on; whereby it

becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far as it is identified with

the body, and so on, as something not searched for but to be searched

for, not heard but to be heard, not seized but to be seized, not

perceived but to be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like.

Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as 'there is no

other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), that there is in reality any

seer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it

be said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal

individual soul; for)[110] the Lord differs from the soul

(vij/n/anatman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product

of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the

ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a

shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; or as the

free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is

determined by its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With reference to

this fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual Self,

the two last Sutras have been propounded.

anandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i.e. to the

pradhana inferred by the Sa@nkhyas.)

Since in the passage 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,'

which occurs in the chapter treating of the anandamaya (Taitt. Up. II,

6), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred,

i.e. the non-intelligent pradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhyas, cannot be

regarded as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the

world. Although the opinion that the pradhana is the cause of the world,

has already been refuted in the Sutra I, 1, 5, it is here, where a

favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the

basis of the scriptural passage about the cause of the world feeling

desire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all

scriptural passages).

the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on

that (being fully known).

And for the following reason also the term, 'the Self consisting of

bliss,' cannot denote either the pradhana or the individual soul.

Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge

is joined, i.e. identified, with the Self of bliss under discussion,

i.e. obtains final release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up.

II, 7), 'When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which is

invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the

fearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is

fear for him.' That means, if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss

even a small difference in the form of non-identity, then he finds no

release from the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means

of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self

consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory

existence. But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we

understand by the Self consisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not

either the pradhana or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the

Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made concerning the

true meaning of the word 'anandamaya[111].' On what grounds, we ask, can

it be maintained that the affix 'maya' after having, in the series of

compounds beginning with annamaya and ending with vij/n/anamaya, denoted

mere modifications, should all at once, in the word anandamaya, which

belongs to the same series, denote abundance, so that anandamaya would

refer to Brahman? If it should be said that the assumption is made on

account of the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the

mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt. Up. II), we

reply that therefrom it would follow that also the Selfs consisting of

food, breath, &c., denote Brahman (because the governing influence of

the mantra extends to them also).--The advocate of the former

interpretation will here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use

of above, viz. as follows: To assume that the Selfs consisting of food,

and so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because after each of them

an inner Self is mentioned. After the Self of bliss, on the other hand,

no further inner Self is mentioned, and hence it must be considered to

be Brahman itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping

the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed out by the

mantra), and taking up a new topic.--But to this we reply that, although

unlike the case of the Selfs consisting of food, &c., no inner Self is

mentioned after the Self consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be

considered as Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of

bliss Scripture declares, 'Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its right

arm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its trunk. Brahman is

its tail, its support.' Now, here the very same Brahman which, in the

mantra, had been introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called

the tail, the support; while the five involucra, extending from the

involucrum of food up to the involucrum of bliss, are merely introduced

for the purpose of setting forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then,

can it be maintained that our interpretation implies the needless

dropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction of a new

topic?--But, it may again be objected, Brahman is called the tail, i.e.

a member of the Self consisting of bliss; analogously to those passages

in which a tail and other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting

of food and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know that

Brahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i.e. a subordinate matter)

is in reality the chief matter referred to?--From the fact, we reply, of

Brahman being the general subject-matter of the chapter.--But, it will

again be said, that interpretation also according to which Brahman is

cognised as a mere member of the anandamaya does not involve a dropping

of the subject-matter, since the anandamaya himself is Brahman.--But, we

reply, in that case one and the same Brahman would at first appear as

the whole, viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere

part, viz. as the tail; which is absurd. And as one of the two

alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appropriate to refer to

Brahman the clause 'Brahman is the tail' which contains the word

'Brahman,' and not the sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman

is not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation of the phrase,

'Brahman is the tail, the support,' goes on, 'On this there is also the

following /s/loka: He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes

himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we know

himself as existing.' As this /s/loka, without any reference to the Self

of bliss, states the advantage and disadvantage connected with the

knowledge of the being and non-being of Brahman only, we conclude that

the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' represents Brahman as

the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter). About the being

or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the other hand, a doubt is not

well possible, since the Self of bliss distinguished by joy,

satisfaction, &c., is well known to every one.--But if Brahman is the

principal matter, how can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self

of bliss ('Brahman is the tail, the support')?--Its being called so, we

reply, forms no objection; for the word tail here denotes that which is

of the nature of a tail, so that we have to understand that the bliss of

Brahman is not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or

abode, the one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously

another scriptural passage declares, 'All other creatures live on a

small portion of that bliss' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further, if by the

Self consisting of bliss we were to understand Brahman we should have to

assume that the Brahman meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities

(savi/s/esha), because it is said to have joy and the like for its

members. But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary passage

(II, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object neither of mind nor

speech, and so shows that the Brahman meant is the (absolute) Brahman

(devoid of qualities), 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns

away unable to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears

nothing.' Moreover, if we speak of something as 'abounding in

bliss[112],' we thereby imply the co-existence of pain; for the word

'abundance' in its ordinary sense implies the existence of a small

measure of what is opposed to the thing whereof there is abundance. But

the passage so understood would be in conflict with another passage (Ch.

Up. VII, 24), 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else,

understands nothing else, that is the Infinite;' which declares that in

the Infinite, i.e. Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from it.

Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in each individual body, the Self

consisting of bliss also is a different one in each body. Brahman, on

the other hand, does not differ according to bodies; for the mantra at

the beginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge,

infinite, and another passage says, 'He is the one God, hidden in all

beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11).

Nor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent repetition of the word

'anandamaya;' for merely the radical part of the compound (i.e. the word

ananda without the affix maya) is repeated in all the following

passages; 'It is a flavour, for only after seizing flavour can any one

seize bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss

existed not in the ether? For he alone causes blessedness;' 'Now this is

an examination of bliss;' 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears

nothing;' 'He understood that bliss is Brahman.' If it were a settled

matter that Brahman is denoted by the term, 'the Self consisting of

bliss,' then we could assume that in the subsequent passages, where

merely the word 'bliss' is employed, the term 'consisting of bliss' is

meant to be repeated; but that the Self consisting of bliss is not

Brahman, we have already proved by means of the reason of joy being its

head, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage, viz. 'Brahman

is knowledge and bliss' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28), the mere word 'bliss'

denotes Brahman, we must conclude that also in such passages as, 'If

that bliss existed not in the ether,' the word bliss is used with

reference to Brahman, and is not meant to repeat the term 'consisting of

bliss.' The repetition of the full compound, 'consisting of bliss,'

which occurs in the passage, 'He reaches that Self consisting of bliss'

(Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not refer to Brahman, as it is contained in the

enumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the Self of food, &c., all of which

are mere effects, and all of which are represented as things to be

reached.--But, it may be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is

said to have to be reached, were not Brahman--just as the Selfs

consisting of food, &c. are not Brahman--then it would not be declared

(in the passage immediately following) that he who knows obtains for his

reward Brahman.--This objection we invalidate by the remark that the

text makes its declaration as to Brahman--which is the tail, the

support--being reached by him who knows, by the very means of the

declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss; as appears from

the passage, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, from which all speech

returns,' &c. With reference, again, to the passage, 'He desired: may I

be many, may I grow forth,' which is found in proximity to the mention

of the Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality

connected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which is

mentioned in the still nearer passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the

support,' and does therefore not intimate that the Self of bliss is

Brahman. And, on account of its referring to the passage last quoted

('it desired,' &c.), the later passage also, 'That is flavour,' &c., has

not the Self of bliss for its subject.--But, it may be objected, the

(neuter word) Brahman cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word

as you maintain is done in the passage, 'He desired,' &c.--In reply to

this objection we point to the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 1), 'From that

Self sprang ether,' where, likewise, the masculine word 'Self' can refer

to Brahman only, since the latter is the general topic of the chapter.

In the knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a finally ('he knew that bliss

is Brahman'), the word 'bliss' is rightly understood to denote Brahman,

since we there meet neither with the affix 'maya,' nor with any

statement as to joy being its head, and the like. To ascribe to Brahman

in itself joy, and so on, as its members, is impossible, unless we have

recourse to certain, however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman;

and that the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of the

qualified (savi/s/esha) Brahman is proved by the passage (quoted above),

which declares that Brahman transcends speech and mind. We therefore

must conclude that the affix maya, in the word anandamaya, does not

denote abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in the

words annamaya and the subsequent similar compounds.

The Sutras are therefore to be explained as follows. There arises the

question whether the passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' is to

be understood as intimating that Brahman is a mere member of the Self

consisting of bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said

that it must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, 'The Self

consisting of bliss on account of the repetition.' That means: Brahman,

which in the passage 'the Self consisting of bliss,' &c., is spoken of

as the tail, the support, is designated as the principal matter (not as

something subordinate). On account of the repetition; for in the

memorial /s/loka, 'he becomes himself non-existing,' Brahman alone is

reiterated. 'If not, on account of the word denoting a modification; not

so, on account of abundance.' In this Sutra the word 'modification' is

meant to convey the sense of member. The objection that on account of

the word 'tail,' which denotes a mere member, Brahman cannot be taken as

the principal matter must be refuted. This we do by remarking that there

is no difficulty, since a word denoting a member may be introduced into

the passage on account of pra/k/urya[113]. Pra/k/urya here means a

phraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After the different

members, beginning with the head and ending with the tail, of the Selfs,

consisting of food, &c. have been enumerated, there are also mentioned

the head and the other limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added,

'Brahman is the tail, the support;' the intention being merely to

introduce some more terms denoting members, not to convey the meaning of

'member,' (an explanation which is impossible) because the preceding

Sutra already has proved Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the

principal matter. 'And because he is declared to be the cause of it.'

That means: Brahman is declared to be the cause of the entire aggregate

of effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting of bliss, in the following

passage, 'He created all whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as

Brahman is the cause, it cannot at the same time be called the member,

in the literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing

but one of Brahman's effects. The other Sutras also (which refer to the

Self of bliss[114]) are to be considered, as well as they may, as

conveying a knowledge of Brahman, which (Brahman) is referred to in the

passage about the tail.

account of his qualities being declared[115].

The following passage is found in Scripture (Ch. Up. I, 6, 6 ff.), 'Now

that person bright as gold who is seen within the sun, with beard bright

as gold and hair bright as gold, bright as gold altogether to the very

tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus; his name is Ut, for

he has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above

all evil. So much with reference to the devas.' And further on, with

reference to the body, 'Now the person who is seen in the eye,' &c. Here

the following doubt presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the

object of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye, merely

some special individual soul, which, by means of a large measure of

knowledge and pious works, has raised itself to a position of eminence;

or do they refer to the eternally perfect highest Lord?

The purvapakshin takes the former view. An individual soul, he says, is

referred to, since Scripture speaks of a definite shape. To the person

in the sun special features are ascribed, such as the possession of a

beard as bright as gold and so on, and the same features manifestly

belong to the person in the eye also, since they are expressly

transferred to it in the passage, 'The shape of this person is the same

as the shape of that person.' That, on the other hand, no shape can be

ascribed to the highest Lord, follows from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3,

15), 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without

decay.' That an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact

that a definite abode is mentioned, 'He who is in the sun; he who is in

the eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no special abode, but abides

in his own glory, no similar statement can be made; compare, for

instance, the two following passages, 'Where does he rest? In his own

glory?' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); and 'like the ether he is omnipresent,

eternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied by the fact that

the might (of the being in question) is said to be limited; for the

passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beyond that, and of the wishes of the

devas,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in the sun;

and the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of the

wishes of men,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in

the eye. No limit, on the other hand, can be admitted of the might of

the highest Lord, as appears from the passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22),

'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all

things. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be

confounded;' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all

limiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye and

the sun cannot be the highest Lord.

To this reasoning the Sutra replies, 'The one within, on account of his

qualities being declared.' The person referred to in the passages

concerning the person within the sun and the person within the eye is

not a transmigrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because his

qualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest Lord are

indicated in the text as follows. At first the name of the person within

the sun is mentioned--'his name is Ut'--and then this name is explained

on the ground of that person being free from all evil, 'He has risen

above all evil.' The same name thus explained is then transferred to the

person in the eye, in the clause, 'the name of the one is the name of

the other.' Now, entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to

the highest Self only; so, for instance (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), 'The Self

which is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is the passage, 'He is

/Ri/k, he is Saman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman,' which declares the person in

the eye to be the Self of the /Ri/k, Saman, and so on; which is possible

only if that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is to be

considered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text, after having stated

in succession /Ri/k and Saman to have earth and fire for their Self with

reference to the Devas, and, again, speech and breath with reference to

the body, continues, '/Ri/k and Saman are his joints,' with reference to

the Devas, and 'the joints of the one are the joints of the other,' with

reference to the body. Now this statement also can be made only with

regard to that which is the Self of all. Further, the passage,

'Therefore all who sing to the Vina sing him, and from him also they

obtain wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic of all

worldly songs; which again holds true of the highest Lord only. That

absolute command over the objects of worldly desires (as displayed, for

instance, in the bestowal of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord

is meant, appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad-gita

(X, 41), 'Whatever being there is possessing power, glory, or strength,

know it to be produced from a portion of my energy[116].' To the

objection that the statements about bodily shape contained in the

clauses, 'With a beard bright as gold,' &c., cannot refer to the highest

Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a

bodily shape formed of Maya, in order to gratify thereby his devout

worshippers. Thus Sm/ri/ti also says, 'That thou seest me, O Narada, is

the Maya emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with the

qualities of all beings.' We have further to note that expressions such

as, 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without

decay,' are made use of where instruction is given about the nature of

the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities; while

passages such as the following one, 'He to whom belong all works, all

desires, all sweet odours and tastes' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), which

represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion, speak of him, who

is the cause of everything, as possessing some of the qualities of his

effects. Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage under

discussion, as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With reference

to the objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because an abode

is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of devout meditation, a

special abode may be assigned to Brahman, although it abides in its own

glory only; for as Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be

viewed as being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally,

about the limitation of Brahman's might, which depends on the

distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the body, has

likewise reference to devout meditation only. From all this it follows

that the being which Scripture states to be within the eye and the sun

is the highest Lord.

individual souls animating the sun, &c.), on account of the declaration

of distinction.

There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual souls which animate

the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within; whose

distinction (from all individual souls) is proclaimed in the following

scriptural passage, 'He who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom

the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun

within; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (B/ri/. Up. III,

7, 9). Here the expression, 'He within the sun whom the sun does not

know,' clearly indicates that the Ruler within is distinct from that

cognising individual soul whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within

we have to identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet of

the sameness of purport of all Vedanta-texts. It thus remains a settled

conclusion that the passage under discussion conveys instruction about

the highest Lord.

marks (of the latter being mentioned).

In the Chandogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with, 'What is the

origin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings take

their rise from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is

greater than these, ether is their rest.'--Here the following doubt

arises. Does the word 'ether' denote the highest Brahman or the

elemental ether?--Whence the doubt?--Because the word is seen to be used

in both senses. Its use in the sense of 'elemental ether' is well

established in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech; and, on the other

hand, we see that it is sometimes used to denote Brahman, viz. in cases

where we ascertain, either from some complementary sentence or from the

fact of special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant. So,

for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'If that bliss existed not in the

ether;' and Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'That which is called ether is the

revealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names

are[117] that is Brahman.' Hence the doubt.--Which sense is then to be

adopted in our case?--The sense of elemental ether, the purvapakshin

replies; because this sense belongs to the word more commonly, and

therefore presents itself to the mind more readily. The word 'ether'

cannot be taken in both senses equally, because that would involve a

(faulty) attribution of several meanings to one and the same word. Hence

the term 'ether' applies to Brahman in a secondary (metaphorical) sense

only; on account of Brahman being in many of its attributes, such as all

pervadingness and the like, similar to ether. The rule is, that when the

primary sense of a word is possible, the word must not be taken in a

secondary sense. And in the passage under discussion only the primary

sense of the word 'ether' is admissible. Should it be objected that, if

we refer the passage under discussion to the elemental ether, a

complementary passage ('for all these beings take their rise from the

ether only, &c.') cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; we reply that

the elemental ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air,

fire, &c. in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. Up. II,

1), 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, and so

on.' The qualities also of being greater and of being a place of rest

may be ascribed to the elemental ether, if we consider its relations to

all other beings. Therefore we conclude that the word 'ether' here

denotes the elemental ether.

To this we reply as follows:--The word ether must here be taken to

denote Brahman, on account of characteristic marks of the latter being

mentioned. For the sentence, 'All these beings take their rise from the

ether only,' clearly indicates the highest Brahman, since all

Vedanta-texts agree in definitely declaring that all beings spring from

the highest Brahman.--But, the opponent may say, we have shown that the

elemental ether also may be represented as the cause, viz. of air, fire,

and the other elements in due succession.--We admit this. But still

there remains the difficulty, that, unless we understand the word to

apply to the fundamental cause of all, viz. Brahman, the affirmation

contained in the word 'only' and the qualification expressed by the word

'all' (in 'all beings') would be out of place. Moreover, the clause,

'They return into the ether,' again points to Brahman, and so likewise

the phrase, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest;' for

absolute superiority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the

highest Self only; cp. Ch. Up. III, 14, 3, 'Greater than the earth,

greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these

worlds.' The quality of being a place of rest likewise agrees best with

the highest Brahman, on account of its being the highest cause. This is

confirmed by the following scriptural passage: 'Knowledge and bliss is

Brahman, it is the rest of him who gives gifts' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28).

Moreover, Jaivali finding fault with the doctrine of /S/alavatya, on

account of (his saman) having an end (Ch. Up. I, 8, 8), and wishing to

proclaim something that has no end chooses the ether, and then, having

identified the ether with the Udgitha, concludes, 'He is the Udgitha

greater than great; he is without end.' Now this endlessness is a

characteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark that the sense of

'elemental ether' presents itself to the mind more readily, because it

is the better established sense of the word aka/s/a, we reply, that,

although it may present itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be

accepted, because we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the

complementary sentences. That the word aka/s/a is also used to denote

Brahman has been shown already; cp. such passages as, 'Ether is the

revealer of all names and forms.' We see, moreover, that various

synonyma of aka/s/a are employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance,

/Ri/k Sa/m/h. I, 164, 39, 'In which the Vedas are[118], in the

Imperishable one (i.e. Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on

which all gods have their seat.' And Taitt. Up. III, 6, 'This is the

knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a, founded on the highest ether

(vyoman).' And again, 'Om, ka is Brahman, ether (kha) is Brahman' (Ch.

Up. IV, 10, 5), and 'the old ether' (B/ri/. Up. V, 1)[119]. And other

similar passages. On account of the force of the complementary passage

we are justified in deciding that the word 'ether,' although occurring

in the beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman. The case is

analogous to that of the sentence, 'Agni (lit. the fire) studies a

chapter,' where the word agni, although occurring in the beginning, is

at once seen to denote a boy[120]. It is therefore settled that the word

'ether' denotes Brahman.

Concerning the udgitha it is said (Ch. Up. I, 10, 9), 'Prastot/ri/, that

deity which belongs to the prastava, &c.,' and, further on (I, 11, 4;

5), 'Which then is that deity? He said: Breath. For all these beings

merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise. This is the deity

belonging to the prastava.' With reference to this passage doubt and

decision are to be considered as analogous to those stated under the

preceding Sutra. For while in some passages--as, for instance, 'For

indeed, my son, mind is fastened to pra/n/a,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2; and,

'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18--the word 'breath' is

seen to denote Brahman, its use in the sense of a certain modification

of air is better established in common as well as in Vedic language.

Hence there arises a doubt whether in the passage under discussion the

word pra/n/a denotes Brahman or (ordinary) breath. In favour of which

meaning have we then to decide?

Here the purvapakshin maintains that the word must be held to denote the

fivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar modification of wind (or

air); because, as has been remarked already, that sense of the word

pra/n/a is the better established one.--But no, an objector will say,

just as in the case of the preceding Sutra, so here also Brahman is

meant, on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also

a complementary passage gives us to understand that all beings spring

from and merge into pra/n/a; a process which can take place in connexion

with the highest Lord only.--This objection, the purvapakshin replies,

is futile, since we see that the beings enter into and proceed from the

principal vital air also. For Scripture makes the following statement

(Sat. Br. X, 3, 3, 6), 'When man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech

merges, into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind;

when he awakes then they spring again from breath alone.' What the Veda

here states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during sleep,

while the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly, the activity of

the sense organs is interrupted and again becomes manifest at the time

of awaking only. And as the sense organs are the essence of all material

beings, the complementary passage which speaks of the merging and

emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the principal vital air

also. Moreover, subsequently to pra/n/a being mentioned as the divinity

of the prastava the sun and food are designated as the divinities of the

udgitha and the pratibara. Now as they are not Brahman, the pra/n/a

also, by parity of reasoning, cannot be Brahman.

To this argumentation the author of the Sutras replies: For the same

reason pra/n/a--that means: on account of the presence of characteristic

marks--which constituted the reason stated in the preceding Sutra--the

word pra/n/a also must be held to denote Brahman. For Scripture says of

pra/n/a also, that it is connected with marks characteristic of Brahman.

The sentence, 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath

they arise,' which declares that the origination and retractation of all

beings depend on pra/n/a, clearly shows pra/n/a to be Brahman. In reply

to the assertion that the origination and retractation of all beings can

be reconciled equally well with the assumption of pra/n/a denoting the

chief vital air, because origination and retractation take place in the

state of waking and of sleep also, we remark that in those two states

only the senses are merged into, and emerge from, the chief vital air,

while, according to the scriptural passage, 'For all these beings, &c.,'

all beings whatever into which a living Self has entered, together with

their senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. And even if the word

'beings' were taken (not in the sense of animated beings, but) in the

sense of material elements in general, there would be nothing in the way

of interpreting the passage as referring to Brahman.--But, it may be

said, that the senses together with their objects do, during sleep,

enter into pra/n/a, and again issue from it at the time of waking, we

distinctly learn from another scriptural passage, viz. Kau. Up. III, 3,

'When a man being thus asleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one

with that pra/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names,'

&c.--True, we reply, but there also the word pra/n/a denotes (not the

vital air) but Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks of

Brahman being mentioned. The objection, again, that the word pra/n/a

cannot denote Brahman because it occurs in proximity to the words 'food'

and 'sun' (which do not refer to Brahman), is altogether baseless; for

proximity is of no avail against the force of the complementary passage

which intimates that pra/n/a is Brahman. That argument, finally, which

rests on the fact that the word pra/n/a commonly denotes the vital air

with its five modifications, is to be refuted in the same way as the

parallel argument which the purvapakshin brought forward with reference

to the word 'ether.' From all this it follows that the pra/n/a, which is

the deity of the prastava, is Brahman.

Some (commentators)[121] quote under the present Sutra the following

passages, 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18), and 'for to

pra/n/a mind is fastened' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2). But that is wrong since

these two passages offer no opportunity for any discussion, the former

on account of the separation of the words, the latter on account of the

general topic. When we meet with a phrase such as 'the father of the

father' we understand at once that the genitive denotes a father

different from the father denoted by the nominative. Analogously we

infer from the separation of words contained in the phrase, 'the breath

of breath,' that the 'breath of breath' is different from the ordinary

breath (denoted by the genitive 'of breath'). For one and the same thing

cannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated of--and thus distinguished

from--itself. Concerning the second passage we remark that, if the

matter constituting the general topic of some chapter is referred to in

that chapter under a different name, we yet conclude, from the general

topic, that that special matter is meant. For instance, when we meet in

the section which treats of the jyotish/t/oma sacrifice with the

passage, 'in every spring he is to offer the jyotis sacrifice,' we at

once understand that the word denotes the jyotish/t/oma. If we therefore

meet with the clause 'to pra/n/a mind is fastened' in a section of which

the highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a moment suppose that

the word pra/n/a should there denote the ordinary breath which is a mere

modification of air. The two passages thus do not offer any matter for

discussion, and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for the

Sutra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the passage about the

pra/n/a, which is the deity of the prastava, allows room for doubt,

purvapaksha and final decision.

passage which is connected with the passage about the light).

Scripture says (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines above

this heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, in the highest

worlds beyond which there are no other worlds that is the same light

which is within man.' Here the doubt presents itself whether the word

'light' denotes the light of the sun and the like, or the highest Self.

Under the preceding Sutras we had shown that some words which ordinarily

have different meanings yet in certain passages denote Brahman, since

characteristic marks of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has

to be discussed whether, in connexion with the passage quoted,

characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned or not.

The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes nothing else

but the light of the sun and the like, since that is the ordinary

well-established meaning of the term. The common use of language, he

says, teaches us that the two words 'light' and 'darkness' denote

mutually opposite things, darkness being the term for whatever

interferes with the function of the sense of sight, as, for instance,

the gloom of the night, while sunshine and whatever else favours the

action of the eye is called light. The word 'shines' also, which the

text exhibits, is known ordinarily to refer to the sun and similar

sources of light; while of Brahman, which is devoid of colour, it cannot

be said, in the primary sense of the word, that it 'shines.' Further,

the word jyotis must here denote light because it is said to be bounded

by the sky ('that light which shines above this heaven'). For while it

is impossible to consider the sky as being the boundary of Brahman,

which is the Self of all and the source of all things movable or

immovable, the sky may be looked upon as forming the boundary of light,

which is a mere product and as such limited; accordingly the text says,

'the light beyond heaven.'--But light, although a mere product, is

perceived everywhere; it would therefore be wrong to declare that it is

bounded by the sky!--Well, then, the purvapakshin replies, let us assume

that the light meant is the first-born (original) light which has not

yet become tripartite[122]. This explanation again cannot be admitted,

because the non-tripartite light does not serve any purpose.--But, the

purvapakshin resumes, Why should its purpose not be found therein that

it is the object of devout meditation?--That cannot be, we reply; for we

see that only such things are represented as objects of devotion as have

some other independent use of their own; so, for instance, the sun

(which dispels darkness and so on). Moreover the scriptural passage,

'Let me make each of these three (fire, water, and earth) tripartite,'

does not indicate any difference[123]. And even of the non-tripartite

light it is not known that the sky constitutes its boundary.--Well, then

(the purvapakshin resumes, dropping the idea of the non-tripartite

light), let us assume that the light of which the text speaks is the

tripartite (ordinary) light. The objection that light is seen to exist

also beneath the sky, viz. in the form of fire and the like, we

invalidate by the remark that there is nothing contrary to reason in

assigning a special locality to fire, although the latter is observed

everywhere; while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which the

idea of place does not apply at all, would be most unsuitable. Moreover,

the clause 'higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which

there are no other worlds,' which indicates a multiplicity of abodes,

agrees much better with light, which is a mere product (than with

Brahman). There is moreover that other clause, also, 'That is the same

light which is within man,' in which the highest light is identified

with the gastric fire (the fire within man). Now such identifications

can be made only where there is a certain similarity of nature; as is

seen, for instance, in the passage, 'Of that person Bhu/h/ is the head,

for the head is one and that syllable is one' (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 3). But

that the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly appears from

the passage, 'Of this we have visible and audible proof' (Ch. Up. III,

13, 7; 8), which declares that the fire is characterised by the noise it

makes, and by heat; and likewise from the following passage, 'Let a man

meditate on this as that which is seen and heard.' The same conclusion

may be drawn from the passage, 'He who knows this becomes conspicuous

and celebrated,' which proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to

the devout meditation on Brahman a high reward would have to be

allotted. Nor is there mentioned in the entire passage about the light

any other characteristic mark of Brahman, while such marks are set forth

in the passages (discussed above) which refer to pra/n/a and the ether.

Nor, again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding section, 'the Gayatri

is everything whatsoever exists,' &c. (III, 12); for that passage makes

a statement about the Gayatri metre only. And even if that section did

refer to Brahman, still Brahman would not be recognised in the passage

at present under discussion; for there (in the section referred to) it

is declared in the clause, 'Three feet of it are the Immortal in

heaven'--that heaven constitutes the abode; while in our passage the

words 'the light above heaven' declare heaven to be a boundary. For all

these reasons the word jyotis is here to be taken in its ordinary

meaning, viz. light.

To this we make the following reply. The word jyotis must be held to

denote Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) being mentioned.

In a preceding passage Brahman had been spoken of as having four feet

(quarters). 'Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person

(purusha). One foot of it are all the beings, three feet of it are the

Immortal in heaven.' That which in this passage is said to constitute

the three-quarter part, immortal and connected with heaven, of Brahman,

which altogether comprises four quarters; this very same entity we

recognise as again referred to in the passage under discussion, because

there also it is said to be connected with heaven. If therefore we

should set it aside in our interpretation of the passage and assume the

latter to refer to the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of

dropping, without need, the topic started and introducing a new subject.

Brahman, in fact, continues to form the subject-matter, not only of the

passage about the light, but likewise of the subsequent section, the

so-called Sa/nd/ilya-vidya (Ch. Up. III, 14). Hence we conclude that in

our passage the word 'light' must be held to denote Brahman. The

objection (raised above) that from common use the words 'light' and 'to

shine' are known to denote effected (physical) light is without force;

for as it is known from the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is

meant, those two words do not necessarily denote physical light only to

the exclusion of Brahman[124], but may also denote Brahman itself, in so

far as it is characterised by the physical shining light which is its

effect. Analogously another mantra declares, 'that by which the sun

shines kindled with heat' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7). Or else we may

suppose that the word jyotis here does not denote at all that light on

which the function of the eye depends. For we see that in other passages

it has altogether different meanings; so, for instance, B/ri/. Up. IV,

3, 5, 'With speech only as light man sits,' and Taitt. Sa. I, 6, 3, 3,

'May the mind, the light, accept,' &c. It thus appears that whatever

illuminates (in the different senses of the word) something else may be

spoken of as 'light.' Hence to Brahman also, whose nature is

intelligence, the term 'light' may be applied; for it gives light to the

entire world. Similarly, other scriptural passages say, 'Him the shining

one, everything shines after; by his light all this is lighted' (Kau.

Up. II, 5, 15); and 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as the

immortal' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 16). Against the further objection that the

omnipresent Brahman cannot be viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that

the assignment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to

reason because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor does

it avail anything to say that it is impossible to assign any place to

Brahman because Brahman is out of connexion with all place. For it is

possible to make such an assumption, because Brahman is connected with

certain limiting adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different

kinds of devout meditation on Brahman as specially connected with

certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart. For the same

reason it is also possible to attribute to Brahman a multiplicity of

abodes, as is done in the clause (quoted above) 'higher than all.' The

further objection that the light beyond heaven is the mere physical

light because it is identified with the gastric fire, which itself is a

mere effect and is inferred from perceptible marks such as the heat of

the body and a certain sound, is equally devoid of force; for the

gastric fire may be viewed as the outward appearance (or symbol) of

Brahman, just as Brahman's name is a mere outward symbol. Similarly in

the passage, 'Let a man meditate on it (the gastric light) as seen and

heard,' the visibility and audibility (here implicitly ascribed to

Brahman) must be considered as rendered possible through the gastric

fire being the outward appearance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in

the objection that Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions an

inconsiderable reward only; for there is no reason compelling us to have

recourse to Brahman for the purpose of such and such a reward only, and

not for the purpose of such and such another reward. Wherever the text

represents the highest Brahman--which is free from all connexion with

distinguishing attributes--as the universal Self, it is understood that

the result of that instruction is one only, viz. final release.

Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman is taught to be connected with

distinguishing attributes or outward symbols, there, we see, all the

various rewards which this world can offer are spoken of; cp. for

instance, B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 24, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver

of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth.' Although in the passage

itself which treats of the light no characteristic mark of Brahman is

mentioned, yet, as the Sutra intimates, the mark stated in a preceding

passage (viz. the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it,' &c.) has to be

taken in connexion with the passage about the light as well. The

question how the mere circumstance of Brahman being mentioned in a not

distant passage can have the power of divorcing from its natural object

and transferring to another object the direct statement about light

implied in the word 'light,' may be answered without difficulty. The

passage under discussion runs[125], 'which above this heaven, the

light.' The relative pronoun with which this clause begins intimates,

according to its grammatical force[126], the same Brahman which was

mentioned in the previous passage, and which is here recognised (as

being the same which was mentioned before) through its connexion with

heaven; hence the word jyotis also--which stands in grammatical

co-ordination to 'which'--must have Brahman for its object. From all

this it follows that the word 'light' here denotes Brahman.

metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus (i.e. by means of

the metre) the direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus

it is seen (in other passages also).

We now address ourselves to the refutation of the assertion (made in the

purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that in the previous passage also

Brahman is not referred to, because in the sentence, 'Gayatri is

everything whatsoever here exists,' the metre called Gayatri is spoken

of.--How (we ask the purvapakshin) can it be maintained that, on account

of the metre being spoken of, Brahman is not denoted, while yet the

mantra 'such is the greatness of it,' &c., clearly sets forth Brahman

with its four quarters?--You are mistaken (the purvapakshin replies).

The sentence, 'Gayatri is everything,' starts the discussion of Gayatri.

The same Gayatri is thereupon described under the various forms of all

beings, earth, body, heart, speech, breath; to which there refers also

the verse, 'that Gayatri has four feet and is sixfold.' After that we

meet with the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it.' &c. How then, we

ask, should this mantra, which evidently is quoted with reference to the

Gayatri (metre) as described in the preceding clauses, all at once

denote Brahman with its four quarters? Since therefore the metre Gayatri

is the subject-matter of the entire chapter, the term 'Brahman' which

occurs in a subsequent passage ('the Brahman which has thus been

described') must also denote the metre. This is analogous to a previous

passage (Ch. Up. III, 11, 3, 'He who thus knows this Brahma-upanishad'),

where the word Brahma-upanishad is explained to mean Veda-upanishad. As

therefore the preceding passage refers (not to Brahman, but) to the

Gayatri metre, Brahman does not constitute the topic of the entire

This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our position.

'Because thus direction of the mind is declared,' i.e. because the

Brahma/n/a passage, 'Gayatri indeed is all this,' intimates that by

means of the metre Gayatri the mind is to be directed on Brahman which

is connected with that metre. Of the metre Gayatri, which is nothing but

a certain special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be

said that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to understand

the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as the cause of the world,

is connected with that product also whose name is Gayatri, is 'all

this;' in accordance with that other passage which directly says, 'All

this indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1). That the effect is in

reality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on, under

Sutra II, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain

effects (of Brahman) is seen to be mentioned in other passages also, so,

for instance, Ait. Ar. III, 2, 3, 12, 'For the Bahv/rik/as consider him

in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas

in the Mahavrata ceremony.' Although, therefore, the previous passage

speaks of the metre, Brahman is what is meant, and the same Brahman is

again referred to in the passage about the light, whose purport it is to

enjoin another form of devout meditation.

Another commentator[127] is of opinion that the term Gayatri (does not

denote Brahman in so far as viewed under the form of Gayatri, but)

directly denotes Brahman, on account of the equality of number; for just

as the Gayatri metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so

Brahman also has four feet, (i.e. quarters.) Similarly we see that in

other passages also the names of metres are used to denote other things

which resemble those metres in certain numerical relations; cp. for

instance, Ch. Up. IV, 3, 8, where it is said at first, 'Now these five

and the other five make ten and that is the K/ri/ta,' and after that

'these are again the Viraj which eats the food.' If we adopt this

interpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and the metre is not referred

to at all. In any case Brahman is the subject with which the previous

passage is concerned.

the previous passage), because (thus only) the declaration as to the

beings, &c. being the feet is possible.

That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we must assume for

that reason also that the text designates the beings and so on as the

feet of Gayatri. For the text at first speaks of the beings, the earth,

the body, and the heart[128], and then goes on 'that Gayatri has four

feet and is sixfold.' For of the mere metre, without any reference to

Brahman, it would be impossible to say that the beings and so on are its

feet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for

the verse, 'Such is the greatness,' &c. For that verse clearly describes

Brahman in its own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent

the Gayatri as the Self of everything as is done in the words, 'One foot

of it are all the beings; three feet of it are what is immortal in

heaven.' The purusha-sukta also (/Ri/k Sa/m/h. X, 90) exhibits the verse

with sole reference to Brahman. Sm/ri/ti likewise ascribes to Brahman a

like nature, 'I stand supporting all this world by a single portion of

myself' (Bha. Gita X, 42). Our interpretation moreover enables us to

take the passage, 'that Brahman indeed which,' &c. (III, 12, 7), in its

primary sense, (i.e. to understand the word Brahman to denote nothing

but Brahman.) And, moreover, the passage, 'these are the five men of

Brahman' (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former passage about

the Gayatri is taken as referring to Brahman (for otherwise the

'Brahman' in 'men of Brahman' would not be connected with the previous

topic). Hence Brahman is to be considered as the subject-matter of the

previous passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is

referred to in the passage about the light where it is recognised (to be

the same) from its connexion with heaven, remains unshaken.

recognised in the latter) on account of the difference of designation,

is not valid because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary

(to the recognition).

The objection that in the former passage ('three feet of it are what is

immortal in heaven'), heaven is designated as the abode, while in the

latter passage ('that light which shines above this heaven'), heaven is

designated as the boundary, and that, on account of this difference of

designation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be

recognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we do by

remarking that in either designation nothing is contrary to the

recognition. Just as in ordinary language a falcon, although in contact

with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree but also

above the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here

referred to as being beyond heaven as well.

Another (commentator) explains: just as in ordinary language a falcon,

although not in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be

above the top of the tree but also on the top of the tree, so Brahman

also, which is in reality beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two

passages) said to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the

former passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it remains

therefore a settled conclusion that the word 'light' denotes Brahman.

consideration (of the passages referring to pra/n/a).

In the Kaushitaki-brahma/n/a-upanishad there is recorded a legend of

Indra and Pratardana which begins with the words, 'Pratardana, forsooth,

the son of Divodasa came by means of fighting and strength to the

beloved abode of Indra' (Kau. Up. III, 1). In this legend we read: 'He

said: I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self (praj/n/atman), meditate on me

as Life, as Immortality' (III, 2). And later on (III, 3), 'Pra/n/a

alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body, makes it

rise up.' Then, again (III, 8), 'Let no man try to find out what speech

is, let him know the speaker.' And in the end (III, 8), 'That breath

indeed is the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal.'--Here

the doubt presents itself whether the word pra/n/a denotes merely

breath, the modification of air, or the Self of some divinity, or the

individual soul, or the highest Brahman.--But, it will be said at the

outset, the Sutra I, 1, 21 already has shown that the word pra/n/a

refers to Brahman, and as here also we meet with characteristic marks of

Brahman, viz. the words 'bliss, imperishable, immortal,' what reason is

there for again raising the same doubt?--We reply: Because there are

observed here characteristic marks of different kinds. For in the legend

we meet not only with marks indicating Brahman, but also with marks

pointing to other beings Thus Indra's words, 'Know me only' (III, 1)

point to the Self of a divinity; the words, 'Having laid hold of this

body it makes it rise up,' point to the breath; the words, 'Let no man

try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' point to the

individual soul. There is thus room for doubt.

If, now, the purvapakshin maintains that the term pra/n/a here denotes

the well-known modification of air, i.e. breath, we, on our side, assert

that the word pra/n/a must be understood to denote Brahman.--For what

reason?--On account of such being the consecutive meaning of the

passages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire section which

treats of the pra/n/a, we observe that all the single passages can be

construed into a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman.

At the beginning of the legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra

to choose a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he selects for

his boon, in the following words, 'Do you yourself choose that boon for

me which you deem most beneficial for a man.' Now, as later on pra/n/a

is declared to be what is most beneficial for man, what should pra/n/a

denote but the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that Self a

man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial for him, as many

scriptural passages declare. Compare, for instance, /S/ve. Up. III, 8,

'A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go.'

Again, the further passage, 'He who knows me thus by no deed of his is

his life harmed, not by theft, not by bhru/n/ahatya' (III, 1), has a

meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object of knowledge. For,

that subsequently to the cognition of Brahman all works and their

effects entirely cease, is well known from scriptural passages, such as

the following, 'All works perish when he has been beheld who is the

higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, pra/n/a can be

identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman. For the air

which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those

characteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding

passage (viz. those intimated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,'

'immortal') can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with

any being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following passages,

'He does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a bad action.

For he makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good

deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these

worlds do a bad deed;' and, 'He is the guardian of the world, he is the

king of the world, he is the Lord of the world' (Kau. Up. III, 8). All

this can be properly understood only if the highest Brahman is

acknowledged to be the subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the

vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word pra/n/a denotes

speaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not valid)

because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the

An objection is raised against the assertion that pra/n/a denotes

Brahman. The word pra/n/a, it is said, does not denote the highest

Brahman, because the speaker designates himself. The speaker, who is a

certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal

himself to Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am pra/n/a, the

intelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the pra/n/a, which this latter

passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of

the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the

attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance,

B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on,

also, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number

of attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no

way belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvash/tri/; I

delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,' and so on. Indra

may be called pra/n/a on account of his strength. Scripture says,

'Strength indeed is pra/n/a,' and Indra is known as the god of strength;

and of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The

personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self;

for the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It thus being

a settled matter that some passages convey information about the

personal Self of some deity, the other passages also--as, for instance,

the one about what is most beneficial for man--must be interpreted as

well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence pra/n/a does

not denote Brahman.

This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are

found a multitude of references to the interior Self. For the passage,

'As long as pra/n/a dwells in this body so long surely there is life,'

declares that that pra/n/a only which is the intelligent interior

Self--and not some particular outward deity--has power to bestow and to

take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the

pra/n/as as founded on the existence of the pra/n/a, it shows that that

pra/n/a is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the

sense-organs.[129]

Of the same tendency is the passage, 'Pra/n/a, the intelligent Self,

alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up;' and the passage

(which occurs in the passus, 'Let no man try to find out what speech

is,' &c.), 'For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the

spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the

subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the pra/n/a. And that pra/n/a

indeed is the Self of pra/n/a, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' So also

the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as

it were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and

senses, sums up as follows, 'He is my Self, thus let it be known;' a

summing up which is appropriate only if pra/n/a is meant to denote not

some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural

passage declares 'this Self is Brahman, omniscient'[130] (B/ri/. Up. II,

5, 19). We therefore arrive at the conclusion that, on account of the

multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains

information regarding Brahman, not regarding the Self of some

deity.--How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring

to himself be explained?

with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture,

as in the case of Vamadeva.

The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of

/ri/shi-like intuition[131]--the existence of which is vouched for by

Scripture--its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs

Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words 'Know me

By intuition of the same kind the /ri/shi Vamadeva reached the knowledge

expressed in the words, 'I was Manu and Surya;' in accordance with the

passage, 'Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed

became that' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the

purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that Indra after saying, 'Know me

only,' glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son

and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of

Tvash/tri/'s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of

glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge--in which case the sense of

the passage would be, 'Because I accomplished such and such deeds,

therefore know me'--but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the

highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the

slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and the like, goes on in the clause next

following to exalt knowledge, 'And not one hair of me is harmed there.

He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed.'--(But how

does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)--Because, we reply, its

meaning is as follows: 'Although I do such cruel deeds, yet not even a

hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life

of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of

his.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else

but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am pra/n/a,

the intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.

characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air

(being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout

meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of

(the meaning advocated by us) being accepted (elsewhere); and on account

of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the passage

under discussion).

Although we admit, the purvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the

pra/n/a does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity,

since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still

we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.--For what reason?--Because it

mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand,

and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 'Let no man

try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' mentions a

characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held

to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules

and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On

the other hand, we have the passage, 'But pra/n/a alone, the intelligent

Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to

the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it

sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs

(Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 'Then

pra/n/a (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived;

I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those,

again, who in the passage quoted above read 'this one (masc.), the

body[132]' must give the following explanation, Pra/n/a having laid hold

of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the

sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the

chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for

the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although

non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other pra/n/as, viz. the

sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if

the word pra/n/a be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the

chief vital air, the pra/n/a and the intelligent Self may be spoken of

in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual

concomitance, or as being different on account of their (essentially

different) individual character; and in these two different ways they

are actually spoken of in the two following passages, 'What is pra/n/a

that is praj/n/a, what is praj/n/a that is pra/n/a;' and, 'For together

do these two live in the body and together do they depart.' If, on the

other hand, pra/n/a denoted Brahman, what then could be different from

what? For these reasons pra/n/a does not denote Brahman, but either the

individual soul or the chief vital air or both.

All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the

threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would involve

the assumption of devout meditation of three different kinds, viz. on

the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is

inappropriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds

of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the pra/n/a really

constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the

beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause

'Know me only,' followed by 'I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self,

meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, 'And

that pra/n/a indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable,

immortal.' The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be

similar, and we therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the

same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as

to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten

subjects (subjective powers)[133] cannot rest on anything but Brahman.

Moreover, pra/n/a must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning)

being accepted,' i.e. because in the case of other passages where

characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word pra/n/a is taken

in the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the passage

to refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage itself there

is 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance,

the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the

passage, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' contains a

characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the

function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can

figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No

mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes

down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5).

Nor does the indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur

in the passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know

the speaker,' preclude the view of pra/n/a denoting Brahman. For, as the

passages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and others, prove, there is

in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from

Brahman, but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the

mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul,

agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz.

'let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,')

which, by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions,

aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the

individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That

the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears

from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is

not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know

as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the

statement about the difference of pra/n/a and praj/n/a (contained in the

passage, 'Together they dwell in this body, together they depart') does

not agree with that interpretation according to which pra/n/a is

Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the

respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and

constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of

as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by

those two adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may

be identified, as is done in the passage 'pra/n/a is praj/n/a.'

The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different manner

also[134], as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as

well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter

whose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of

devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout

meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect

of pra/n/a, under the aspect of praj/n/a, and in itself. The passages,

'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is pra/n/a,' and 'Having

laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it

alone as uktha,' refer to the pra/n/a aspect. The introductory passage,

'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that praj/n/a,' and

the subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the

word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by praj/n/a taken

possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the

praj/n/a aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the

following passage, 'These ten objects have reference to praj/n/a, the

ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there

would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no

objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is

not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the

spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the

subjects and the subjects on the pra/n/a.' Thus we see that the one

meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as

Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in

itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman

is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so,

for instance (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body

is pra/n/a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three

aspects perfectly agrees with the pra/n/a chapter[135]; as, on the one

hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses

we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and

as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of pra/n/a,

praj/n/a, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled

conclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.

[Footnote 32: The subject is the universal Self whose nature is

intelligence (/k/u); the object comprises whatever is of a

non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal

organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material

[Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of

the 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in

order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego.

Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and

the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam

asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and

second person.]

[Footnote 34: Adhyasa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of

(mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential

nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.]

[Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of

speech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have

existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and

the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of

wrong knowledge.]

[Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children,

wealth, &c., belong to my Self.']

[Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form

of remembrance' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those

cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other

thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow

which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to

consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in

Pa/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati. These are cases of

recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself

to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived

is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in

the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which

is at the time not present but remembered only.]

[Footnote 39: The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act

of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are

superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place,

mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the

case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a

piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the

modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action

which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the

latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 40: This is the definition of the akhyativadins.]

[Footnote 41: Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to

[Footnote 42: The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is

svayampraka/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all

cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as

it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of

Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross

bodies, i.e. in so far as it is jiva, individual or personal soul. Cp.

Bhamati, pp. 22, 23: '/k/idatmaiva svayampraka/s/oszpi

buddhyadivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/at katha/mk/id asm

upratyayavishayoszha/m/karaspada/m/ jiva iti /k/a jantur iti /k/a

ksheuajna iti /k/akhyayate.']

[Footnote 43: Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector

says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the

ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may

be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the

ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by

itself or by anything else.--It is known or manifest, the Vedantin

replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i.e.

on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri

construes the above clause in a different way:

asmatpratyayavishayatveszpy aparokshatvad ekantenavishayatvabbavat

tasminn aha@nkaradyadhyasa ity artha/h/. Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id

atmano nesh/t/am ity asa@nkyaha pratyagatmeti.]

[Footnote 44: Tatraiva/m/ sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara/n/e sati.

Bha. Tasminn adhyase uktarityazvidyavmake sati. Go. Yatratmani

buddhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa/h/ tena

buddhyadi-nasztmana va k/ri/tenasz/s/anayadidoshe/n/a /k/aitanyagu/n/ena

/k/atmanatma va vastuto na svalpenapi yujyate. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 45: Whether they belong to the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of

the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e.

that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.]

[Footnote 46: It being of course the function of the means of right

knowledge to determine Truth and Reality.]

[Footnote 47: The Bhamati takes adhish/th/anam in the sense of

superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a

superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.]

[Footnote 48: If activity could proceed from the body itself,

non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.]

[Footnote 49: I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the

Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.]

[Footnote 50: The Mima/m/sa, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show

that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with

Brahman. This Mima/m/sa being an enquiry into the meaning of the

Vedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta mima/m/sa.]

[Footnote 51: Nadhikarartha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyartha/h/, kam

ayam atha/s/abdo brahmaj/n/ane/kkh/ya/h/ kim vantar/n/itavi/k/arasya

athave/kkh/avi/s/esha/n/aj/n/anasyarambhartha/h/. Nadya/h/ tasya

mima/m/sapravartikayas tadapravartyatvad anarabhyatvat tasya/s/

/k/ottaratra pratyadhikara/n/am apratipadanat. Na

dvitiyoztha/s/abdenanantaryoktidvara vi/s/ish/t/adhikaryasamarpa/n/e

sadhana/k/atush/t/ayasampannana/m/ brahmadhitadvi/k/arayor anarthitvad

vi/k/aranarambhan na /k/a vi/k/aravidhiva/s/ad adhikari kalpya/h/

prarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhikari/n/a/s/ /k/a vidhyapekshitopadhitvan na

t/ri/tiya/h/ brahmaj/n/anasyanandasakshatkaratvenadhikaryatve z

pyapradhanyad atha/s/abdasambandhat tasman narambharthateti. Ananda

[Footnote 52: Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry

into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may

be comprised under the relation of anantarya.]

[Footnote 53: He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then

from the breast.]

[Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for

instance, the offering of the prayajas is to the

dar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for

another as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apur/n/amasa

qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is

unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of

succession of the actions is in its right place.]

[Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are

discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering

(titiksha), attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and

faith (/s/raddha).]

[Footnote 56: According to Pa/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case

expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or

connected with, some other thing.]

[Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result

may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grama/m/

ga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the

arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring

object and result coincide.]

[Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the

Brahma-mima/m/sa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and

from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief

[Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the

Nyaya, the Sa@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three

opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the

two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.]

[Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of

the essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in

the beginning,' &c.]

[Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and

Go.; the Bha. proposes another less plausible division.]

[Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara/h/ are:

origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.]

[Footnote 63: The pradhana, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal

matter of the world in the /S/a@nkhya-system. It will be fully discussed

in later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhana has

been left untranslated. Cp. Sa@nkhya Karika 3.]

[Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sari/n/am evagamaj

jagaddhetum a/k/akshate. Ananada Giri.]

[Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.]

[Footnote 66: Atmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga),

syntactical connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use

of in the Purva Mima/m/sa.]

[Footnote 68: The so-called sakshatkara of Brahman. The &c. comprises

inference and so on.]

[Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial

post and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being

supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial

[Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/astras were not of a different

nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/astras;

if they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge

of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way

as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly

world and the like.]

[Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the

gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the

third that is independent of either.]

[Footnote 72: Ananda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is:

p/ri/thagjij/n/asavishayatva/k/ /k/a dharmadyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/

brahma/n/o yuktam ityaha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapa/th/e dharmadyasparse

karmaphalavailaksba/n/ya/m/ hetuk/ri/tam.--The above translation follows

Govindananda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva

karmaphalavilaksha/n/atvad ity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena

kena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampadanam. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on

account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is

identified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief

object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality.

The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not

only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence

being common to both.]

[Footnote 75: Adhyasa/h/ /s/astratoitasmi/m/s taddhi/h/. Sampadi

sampadyamanasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti

vi/s/esha/h/. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are,

therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/

sa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vayau pra/n/e /k/a da/s/a/s/agata/m/ jagad

dar/s/ayati yatha jivatmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyaya

brahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvayaphalayakalpata iti. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 77: The butter used in the upa/ms/uyaja is ceremonially

purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be

said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as

kart/ri/--agent--stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of

meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with

[Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of

obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from

the two preceding hypotheses.]

[Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/

karoti), things to be obtained (grama/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be

modified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be

ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).]

[Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided

like transitory things.]

[Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice

with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid

[Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages

conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the

objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing

information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a

purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of

which no purpose has been established?]

[Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural

motives--not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and

[Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.]

[Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the

Veda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are

differently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara

endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer

to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin

action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might

be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for

instance, 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as

enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the

one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean

'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahma/n/a is to be formed;' just

as we understand something positive by the expression 'a

non-Brahma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To

this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word

'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to

which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words

denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire

absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded

to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the

heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the

non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as

intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The

question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed

in all treatises on the Purva Mima/m/sa; see, for instance,

Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.]

[Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far

as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is

finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.]

[Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife,

children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self,

i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.]

[Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.]

[Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best

[Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose

state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.]

[Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant,

not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.]

[Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to

rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle

independent of Sattva.]

[Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapatlim

nirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad

va brahma/n/o sarvaj/n/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti.

Prathama/m/ pratyaha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvara viyz/rin/oti

anityatve hiti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/n/aneti. Svato nityasyapi

j/n/anasya tattadarthava/kkh/innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam

pratyayartho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatity aha.--The knowledge of Brahman is

eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but

it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the

verbal affix in 'janati' indicating the particularity of the act.]

[Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapa/th/aka of the

Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to

fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the

third passage also where it occurs.]

[Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to

assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three

[Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost

his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing

so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of

an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is

that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther

astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.]

[Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.]

[Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose

guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather

hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.]

[Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.]

[Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jivatman is

conversant with the names and forms of individual things.]

[Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of

the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are

[Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is

meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities--such as the

heart and the like--which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.]

[Footnote 103: Ananda Giri reads avish/t/asya for avishk/ri/tasya.]

[Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of

the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying

different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones,

&c. only the satta, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants,

animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in

animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.]

[Footnote 105: Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus

here also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva

siddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sutrak/ri/to api matam ity aha, evam iti,

/s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/astre dvairupyam brahma/n/o

bhavati; tatra sopadhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara/n/am

udaharati adityeti; uktanyaya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasarayati evam iti;

sopadhikopade/s/avan nirupadhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityadina,

atmaj/n/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam aha

pareti; annamayadyupadhidvarokasya katham paravidyavishayatva/m/ tatraha

upadhiti; nir/n/ayakramam aha vakyeti, uktartham adhikara/n/a/m/

kvastity asa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.]

[Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.]

[Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument

which is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.]

[Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so

on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot,

therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are

likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.]

[Footnote 109: Yadi labdha na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramatmano

vastutobhinnena jivatmana paramatma labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 110: Yatha paramesvarad bhinno jivatma drash/t/a na bhavaty

evam givatmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti,

jivasyanirva/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirva/k/ya/h/ syad ity ata aha

parame/s/varas tv avidyakalpitad iti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 111: The explanation of the anandamaya given hitherto is here

recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is

attributed by Go. An. to the v/ri/ttikara.]

[Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must

be taken if understood to denote Brahman.]

[Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.]

[Footnote 114: See I, 1, 15-19. ]

[Footnote 115: The preceding adhikara/n/a had shown that the five Selfs

(consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates,

are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of

Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman itself

is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara/n/a undertakes to

show that the passage about the golden person represents the savi/s/esha

Brahman as the object of devout meditation.]

[Footnote 116: So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes

on poets and singers is Brahman.]

[Footnote 117: Or else 'that which is within forms and names.']

[Footnote 118: Viz. as intimating it. Thus An. Gi. and Go. An. against

the accent of /rik/a/h/. Saya/n/a explains /rik/a/h/ as genitive.]

[Footnote 119: O/m/karasya pratikatvena va/k/akatvena lakshakatvena va

brahmatvam uktam, om iti, ka/m/ sukha/m/ tasyarthendriyayogajatva/m/

varayitu/m/ kham iti, tasya bhutaka/s/atva/m/ vyaseddhum pura/n/am ity

uktam. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 120: The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be

decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that is not

possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new

chapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to be taken into

consideration.]

[Footnote 121: The v/ri/ttikara, the commentators say.]

[Footnote 122: I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth,

according to Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was

entriely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the

[Footnote 123: So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as

non-tripartite light exists at all.]

[Footnote 124: Brahma/n/o vyava/kkh/idya teja/h/samarpakatva/m/

vi/s/eshakatvam, tadabhavozvi/s/eshakatvam. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 125: If we strictly follow the order of words in the

[Footnote 126: Svasamarthyena sarvanamna/h/

sannihitaparamar/s/itvava/s/ena.]

[Footnote 127: The v/ri/ttikara according to Go. An. in his /t/ika on

the bhashya to the next Sutra.]

[Footnote 128: Concerning the difficulty involved in this

interpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.]

[Footnote 129: The text runs, 'astitve /k/a pra/n/ana/m/ ni/hs/reyasam,'

and Go. An. explains 'astitve pra/n/asthitau pra/n/ana/m/ indriya/n/am

sthitir ity arthata/h/ /s/rutim aha.' He as well as An. Gi. quotes as

the text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athato ni/hs/reyasadanam

ity adi.' But if instead of 'astitve /k/a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get

the concluding clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's

[Footnote 130: Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the

Kau. Up. is Brahman.]

[Footnote 131: I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth,

rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.]

[Footnote 132: Ima/m/ /s/ariram instead of ida/m/ /s/ariram.]

[Footnote 133: Pa/nk/a /s/abdadaya/h/ pa/nk/a p/ri/thivyadaya/s/ /k/a

da/s/a bhutamatra/h/ pa/nk/a buddhindriya/n/i pa/nk/a buddhaya iti

da/s/a praj/n/amatra/h/. Yadva j/n/anendriyartha/h/ pa/nk/a

karzmendriyartha/s/ /ka/ pa/nk/eti da/s/a bhutamatra/h/

dvividhanindriya/n/i praj/n/amatra da/s/eti bhava/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 134: Viz. by the v/ri/ttikara.]

[Footnote 135: Ihapi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogat' of the

is known from everywhere.

Scripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and

breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man

is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is

in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him

therefore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body

is breath (the subtle body),' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 14). Concerning this

passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the

object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind,

&c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.

The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says.--Why?--Because the embodied

Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected

with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is

declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II,

1, 2), 'He is without breath, without mind, pure.'--But, it may be

objected, the passage, 'All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman

directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the

object of meditation?--This objection does not apply, the purvapakshin

rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on

Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being:

because Brahman is all this, tajjalan, let a man meditate with a calm

mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman

only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because,

as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion;

therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence

aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin

meditation on Brahman[136]; but meditation is separately enjoined in the

clause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon

the subsequent passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,'

&c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the

individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken

of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also

subsequently stated in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires

belong,' &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The

attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being

extremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self

within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of

barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of

the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected

that the immediately following passage, 'greater than the earth,' &c.,

cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness

which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the

same thing; and that, if one attribute only is to be ascribed to the

subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned

first; while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the

soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the

whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the

declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, 'That is Brahman'

(III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul[137], as it is clearly

connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the

object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind

To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be

meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind

and so on.--Why?--'On account of there being taught here what is known

from everywhere.' What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the

sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is

mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, ('all this indeed

is Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished

by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid

the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly

introducing a new topic.--But, it may be said, it has been shown that

Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the

purpose of intimating the injunction of calmness of mind, not for the

purpose of intimating Brahman itself.--True, we reply; but the fact

nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind,

&c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off

so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the

individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly

pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are

therefore not equal.

Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict

sense can be expressed[138], there being no speaker, still such phrases

as 'desired to be expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the

result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we

speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received

(by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be

expressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to

be received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired

to be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic

sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the

passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i.e.

intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities

of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for

the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self

which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and

reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true

desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another

passage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (Ch.

Up. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he

whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the

ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also

expressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the other

explanation also, according to which the passage means 'he whose Self is

the ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole

world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the

same reasons he is called 'he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus

the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the

nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms 'consisting of

mind,' and 'having breath for its body,' which the purvapakshin asserts

cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of

everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which

belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly

/S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti say of Brahman, 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou

art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy

staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (/S/ve. Up. IV,

3), and 'its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are

everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the

world' (Bha. Gita III, 13).

The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, without

mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms

'consisting of mind; having breath for its body,' on the other hand,

refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities

mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman

only is represented as the object of meditation.

embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).

The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are

possible in Brahman; the present Sutra states that they are not possible

in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained,

the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the embodied

individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, 'He whose

purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is

not disturbed, who is greater than the earth,' cannot easily be

attributed to the embodied Self. By the term 'embodied' (/s/arira) we

have to understand 'residing' in a body. If it be objected that the Lord

also resides in the body[139], we reply, True, he does reside in the

body, but not in the body only; for /s/ruti declares him to be

all-pervading; compare, 'He is greater than the earth; greater than the

atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul,

on the other hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of

fruition it does not exist.

activity and of the agent.

The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the

embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate)

denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage,

'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' (Ch. Up. III,

14, 4), the word 'him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion,

viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes

of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as

something to be obtained; while the words, 'I shall obtain,' represent

the meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer. Now,

wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same

being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the

same time. The relation existing between a person meditating and the

thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.--And thus for

the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of

consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on,

cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a

difference of words.

That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred

subject-matter (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 'Like a rice grain, or a barley

grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden

person is in the Self.' There one word, i.e. the locative 'in the Self,'

denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative

'person,' denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting

of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different.

Sm/ri/ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self and the

highest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated

in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all

beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.'

But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different

from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the

preceding Sutras? /S/ruti passages, as well as Sm/ri/ti, expressly deny

that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for

instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23, 'There is no other seer but he; there

is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. Gita XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O

Bharata, to be the kshetiaj/n/a in all kshetras.'

True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the

highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body,

the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of

as if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, although in reality

unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and

other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self)

the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically

assumed, as long as we have not learned--from the passage, 'That art

thou'--that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the

truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the

whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final

release, and the like.

account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the

denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman)

has thus to be contemplated, and because the case is analogous to that

On account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in the

clause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the

declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, 'He

is smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul only, which is

of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under

discussion, and not the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the

purvapaksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the present

Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection

raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a

thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as

omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and

therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to

occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of

Ayodhya although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole

earth.--But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to

occupy a limited space and to be minute?--He may, we reply, be spoken of

thus, 'because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under

discussion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the

lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar

qualities--which apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a

modification of the mind--just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred

stone called /S/alagram. Although present everywhere, the Lord is

pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is,

moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether,

although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if

considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also.

But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of

abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special

forms of contemplation, and are not real. The latter consideration

disposes also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the

heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would

follow that it is affected by all the imperfections which attach to

beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different

cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and

individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of

Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the

But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore

connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the

nature of intelligence and therefore not different from the individual

soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure,

pain, and so on (as the individual soul). The same result follows from

its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different

from the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other

knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), and similar passages. Hence the

highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory

This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From

the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living

beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to

fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is

the difference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and

demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter

is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all

evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the

fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on

the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their

essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in

Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is

on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and

refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of

more than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the assertion, that because

Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be

subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the

question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no

other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as,

'That art thou,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and

so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural

matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not

sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.

Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman which is

free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel

even the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to fruition; how then

should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the

part of Brahman?--Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and

Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.--In that case, we

reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong

knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched

thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in

consequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason

the Sutrakara says[140] 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of

their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition

on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a

difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being

the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed

by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect

knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the

figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of

fruition on Brahman's part.

immovable is mentioned (as his food).

We read in the Ka/th/avalli (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He

to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a

condiment?' This passage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and

'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the

eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no

distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the

individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that

Upanishad, the subjects of questions[141].

The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from

Scripture as well (cp. B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be

the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater,

according to the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up.

III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of

the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu.

Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.'

The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is

mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable

and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death

is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the

consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self,

however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to

eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made

of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right

to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that

this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all

living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being

the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may

here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances

only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self

cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on

without eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the

fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such

fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to

negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it

is well established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause

of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. Therefore

the eater can here be Brahman only.

only can be the eater referred to is moreover evident from the passage

(Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which

shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the

general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then

knows where he is,' shows that the cognition is connected with

difficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.

highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the

same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same

In the same Ka/th/avalli we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking

the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into

the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call

them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the

Tri/n/a/k/iketa sacrifice.'

Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul

are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the

mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of

as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i.e. the

body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on

this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a

preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is

dead--some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know

taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand,

the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it

intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul;

and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question

contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as different

from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the

past and the future, tell me that.'

The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus been stated, a

caviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can

be maintained.--Why?--On account of the characteristic mark implied in

the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to enjoy, the

fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent

individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual

form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the

two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the

same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual

soul and the highest Self, cannot be maintained; for drinking (i.e. the

fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account

of the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'

These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that

in phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men)

are walking,' the attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which

properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to

many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them

is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that,

while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink

because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume

that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument

being figuratively spoken of as the agent--a figure of speech

exemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a

chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be

represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt

whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the

individual soul and the highest Self.

Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views

is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into

the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in

either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as

'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another

interpretation is possible, to assume that a special place is here

ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world

of their good deeds' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of

the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the

sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the

scriptural passage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow

smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what

is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed

to each other like light and shade. Hence we conclude that the buddhi

and the individual soul are spoken of.

To this we make the following reply:--In the passage under discussion

the individual soul (vij/n/anatman) and the highest Self are spoken of,

because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature.

For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned,

beings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance,

the order is given, 'Look out for a second (i.e. a fellow) for this

bull,' people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So

here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to

determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when

a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for

the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the

soul.--But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be

meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the

cave?--Well, we reply, /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti speaks of the highest

Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12),

'The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt.

Up. II, 1, 'He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;'

and, 'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not

contrary to reason to assign to the omnipresent Brahman a special

locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already

demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works,

which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual

soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one

of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light and shade

also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not

belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like

light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience,

and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore

understand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul and

the highest Self.--Another reason for this interpretation follows.

Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only

with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent

passage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be

the chariot,' which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual

soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory

existence and final release, while the passage (9), 'He reaches the end

of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/n/u,' represents

the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding

passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his

Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has

entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the

abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same

two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The

highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the clause,

'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings forward a special

class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted

(as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the

passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest

The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'Two

birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general

topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore

conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the

passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is

meant, and from the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and

of intelligence, implied in the words, 'The other looks on without

eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again

the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged

into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own

impotence (ani/s/a), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord

(i/s/a.) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away.'

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra,

'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision

of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is

differently interpreted in the Pai@ngi-rahasya Brahma/n/a. According to

the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other

being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (j/n/a); so

that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetraj/n/a). The

objection that the word sattva might denote the individual soul, and the

word kshetraj/n/a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in

the first place, the words sattva and kshetraj/n/a have the settled

meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are in the second

place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Pai@ngi-rahasya,)

'The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one,

the seer, is the kshetraj/n/a; the two are therefore the internal organ

and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall

under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting

forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by

the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting

and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes

connected with the sa/m/sara and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is

pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on

without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with /s/ruti and sm/ri/ti

passages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the

individual soul' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the

passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in

the concluding passage of the section, 'These two are the sattva and the

kshetraj/n/a; to him indeed who knows this no impurity

attaches[142].'--But how can, on the above interpretation, the

non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an

enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet

fruit?'--The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the

fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the

intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of

Brahman. To that end[143] the passage under discussion metaphorically

ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so

far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting

and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the

soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in

reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not

the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is

not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be

considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere

presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here

maintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there one

sees the other,' &c.; B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical

assumption of agents, and so on--comparable to the assumption of the

existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream--holds good in the

sphere of Nescience only; while the passage, 'But when the Self only is

all this, how should he see another?' declares that all that practically

postulated existence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative

(of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).

Scripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is

the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even

though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on

both sides,' &c. (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1).

The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self

which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of

some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.

With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as follows: What is

meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i.e. the image

of a person (reflected in the eye of another): for of that it is well

known that it is seen, and the clause, 'The person that is seen in the

eye,' refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately

take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual

Self (cognitional Self, vij/n/anatman) which perceives the colours by

means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and,

moreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the passage) favours this

interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to

the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the

passage (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 2), 'He (the person in the sun) rests with his

rays in him (the person in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as

immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the

scriptural passage) may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord,

on the other hand[144], cannot be meant, because a particular locality

Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by

the person within the eye.--Why?--'On account of the agreement.' For the

qualities mentioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest

Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the

highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we

know from such texts as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou.' Immortality

and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The

location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest

Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scripture declares to be free

from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the

eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the

passage, 'Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs

away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the

qualities of sa/m/yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord

only (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him Sa/m/yadvama, for all blessings

(vama) go towards him (sa/m/yanti). He is also vamani, for he leads

(nayati) all blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati)

in all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within

the eye is the highest Lord.

But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which

is omnipresent like the ether?--To this question we reply that there

would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were

assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so

on, are attributed to him in the passage, 'He who dwells in the earth,'

&c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned,

viz. in the clause, 'He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so

on,' which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is

assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that

also such things as name and form, although not appropriate to Brahman

which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it.

That, in such passages as 'His name is ut, he with the golden beard'

(Ch. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of,

for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name

and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to

attribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence,

subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not contrary

to reason[145]; no more than to contemplate Vish/n/u in the sacred

distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brahman).

There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant

in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman

being meant is established 'by the reference to that which is

distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as

characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter[146], viz. in

the clauses, 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' that

same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage

also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion;

the clause, 'The teacher will tell you the way[147],' merely announcing

that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject

will be started].--How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman,

as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the

passage?--We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. 'Breath is

Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upako/s/ala says, 'I understand

that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is

Brahman.' Thereupon the fires reply, 'What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is

Ka.' Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether.

If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to

qualify the sense of 'Kha,' we should conclude that the name Brahman is

here symbolically[148] given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in

other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to

the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure

springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If

the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should

conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two

words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they

intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure. If[149] in the passage referred

to (viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second

Brahman (i.e. the word Brahman in the clause 'Ka is Brahman') were not

added, and if the sentence would run 'Ka, Kha is Brahman,' the word Ka

would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being

a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To

prevent this, both words--Ka as well as Kha--are joined with the word

Brahman ('Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brahman'). For the passage wishes to

intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated

upon as something in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the

beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is

spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim

in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words, 'This is

our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;' wherein they

point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, 'The teacher will

tell you the way' (which form the last clause of the concluding

passage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude

the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying,

'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one

who knows it' (which words intervene between the concluding speech of

the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person

within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person

within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus

appears that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman

which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent

it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of

Sa/m/yadvama and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus

knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, 'That

person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.'

The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following

reason also. From /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti we are acquainted with the

way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i.e.

who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described

(Pra. Up. I, 10), 'Those who have sought the Self by penance,

abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This

is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest.

From thence they do not return;' and also (Bha. Gita VIII, 24), 'Fire,

light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of

the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to

Brahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for

him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Ch. Up. IV, 15,

5), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to

light;' and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon

to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.

This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman. Those who

proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.' From this

description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows

Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.

account of the non-permanency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the

impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed

to the other Selfs).

To the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the person in the eye is

either the reflected Self or the cognitional Self (the individual soul)

or the Self of some deity the following answer is given.--No other Self

such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on

account of non-permanency.--The reflected Self, in the first place, does

not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the

eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the

person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage 'That

person within the eye' must, moreover, be held, on the ground of

proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man's own eye is the

object of (that man's) devout meditation (and not the reflected image of

his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then,

another man approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the

image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we

reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that

the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye

another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye.

Scripture, moreover, (viz. Ch. Up. VIII, 9, 1, 'It (the reflected Self)

perishes as soon as the body perishes,') declares the non-permanency of

the reflected Self.--And, further, 'on account of impossibility' (the

person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the

other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be

perceived in the reflected Self.--Of the cognitional Self, in the second

place, which is in general connexion with the whole body and all the

senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in

the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading

may, for the purpose of contemplation, be spoken of as connected with

particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already.

The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility

of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it.

Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the

highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (adhyaropita)

the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz, mortality and fear; so

that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities

of being the sa/m/yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the

cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power

(ai/s/varya).--In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz.

the sun) has its station in the eye--according to the scriptural

passage, 'He rests with his rays in him'--still Selfhood cannot be

ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (paragrupatva).

Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks

of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of

the gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their

lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally

belong to them; as the mantra declares, 'From terror of it (Brahman) the

wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra,

yea, Death runs as the fifth.'--Hence the person in the eye must be

viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being

adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known

and established, which is contained in the words 'is seen' (in the

phrase 'the person that is seen in the eye'), has to be taken as

referring to (the mental perception founded on) the /s/astra which

belongs to those who know; and the glorification (of devout meditation)

has to be understood as its purpose.

the attributes of that (Brahman) are designated.

In B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 1 ff. we read, 'He who within rules this world and

the other world and all beings,' and later on, 'He who dwells in the

earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the

earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,

the immortal,' &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of

a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling

within, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the

sacrifice, the beings, the Self.--Here now, owing to the unusualness of

the term (antaryamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self

of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who

has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability

of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being.

What alternative then does recommend itself?

As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says, we must assume

that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all

those mentioned above.--Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we

have no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character,

and that, on the other hand, the term antaryamin--which is derived from

antaryamana (ruling within)--cannot be called altogether unknown, that

therefore antaryamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over

the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 16), 'He

whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,'

&c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on,

dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action;

rulership is therefore rightly ascribed to him.--Or else the rulership

spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable

to enter within all things.--The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot

be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are

required for ruling).

To this we make the following reply.--The internal ruler, of whom

Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self,

cannot be anything else.--Why so?--Because its qualities are designated

in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the

statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of

created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate

attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the

omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.--The qualities

of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage,

'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their

primary sense to the highest Self.--Further, the passage, 'He whom the

earth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not

known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for

the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.--The attributes

'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of

shape and other sensible qualities.--The objection that the highest Self

is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is

without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to

the organs of action of those whom he rules.--If it should be objected

that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual

soul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad

infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no

other ruler (but the highest Self[150]). The objection would be valid

only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.--For all

these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.

(viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not

belonging to it.

Good so far, a Sa@nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of

not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana assumed by the

Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other

sensible qualities. For their Sm/ri/ti says, 'Undiscoverable,

unknowable, as if wholly in sleep' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also

the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects.

Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana.

The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra I, 1, 5,

but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging

to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies that the word 'internal

ruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to

the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as

not being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the

Sa@nkhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage

which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler

(B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but

hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.'--And Selfhood

also cannot belong to the pradhana.

Well, then, if the term 'internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote

the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us

suppose it to denote the embodied (individual) soul, which is

intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is

internal (pratya/nk/), and therefore of the nature of Self; and which is

immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil

actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not

being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an

action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the

action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance

(B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2), 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.' The

individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of

the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler

is the embodied soul.--To this reasoning the following Sutra replies.

ruler), for both also (i.e. both recensions of the B/ri/had Ara/n/yaka)

speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).

The word 'not' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding

Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual

soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a

jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the

other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of

both /s/akhas, i.e. the Ka/n/vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in

their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler,

viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the

object of his rule. The Ka/n/vas read (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 22), 'He who

dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, 'He who dwells in the Self.' If

the latter reading is adopted, the word 'Self' denotes the individual

soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word

'knowledge;' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is

therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual

soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term 'internal ruler.'--But how,

it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two

seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul

different from him?--Why--we ask in return--should that be

impossible?--Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural

passages, such as, 'There is no other seer but he,' &c., which deny that

there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal

ruler under discussion.--May, we rejoin, that passage not have the

purpose of denying the existence of another ruler?--No, the opponent

replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no

occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any

specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in

We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's

objection.--The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and

the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of

the organs of action, presented by Nescience, and is not absolutely

true. For the Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not

possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically

treated as if it were two; just as we make a distinction between the

ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those

scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object

of knowledge, for perception and the other means of proof, for the

intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of

Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance

with this, the scriptural passage, 'Where there is duality, as it were,

there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists

only in the sphere of Nescience; while the subsequent passage, 'But when

the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the

practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.

Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.

Scripture says, 'The higher knowledge is this by which the

Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,

which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without

hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal,

that which is imperishable, that it is which the wise regard as the

source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6).--Here the doubt arises

whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by

invisibility, &c. be the pradhana or the embodied soul, or the highest

We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings

the non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately

subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned

as parallel instances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its

thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring

forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the

Indestructible.'--But, it may be objected, men and spiders which are

here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature.--No, the

purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the

source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the

non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source

of the threads; and so in the case of man also.--While, moreover, in the

case of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be

accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as

invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer

and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as

invisibility which agree with the pradhana, no attribute of a contrary

nature being mentioned.--But the qualities mentioned in the

complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), 'He who knows all and perceives

all,' do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana; how, then, can the

source of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhana?--To this the

purvapakshin replies: The passage, 'The higher knowledge is that by

which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen,'

&c., points, by means of the term 'the Indestructible,' to the source of

all beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This

same 'Indestructible' is again mentioned later on in the passage, 'It is

higher than the high Imperishable.' Now that which in this latter

passage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the

qualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradhana

denoted by the term 'the Imperishable' is the source of all beings.--If,

however, the word 'source' (yoni) be taken in the sense of operative

cause, we may by 'the source of the beings' understand the embodied Self

also, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin

of the complex of things.

To this we make the following reply.--That which here is spoken of as

the source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as

invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing

else.--Whereupon is this conclusion founded?--On the statement of

attributes. For the clause, 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving,'

clearly states an attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since

the attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated

either of the non-intelligent pradhana or the embodied soul whose power

of sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that

the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under

discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all

beings--which latter is denoted by the term 'the Imperishable'--not to

the source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible

because the source of all beings, which--in the clause, 'From the

Indestructible everything here arises'--is designated as the material

cause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and

again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1, 9),

'From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of

knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As

therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of discussion

is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred

to in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same

Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are

ascribed.--We further maintain that also the passage, 'Higher than the

high Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from the

imperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of

discussion. We conclude this from the circumstance that the passage, 'He

truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the

imperishable true person,' (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the

passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely

declares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by

invisibility and the like--which formed the subject of the preceding

chapter--will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is

called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the

next Sutra.--Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the

Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that

it comprises the /Ri/g-veda and so on, and then the text continues, 'The

higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.'

Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the higher

knowledge. If we now were to assume that the Indestructible

distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different

from the highest Lord, the knowledge referring to it would not be the

higher one. For the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on

account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere

worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss; and nobody would

assume absolute bliss to result from the knowledge of the

pradhana.--Moreover, as on the view we are controverting the highest

Self would be assumed to be something higher than the imperishable

source of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be

acknowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds

only.--Further, the reference to the knowledge of everything being

implied in the knowledge of one thing--which is contained in the passage

(I, 1, 3), 'Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything

else becomes known?'--is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the

Self of all, and not either to the pradhana which comprises only what is

non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the objects of

enjoyment.--The text, moreover, by introducing the knowledge of Brahman

as the chief subject--which it does in the passage (I, 1, 1), 'He told

the knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest

son Atharvan'--and by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of

knowledge, viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads

to the comprehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of

the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the

term 'knowledge of Brahman' would become meaningless if that

Imperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not

Brahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the /Ri/g-veda,

and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of Brahman for

the mere purpose of glorifying the latter; as appears from the passages

in which it (the lower knowledge) is spoken of slightingly, such as (I,

2, 7), 'But frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen

in which this lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as

the highest good are subject again and again to old age and death.'

After these slighting remarks the text declares that he who turns away

from the lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12),

'Let a Brahama/n/a after he has examined all these worlds which are

gained by works acquire freedom from all desires. Nothing that is

eternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal (made). Let him

in order to understand this take fuel in his hand and approach a guru

who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.'--The remark that,

because the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as

parallel instances, that also which is compared to them, viz. the source

of all beings must be non-intelligent, is without foundation, since it

is not necessary that two things of which one is compared to the other

should be of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to which

the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth and the like, are

material, while nobody would assume the source of all beings to be

material.--For all these reasons the source of all beings, which

possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.

(the source of all beings) because there are stated distinctive

attributes and difference.

The source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the two

others, viz. the pradhana and the individual soul, on account of the

following reason also. In the first place, the text distinguishes the

source of all beings from the embodied soul, as something of a different

nature; compare the passage (II, 1, 2), 'That heavenly person is without

body, he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and

without mind, pure.' The distinctive attributes mentioned here, such as

being of a heavenly nature, and so on, can in no way belong to the

individual soul, which erroneously considers itself to be limited by

name and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes their

attributes to itself. Therefore the passage manifestly refers to the

Person which is the subject of all the Upanishads.--In the second place,

the source of all beings which forms the general topic is represented in

the text as something different from the pradhana, viz. in the passage,

'Higher than the high Imperishable.' Here the term 'Imperishable' means

that undeveloped entity which represents the seminal potentiality of

names and forms, contains the fine parts of the material elements,

abides in the Lord, forms his limiting adjunct, and being itself no

effect is high in comparison to all effects; the whole phrase, 'Higher

than the high Imperishable,' which expresses a difference then clearly

shows that the highest Self is meant here.--We do not on that account

assume an independent entity called pradhana and say that the source of

all beings is stated separately therefrom; but if a pradhana is to be

assumed at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being

assumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed to the

statements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all beings denoted

by the terms 'the Undeveloped' and so on, we have no objection to such

an assumption, and declare that, on account of the separate statement

therefrom, i.e. from that pradhana, 'the source of all beings' must mean

the highest Lord.--A further argument in favour of the same conclusion

is supplied by the next Sutra.

Subsequently to the passage, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' we

meet (in the passage, 'From him is born breath,' &c.) with a description

of the creation of all things, from breath down to earth, and then with

a statement of the form of this same source of beings as consisting of

all created beings, 'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon,

the quarters his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his

breath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth; he is

indeed the inner Self of all things.' This statement of form can refer

only to the highest Lord, and not either to the embodied soul, which, on

account of its small power, cannot be the cause of all effects, or to

the pradhana, which cannot be the inner Self of all beings. We therefore

conclude that the source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either

of the other two.--But wherefrom do you conclude that the quoted

declaration of form refers to the source of all beings?--From the

general topic, we reply. The word 'he' (in the clause, 'He is indeed the

inner Self of all things') connects the passage with the general topic.

As the source of all beings constitutes the general topic, the whole

passage, from 'From him is born breath,' up to, 'He is the inner Self of

all beings,' refers to that same source. Similarly, when in ordinary

conversation a certain teacher forms the general topic of the talk, the

phrase, 'Study under him; he knows the Veda and the Veda@ngas

thoroughly,' as a matter of course, refers to that same teacher.--But

how can a bodily form be ascribed to the source of all beings which is

characterised by invisibility and similar attributes?--The statement as

to its nature, we reply, is made for the purpose of showing that the

source of all beings is the Self of all beings, not of showing that it

is of a bodily nature. The case is analogous to such passages as, 'I am

food, I am food, I am the eater of food' (Taitt. Up. III, 10,

6).--Others, however, are of opinion[151] that the statement quoted does

not refer to the source of all beings, because that to which it refers

is spoken of as something produced. For, on the one hand, the

immediately preceding passage ('From him is born health, mind, and all

organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of

all') speaks of the aggregate of beings from air down to earth as

something produced, and, on the other hand, a passage met with later on

('From him comes Agni, the sun being his fuel,' up to 'All herbs and

juices') expresses itself to the same purpose. How then should all at

once, in the midst of these two passages (which refer to the creation),

a statement be made about the nature of the source of all beings?--The

attribute of being the Self of all beings, (which above was said to be

mentioned in the passage about the creation, 'Fire is his head,' &c., is

not mentioned there but) is stated only later on in a passage subsequent

to that which refers to the creation, viz. 'The Person is all this,

sacrifice,' &c. (II, 1, 10).--Now, we see that /s/ruti as well as

sm/ri/ti speaks of the birth of Prajapati, whose body is this threefold

world; compare /Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 121, 1, 'Hira/n/ya-garbha arose in

the beginning; he was the one born Lord of things existing. He

established the earth and this sky; to what God shall we offer our

oblation?' where the expression 'arose' means 'he was born.' And in

sm/ri/ti we read, 'He is the first embodied one, he is called the

Person; as the primal creator of the beings Brahman was evolved in the

beginning.' This Person which is (not the original Brahman but) an

effect (like other created beings) may be called the internal Self of

all beings (as it is called in II, 1, 4), because in the form of the

Self of breath it abides in the Selfs of all beings.--On this latter

explanation (according to which the passage, 'Fire is his head,' &c.,

does not describe the nature of the highest Lord, and can therefore not

be referred to in the Sutra) the declaration as to the Lord being the

'nature' of all which is contained in the passage, 'The Person is all

this, sacrifice,' &c., must be taken as the reason for establishing the

highest Lord, (i.e. as the passage which, according to the Sutra, proves

that the source of all beings is the highest Lord[152].)

qualifying the common terms (Vai/s/vanara and Self).

(In Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.) a discussion begins with the words, 'What is our

Self, what is Brahman?' and is carried on in the passage, 'You know at

present that Vai/s/vanara Self, tell us that;' after that it is declared

with reference to Heaven, sun, air, ether, water, and earth, that they

are connected with the qualities of having good light, &c., and, in

order to disparage devout meditation on them singly, that they stand to

the Vai/s/vanara in the relation of being his head, &c., merely; and

then finally (V, 18) it is said, 'But he who meditates on the

Vai/s/vanara Self as measured by a span, as abhivimana[153], he eats

food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs. Of that Vai/s/vanara

Self the head is Sutejas (having good light), the eye Vi/s/varupa

(multiform), the breath P/ri/thagvartman (moving in various courses),

the trunk Bahula (full), the bladder Rayi (wealth), the feet the earth,

the chest the altar, the hairs the grass on the altar, the heart the

Garhapatya fire, the mind the Anvaharya fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya

fire.'--Here the doubt arises whether by the term 'Vai/s/vanara' we have

to understand the gastric fire, or the elemental fire, or the divinity

presiding over the latter, or the embodied soul, or the highest

Lord.--But what, it may be asked, gives rise to this doubt?--The

circumstance, we reply, of 'Vai/s/vanara' being employed as a common

term for the gastric fire, the elemental fire, and the divinity of the

latter, while 'Self' is a term applying to the embodied soul as well as

to the highest Lord. Hence the doubt arises which meaning of the term is

to be accepted and which to be set aside.

Which, then, is the alternative to be embraced?--Vai/s/vanara, the

purvapakshin maintains, is the gastric fire, because we meet, in some

passages, with the term used in that special sense; so, for instance

(B/ri/. Up. V, 9), 'Agni Vai/s/vanara is the fire within man by which

the food that is eaten is cooked.'--Or else the term may denote fire in

general, as we see it used in that sense also; so, for instance

(/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 12), 'For the whole world the gods have made

the Agni Vai/s/vanara a sign of the days.' Or, in the third place, the

word may denote that divinity whose body is fire. For passages in which

the term has that sense are likewise met with; compare, for instance,

/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vai/s/vanara;

for he is the king of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace;' this

and similar passages properly applying to a divinity endowed with power

and similar qualities. Perhaps it will be urged against the preceding

explanations, that, as the word Vai/s/vanara is used in co-ordination

with the term 'Self,' and as the term 'Self' alone is used in the

introductory passage ('What is our Self, what is Brahman?'),

Vai/s/vanara has to be understood in a modified sense, so as to be in

harmony with the term Self. Well, then, the purvapakshin rejoins, let us

suppose that Vai/s/vanara is the embodied Self which, as being an

enjoyer, is in close vicinity to the Vai/s/vanara fire,[154] (i.e. the

fire within the body,) and with which the qualification expressed by the

term, 'Measured by a span,' well agrees, since it is restricted by its

limiting condition (viz. the body and so on).--In any case it is evident

that the term Vai/s/vanara does not denote the highest Lord.

To this we make the following reply.--The word Vai/s/vanara denotes the

highest Self, on account of the distinction qualifying the two general

terms.--Although the term 'Self,' as well as the term 'Vai/s/vanara,'

has various meanings--the latter term denoting three beings while the

former denotes two--yet we observe a distinction from which we conclude

that both terms can here denote the highest Lord only; viz. in the

passage, 'Of that Vai/s/vanara Self the head is Sutejas,' &c. For it is

clear that that passage refers to the highest Lord in so far as he is

distinguished by having heaven, and so on, for his head and limbs, and

in so far as he has entered into a different state (viz. into the state

of being the Self of the threefold world); represents him, in fact, for

the purpose of meditation, as the internal Self of everything. As such

the absolute Self may be represented, because it is the cause of

everything; for as the cause virtually contains all the states belonging

to its effects, the heavenly world, and so on, may be spoken of as the

members of the highest Self.--Moreover, the result which Scripture

declares to abide in all worlds--viz. in the passage, 'He eats food in

all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs'--is possible only if we take

the term Vai/s/vanara to denote the highest Self.--The same remark

applies to the declaration that all the sins are burned of him who has

that knowledge, 'Thus all his sins are burned,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 24,

3).--Moreover, we meet at the beginning of the chapter with the words

'Self' and 'Brahman;' viz. in the passage, 'What is our Self, what is

Brahman?' Now these are marks of Brahman, and indicate the highest Lord

only. Hence he only can be meant by the term Vai/s/vanara.

the highest Lord as described by Sm/ri/ti) is an inference (i.e. an

indicatory mark from which we infer the meaning of /S/ruti).

The highest Lord only is Vai/s/vanara, for that reason also that

Sm/ri/ti ascribes to the highest Lord only a shape consisting of the

threefold world, the fire constituting his mouth, the heavenly world his

head, &c. So, for instance, in the following passage, 'He whose mouth is

fire, whose head the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet

the earth, whose eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to him

the Self of the world.' The shape described here in Sm/ri/ti allows us

to infer a /S/ruti passage on which the Sm/ri/ti rests, and thus

constitutes an inference, i.e. a sign indicatory of the word

'Vai/s/vanara' denoting the highest Lord. For, although the quoted

Sm/ri/ti passage contains a glorification[155], still even a

glorification in the form in which it there appears is not possible,

unless it has a Vedic passage to rest on.--Other Sm/ri/ti passages also

may be quoted in connexion with this Sutra, so, for instance, the

following one, 'He whose head the wise declare to be the heavenly world,

whose navel the ether, whose eyes sun and moon, whose ears the regions,

and whose feet the earth, he is the inscrutable leader of all beings.'

account of the term (viz. Vai/s/vanara, having a settled different

meaning), &c., and on account of his abiding within (which is a

characteristic of the gastric fire); (we say) no, on account of the

perception (of the highest Lord), being taught thus (viz. in the gastric

fire), and on account of the impossibility (of the heavenly world, &c.

being the head, &c. of the gastric fire), and because they (the

Vajasaneyins) read of him (viz. the Vai/s/vanara) as man (which term

cannot apply to the gastric fire).

Here the following objection is raised.--Vai/s/vanara cannot be the

highest Lord, on account of the term, &c., and on account of the abiding

within. The term, viz. the term Vai/s/vanara, cannot be applied to the

highest Lord, because the settled use of language assigns to it a

different sense. Thus, also, with regard to the term Agni (fire) in the

passage (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 1, 11), 'He is the Agni Vai/s/vanara.' The

word '&c.' (in the Sutra) hints at the fiction concerning the three

sacred fires, the garhapatya being represented as the heart, and so on,

of the Vai/s/vanara Self (Ch. Up. V, 18, 2[156]).--Moreover, the

passage, 'Therefore the first food which a man may take is in the place

of homa' (Ch. Up. V, 19, 1), contains a glorification of (Vai/s/vanara)

being the abode of the oblation to Pra/n/a[157]. For these reasons we

have to understand by Vai/s/vanara the gastric fire.--Moreover,

Scripture speaks of the Vai/s/vanara as abiding within. 'He knows him

abiding within man;' which again applies to the gastric fire only.--With

reference to the averment that on account of the specifications

contained in the passage, 'His head is Sutejas,' &c., Vai/s/vanara is to

be explained as the highest Self, we (the purvapakshin) ask: How do you

reach the decision that those specifications, although agreeing with

both interpretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord only,

and not to the gastric fire?--Or else we may assume that the passage

speaks of the elemental fire which abides within and without; for that

that fire is also connected with the heavenly world, and so on, we

understand from the mantra, 'He who with his light has extended himself

over earth and heaven, the two halves of the world, and the atmosphere'

(/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 3).--Or else the attribute of having the

heavenly world, and so on, for its members may, on account of its power,

be attributed to that divinity which has the elemental fire for its

body.--Therefore Vai/s/vanara is not the highest Lord.

To all this we reply as follows.--Your assertions are unfounded,

'because there is taught the perception in this manner.' The reasons

(adduced in the former part of the Sutra), viz. the term, and so on, are

not sufficient to make us abandon the interpretation according to which

Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord.--Why?--On account of perception being

taught in this manner, i.e. without the gastric fire being set aside.

For the passages quoted teach the perception of the highest Lord in the

gastric fire, analogously to such passages as 'Let a man meditate on the

mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1).--Or else they teach that the

object of perception is the highest Lord, in so far as he has the

gastric fire called Vai/s/vanara for his limiting condition; analogously

to such passages as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,

whose form is light' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2[158]). If it were the aim of

the passages about the Vai/s/vanara to make statements not concerning

the highest Lord, but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would be

no possibility of specifications such as contained in the passage 'His

head is Sutejas,' &c. That also on the assumption of Vai/s/vanara being

either the divinity of fire or the elemental fire no room is to be found

for the said specifications, we shall show under the following

Sutra.--Moreover, if the mere gastric fire were meant, there would be

room only for a declaration that it abides within man, not that it is

man. But, as a matter of fact, the Vajasaneyins speak of him--in their

sacred text--as man, 'This Agni Vai/s/vanara is man; he who knows this

Agni Vai/s/vanara as man-like, as abiding within man,' &c. (/S/at. Bra.

X, 6, 1, 11). The highest Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of

everything, may be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within

man.--Those who, in the latter part of the Sutra, read 'man-like'

(puru-shavidham) instead of 'man' (purusham), wish to express the

following meaning: If Vai/s/vanara were assumed to be the gastric fire

only, he might be spoken of as abiding within man indeed, but not as

man-like. But the Vajasaneyins do speak of him as man-like, 'He who

knows him as man-like, as abiding within man.'--The meaning of the term

man-like is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be seen

that, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord has the

heaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth; and with reference

to man, that he forms the head, &c., and is based on the chin (of the

devout worshipper[159]).

fire), or the element (of fire).

The averment that the fanciful attribution of members contained in the

passage 'His head is Sutejas,' &c. may apply to the elemental fire also

which from the mantras is seen to be connected with the heavenly world,

&c., or else to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its

power, is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons already

stated Vai/s/vanara is neither the divinity nor the element. For to the

elemental fire which is mere heat and light the heavenly world and so on

cannot properly be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot

be the Self of another effect.--Again, the heavenly world cannot be

ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in spite of the power of

the latter; for, on the one hand, it is not a cause (but a mere effect),

and on the other hand its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all

these interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded on the

inapplicability of the term 'Self.'

assumption of a direct (worship of the highest Lord as Vai/s/vanara).

Above (Sutra 26) it has been said that Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord,

to be meditated upon as having the gastric fire either for his outward

manifestation or for his limiting condition; which interpretation was

accepted in deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as

abiding within--and so on.--The teacher Jaimini however is of opinion

that it is not necessary to have recourse to the assumption of an

outward manifestation or limiting condition, and that there is no

objection to refer the passage about Vai/s/vanara to the direct worship

of the highest Lord.--But, if you reject the interpretation based on the

gastric fire, you place yourself in opposition to the statement that

Vai/s/vanara abides within, and to the reasons founded on the term, &c.

(Su. 26).--To this we reply that we in no way place ourselves in

opposition to the statement that Vai/s/vanara abides within. For the

passage, 'He knows him as man-like, as abiding within man,' does not by

any means refer to the gastric fire, the latter being neither the

general topic of discussion nor having been mentioned by name

before.--What then does it refer to?--It refers to that which forms the

subject of discussion, viz. that similarity to man (of the highest Self)

which is fancifully found in the members of man from the upper part of

the head down to the chin; the text therefore says, 'He knows him as

man-like, as abiding within man,' just as we say of a branch that it

abides within the tree[160].--Or else we may adopt another

interpretation and say that after the highest Self has been represented

as having the likeness to man as a limiting condition, with regard to

nature as well as to man, the passage last quoted ('He knows him as

abiding within man') speaks of the same highest Self as the mere witness

(sakshin; i.e. as the pure Self, non-related to the limiting

conditions).--The consideration of the context having thus shown that

the highest Self has to be resorted to for the interpretation of the

passage, the term 'Vai/s/vanara' must denote the highest Self in some

way or other. The word 'Vi/s/vanara' is to be explained either as 'he

who is all and man (i.e. the individual soul),' or 'he to whom souls

belong' (in so far as he is their maker or ruler), and thus denotes the

highest Self which is the Self of all. And the form 'Vai/s/vanara' has

the same meaning as 'Vi/s/vanara,' the taddhita-suffix, by which the

former word is derived from the latter, not changing the meaning; just

as in the case of rakshasa (derived from rakshas), and vayasa (derived

from vayas).--The word 'Agni' also may denote the highest Self if we

adopt the etymology agni=agra/n/i, i.e. he who leads in front.--As the

Garhapatya-fire finally, and as the abode of the oblation to breath the

highest Self may be represented because it is the Self of all.

But, if it is assumed that Vai/s/vanara denotes the highest Self, how

can Scripture declare that he is measured by a span?--On the explanation

of this difficulty we now enter.

The circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends all measure being

spoken of as measured by a span has for its reason 'manifestation.' The

highest Lord manifests himself as measured by a span, i.e. he specially

manifests himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some special

places, such as the heart and the like, where he may be perceived.

Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher A/s/marathya, the

scriptural passage which speaks of him who is measured by a span may

refer to the highest Lord.

Or else the highest Lord may be called 'measured by a span' because he

is remembered by means of the mind which is seated in the heart which is

measured by a span. Similarly, barley-corns which are measured by means

of prasthas are themselves called prasthas. It must be admitted that

barley-grains themselves have a certain size which is merely rendered

manifest through their being connected with a prastha measure; while the

highest Lord himself does not possess a size to be rendered manifest by

his connexion with the heart. Still the remembrance (of the Lord by

means of the mind) may be accepted as offering a certain foundation for

the /S/ruti passage concerning him who is measured by a span.--Or

else[161] the Sutra may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although

not really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated upon) as

being of the measure of a span; whereby the passage is furnished with an

appropriate sense.--Thus the passage about him who is measured by a span

may, according to the opinion of the teacher Badari, be referred to the

highest Lord, on account of remembrance.

called prade/s/amatra), Jaimini thinks; for thus (Scripture) declares.

Or else the passage about him who is measured by a span may be

considered to rest on imaginative combination.--Why?--Because the

passage of the Vajasaneyibrahma/n/a which treats of the same topic

identifies heaven, earth, and so on--which are the members of

Vai/s/vanara viewed as the Self of the threefold world--with certain

parts of the human frame, viz. the parts comprised between the upper

part of the head and the chin, and thus declares the imaginative

identity of Vai/s/vanara with something whose measure is a span. There

we read, 'The Gods indeed reached him, knowing him as measured by a span

as it were. Now I will declare them (his members) to you so as to

identify him (the Vai/s/vanara) with that whose measure is a span; thus

he said. Pointing to the upper part of the head he said: This is what

stands above (i.e. the heavenly world) as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the head of

Vai/s/vanara[162]). Pointing to the eyes he said: This is he with good

light (i.e. the sun) as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the eye of V.). Pointing to

the nose he said: This is he who moves on manifold paths (i.e. the air)

as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the breath of V.). Pointing to the space (ether)

within his mouth he said: This is the full one (i.e. the ether) as

Vai/s/vanara. Pointing to the saliva within his mouth he said: This is

wealth as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the water in the bladder of V.). Pointing

to the chin he said: This is the base as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the feet of

V.).'--Although in the Vajasaneyi-brahma/n/a the heaven is denoted as

that which has the attribute of standing above and the sun as that which

has the attribute of good light, while in the Chandogya the heaven is

spoken of as having good light and the sun as being multiform; still

this difference does not interfere (with the unity of the vidya)[163],

because both texts equally use the term 'measured by a span,' and

because all /s/akhas intimate the same.--The above explanation of the

term 'measured by a span,' which rests on imaginative identification,

the teacher Jaimini considers the most appropriate one.

(i.e. the interstice between the top of the head and the chin which is

measured by a span).

Moreover the Jabalas speak in their text of the highest Lord as being in

the interstice between the top of the head and the chin. 'The unevolved

infinite Self abides in the avimukta (i.e. the non-released soul). Where

does that avimukta abide? It abides in the Vara/n/a and the Nasi, in the

middle. What is that Vara/n/a, what is that Nasi?' The text thereupon

etymologises the term Vara/n/a as that which wards off (varayati) all

evil done by the senses, and the term Nasi as that which destroys

(na/s/ayati) all evil done by the senses; and then continues, 'And what

is its place?--The place where the eyebrows and the nose join. That is

the joining place of the heavenly world (represented by the upper part

of the head) and of the other (i.e. the earthly world represented by the

chin).' (Jabala Up. I.)--Thus it appears that the scriptural statement

which ascribes to the highest Lord the measure of a span is appropriate.

That the highest Lord is called abhivimana refers to his being the

inward Self of all. As such he is directly measured, i.e. known by all

animate beings. Or else the word may be explained as 'he who is near

everywhere--as the inward Self--and who at the same time is measureless'

(as being infinite). Or else it may denote the highest Lord as him who,

as the cause of the world, measures it out, i.e. creates it. By all this

it is proved that Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord.

[Footnote 136: The clause 'he is to meditate with a calm mind' if taken

as a gu/n/avidhi, i.e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness

of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin

meditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence

[Footnote 137: Jivezpi dehadib/rim/hanaj jyastvanyayad va brahmatety

artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 138: The discussion is brought on by the term 'vivakshita' in

the Sutra whose meaning is 'expressed, aimed at,' but more literally

'desired to be expressed.']

[Footnote 139: Because he is vyapin.]

[Footnote 140: Another interpretation of the later part of Sutra.]

[Footnote 141: Cp. Ka/th/a Up, I, 1, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.]

[Footnote 142: Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge

that the individual soul is in reality Brahman. The commentators explain

rajas by avidya.]

[Footnote 143: Tadartham iti, jivasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yavat,

/k/aitanya/kh/ayapanna dhi/h/sukhadina pari/n/amata iti, tatra

purushozpi bhakt/ri/tvam ivanubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum

adhyaropayati. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 144: Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here,

because immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow

only, but in their true sense.]

[Footnote 145: The /t/ikas say that the contents of this last sentence

are hinted at by the word 'and' in the Sutra.]

[Footnote 146: I.e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred

fires give to Upako/s/ala, Ch. Up. IV, 10 ff.]

[Footnote 147: Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires,

and introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage

'the person that is seen in the eye,' &c. forms a part.]

[Footnote 148: A/s/rayantarapratyayasya/s/rayantare kshepa/h/

pratika/h/, yatha brahma/s/abda/h/ paramatmavishayo namadishu kshipyate.

[Footnote 149: The following sentences give the reason why, although

there is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.]

[Footnote 150: According to Scripture, Nira@nku/s/a/m/

sarvaniyantritva/m/ /s/rauta/m/ na /k/a tadri/s/e sarvaniyantari bhedo

na /k/anumana/m/ /s/rutibhaditam uttish/th/ati. Ananda Giri. Or else, as

Go. An. remarks, we may explain: as the highest Self is not really

different from the individual soul. So also Bhamati: Na /h/anavastha, na

hi niyantrantara/m/ tena niyamyate ki/m/ tu yo jivo niyanta

lokasiddha/h/ sa paramatmevopadhyava/kkh/edakalpitabheda/h/.]

[Footnote 151: V/ri/ttik/ri/dvyakhyam dushayati, Go. An.; ekade/s/ina/m/

dushayati, Ananda Giri; tad etat paramatenakshepasamadhanabhya/m/

vyakhyaya svamatena vya/k/ash/t/e, puna/h/ /s/abdozpi purvasmad

vi/s/esha/m/ dyotayann asyesh/t/ata/m/ su/k/ayati, Bhamati.--The

statement of the two former commentators must be understood to mean--in

agreement with the Bhamati--that /S/a@nkara is now going to refute the

preceding explanation by the statement of his own view. Thus Go. An.

later on explains 'asmin pakshe' by 'svapakshe.']

[Footnote 152: The question is to what passage the 'rupopanyasat' of the

Sutra refers.--According to the opinion set forth first it refers to Mu.

Up. II, 1, 4 ff.--But, according to the second view, II, 1, 4 to II, 1,

9, cannot refer to the source of all beings, i.e. the highest Self,

because that entire passage describes the creation, the inner Self of

which is not the highest Self but Prajapati, i.e. the Hira/n/yagarbha or

Sutratman of the later Vedanta, who is himself an 'effect,' and who is

called the inner Self, because he is the breath of life (pra/n/a) in

everything.--Hence the Sutra must be connected with another passage, and

that passage is found in II, 1, 10, where it is said that the Person

(i.e. the highest Self) is all this, &c.]

[Footnote 153: About which term see later on.]

[Footnote 154: Sarire laksha/n/aya vai/s/vanara/s/abdopapattim aha

tasyeti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 155: And as such might be said not to require a basis for its

[Footnote 156: Na /k/a garhapatyadih/ri/dayadita brahma/n/a/h/

sambhavini. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 157: Na /k/a pra/n/ahutyadhikara/n/ata z nyatra ja/th/aragner

yujyate. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 158: According to the former explanation the gastric fire is

to be looked on as the outward manifestation (pratika) of the highest

Lord; according to the latter as his limiting condition.]

[Footnote 159: I.e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head

and so on of the devout worshipper.]

[Footnote 160: Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that

it forms a part of the tree.--The Vai/s/vanara Self is identified with

the different members of the body, and these members abide within, i.e.

form parts of the body.]

[Footnote 161: Parima/n/asya h/ri/da/y/advararopitasya smaryama/n/e

katham aropo vishayavishayitvena bhedad ity a/s/a@nkya vyakhyantaram aha

prade/s/eti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 162: Atra sarvatra vai/s/vanara/s/abdas tada@ngapara/h/. Go.

[Footnote 163: Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the

/S/at. Bra. for the explanation of the passage from the Ch. Up.]

term 'own,' i.e. Self.

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5), 'He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the

sky are woven, the mind also with all the vital airs, know him alone as

the Self, and leave off other words! He is the bridge of the

Immortal.'--Here the doubt arises whether the abode which is intimated

by the statement of the heaven and so on being woven in it is the

highest Brahman or something else.

The purvapakshin maintains that the abode is something else, on account

of the expression, 'It is the bridge of the Immortal.' For, he says, it

is known from every-day experience that a bridge presupposes some

further bank to which it leads, while it is impossible to assume

something further beyond the highest Brahman, which in Scripture is

called 'endless, without a further shore' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12). Now if

the abode is supposed to be something different from Brahman, it must be

supposed to be either the pradhana known from Sm/ri/ti, which, as being

the (general) cause, may be called the (general) abode; or the air known

from /S/ruti, of which it is said (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 2, 'Air is that

thread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O Gautama, this world and the

other world and all beings are strung together'), that it supports all

things; or else the embodied soul which, as being the enjoyer, may be

considered as an abode with reference to the objects of its fruition.

Against this view we argue with the sutrakara as follows:--'Of the world

consisting of heaven, earth, and so on, which in the quoted passage is

spoken of as woven (upon something), the highest Brahman must be the

abode.'--Why?--On account of the word 'own,' i.e. on account of the word

'Self.' For we meet with the word 'Self' in the passage, 'Know him alone

as the Self.' This term 'Self' is thoroughly appropriate only if we

understand the highest Self and not anything else.--(To propound another

interpretation of the phrase 'sva/s/abdat' employed in the Sutra.)

Sometimes also Brahman is spoken of in /S/ruti as the general abode by

its own terms (i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman), as, for

instance (Ch. Up. VI. 8, 4), 'All these creatures, my dear, have their

root in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in the

being[164].'--(Or else we have to explain 'sva/s/abdena' as follows), In

the passages preceding and following the passage under discussion

Brahman is glorified with its own names[165]; cp. Mu. Up. II, 1, 10,

'The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest

Immortal,' and II, 2, 11, 'That immortal Brahman is before, is behind,

Brahman is to the right and left.' Here, on account of mention being

made of an abode and that which abides, and on account of the

co-ordination expressed in the passage, 'Brahman is all' (Mu. Up. II, 2,

11), a suspicion might arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated

nature, just as in the case of a tree consisting of different parts we

distinguish branches, stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion

the text declares (in the passage under discussion), 'Know him alone as

the Self.' The sense of which is: The Self is not to be known as

manifold, qualified by the universe of effects; you are rather to

dissolve by true knowledge the universe of effects, which is the mere

product of Nescience, and to know that one Self, which is the general

abode, as uniform. Just as when somebody says, 'Bring that on which

Devadatta sits,' the person addressed brings the chair only (the abode

of Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the passage, 'Know him alone as

the Self,' teaches that the object to be known is the one uniform Self

which constitutes the general abode. Similarly another scriptural

passage reproves him who believes in the unreal world of effects, 'From

death to death goes he who sees any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4,

11). The statement of co-ordination made in the clause 'All is Brahman'

aims at dissolving (the wrong conception of the reality of) the world,

and not in any way at intimating that Brahman is multiform in

nature[166]; for the uniformity (of Brahman's nature) is expressly

stated in other passages such as the following one, 'As a mass of salt

has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus

indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a

mass of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 13).--For all these reasons the

abode of heaven, earth, &c. is the highest Brahman.--Against the

objection that on account of the text speaking of a 'bridge,' and a

bridge requiring a further bank, we have to understand by the abode of

heaven and earth something different from Brahman, we remark that the

word 'bridge' is meant to intimate only that that which is called a

bridge supports, not that it has a further bank. We need not assume by

any means that the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay

and wood. For as the word setu (bridge) is derived from the root si,

which means 'to bind,' the idea of holding together, supporting is

rather implied in it than the idea of being connected with something

beyond (a further bank).

According to the opinion of another (commentator) the word 'bridge' does

not glorify the abode of heaven, earth, &c., but rather the knowledge of

the Self which is glorified in the preceding clause, 'Know him alone as

the Self,' and the abandonment of speech advised in the clause, 'leave

off other words;' to them, as being the means of obtaining immortality,

the expression 'the bridge of the immortal' applies[167]. On that

account we have to set aside the assertion that, on account of the word

'bridge,' something different from Brahman is to be understood by the

abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

have to resort.

By the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to understand the

highest Brahman for that reason also that we find it denoted as that to

which the Released have to resort.--The conception that the body and

other things contained in the sphere of the Not-self are our Self,

constitutes Nescience; from it there spring desires with regard to

whatever promotes the well-being of the body and so on, and aversions

with regard to whatever tends to injure it; there further arise fear and

confusion when we observe anything threatening to destroy it. All this

constitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils with which we

all are acquainted. Regarding those on the other hand who have freed

themselves from the stains of Nescience desire aversion and so on, it is

said that they have to resort to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth,

&c. which forms the topic of discussion. For the text, after having

said, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his

works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher and the lower'

(Mu. Up. II, 2, 8), later on remarks, 'The wise man freed from name and

form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up.

III, 2, 8). That Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the

released, is known from other scriptural passages, such as 'When all

desires which once entered his heart are undone then does the mortal

become immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 7). Of the

pradhana and similar entities, on the other hand, it is not known from

any source that they are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover,

the text (in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self and leave off

other words') declares that the knowledge of the abode of heaven and

earth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of all speech; a condition

which, according to another scriptural passage, attaches to (the

knowledge of) Brahman; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 21, 'Let a wise Brahma/n/a,

after he has discovered him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after

many words, for that is mere weariness of the tongue.'--For that reason

also the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the highest Brahman.

inferred, (i.e. the pradhana), on account of the terms not denoting it.

While there has been shown a special reason in favour of Brahman (being

the abode), there is no such special reason in favour of anything else.

Hence he (the sutrakara) says that that which is inferred, i.e. the

pradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, is not to be accepted as the

abode of heaven, earth, &c.--Why?--On account of the terms not denoting

it. For the sacred text does not contain any term intimating the

non-intelligent pradhana, on the ground of which we might understand the

latter to be the general cause or abode; while such terms as 'he who

perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) intimate an intelligent

being opposed to the pradhana in nature.--For the same reason the air

also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of Selfhood

and intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar qualities do

not belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its adjuncts; thus the

individual soul also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,

&c., for the same reason, i.e. on account of the terms not denoting

it.--Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and

so on, cannot properly be given to the individual soul because the

latter is limited by certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not

omnipresent)[168].--The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is

caused by what follows[169].--The individual soul is not to be accepted

as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the following reason also.

The passage 'Know him alone as the Self' moreover implies a declaration

of difference, viz. of the difference of the object of knowledge and the

knower. Here the individual soul as being that which is desirous of

release is the knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by the

word 'self' and represented as the object of knowledge, is understood to

be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.--For the following reason also

the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,

The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire chapter),

as we see from the passage, 'Sir, what is that through which, when it is

known, everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3) in which the

knowledge of everything is declared to be dependent on the knowledge of

one thing. For all this (i.e. the entire world) becomes known if Brahman

the Self of all is known, not if only the individual soul is

known.--Another reason against the individual soul follows.

the former is characteristic of the highest Lord, the latter of the

individual soul).

With reference to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on,

the text says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. (Mu. Up. III, 1,

1). This passage describes the two states of mere standing, i.e. mere

presence, and of eating, the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,'

referring to the eating, i.e. the fruition of the results of works, and

the clause, 'The other one looks on without eating,' describing the

condition of mere inactive presence. The two states described, viz. of

mere presence on the one hand and of enjoyment on the other hand, show

that the Lord and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room

for this statement which represents the Lord as separate from the

individual soul, only if the passage about the abode of heaven and earth

likewise refers to the Lord; for in that case only there exists a

continuity of topic. On any other supposition the second passage would

contain a statement about something not connected with the general

topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for.--But, it may be

objected, on your interpretation also the second passage makes an

uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it represents the individual

soul as separate from the Lord.--Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the

purpose of Scripture to make statements regarding the individual soul.

From ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different

individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other limiting

adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and enjoyer, and we therefore

must not assume that it is that which Scripture aims at setting forth.

The Lord, on the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells us

nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all scriptural

passages, and we therefore cannot assume that any passage should refer

to him merely casually[170].--That the mantra 'two birds,' &c. speaks of

the Lord--and the individual soul we have already shown under I, 2,

11.--And if, according to the interpretation given in the

Pai@ngi-upanishad (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is understood

to refer to the internal organ (sattva) and the individual soul (not to

the individual soul and the Lord), even then there is no contradiction

(between that interpretation and our present averment that the

individual soul is not the abode of heaven and earth).--How so?--Here

(i.e. in the present Sutra and the Sutras immediately preceding) it is

denied that the individual soul which, owing to its imagined connexion

with the internal organ and other limiting adjuncts, has a separate

existence in separate bodies--its division being analogous to the

division of universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces

within jars and the like--is that which is called the abode of heaven

and earth. That same soul, on the other hand, which exists in all

bodies, if considered apart from the limiting adjuncts, is nothing else

but the highest Self. Just as the spaces within jars, if considered

apart from their limiting conditions, are merged in universal space, so

the individual soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the

abode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really be separate

from the highest Self. That it is not the abode of heaven and earth, is

therefore said of the individual soul in so far only as it imagines

itself to be connected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it

follows that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so

on.--The same conclusion has already been arrived at under I, 2, 21; for

in the passage concerning the source of all beings (which passage is

discussed under the Sutra quoted) we meet with the clause, 'In which

heaven and earth and the sky are woven.' In the present adhikara/n/a the

subject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.

that about the state of deep sleep (i.e. the vital air which remains

awake even in the state of deep sleep).

We read (Ch. Up. VII, 23; 24), 'That which is much (bhuman) we must

desire to understand.--Sir, I desire to understand it.--Where one sees

nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is what

is much (bhuman). Where one sees something else, hears something else,

understands something else, that is the Little.'--Here the doubt arises

whether that which is much is the vital air (pra/n/a) or the highest

Self.--Whence the doubt?--The word 'bhuman,' taken by itself, means the

state of being much, according to its derivation as taught by Pa/n/ani,

VI, 4, 158. Hence there is felt the want of a specification showing what

constitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself at

first the approximate passage, 'The vital air is more than hope' (Ch.

Up. VII, 15, 1), from which we may conclude that the vital air is

bhuman.--On the other hand, we meet at the beginning of the chapter,

where the general topic is stated, with the following passage, 'I have

heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am

in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine;' from which passage

it would appear that the bhuman is the highest Self.--Hence there arises

a doubt as to which of the two alternatives is to be embraced, and which

is to be set aside.

The purvapakshin maintains that the bhuman is the vital air, since there

is found no further series of questions and answers as to what is more.

For while we meet with a series of questions and answers (such as, 'Sir,

is there something which is more than a name?'--'Speech is more than

name.'--'Is there something which is more than speech?'--'Mind is more

than speech'), which extends from name up to vital air, we do not meet

with a similar question and answer as to what might be more than vital

air (such as, 'Is there something which is more than vital air?'--'Such

and such a thing is more than vital air'). The text rather at first

declares at length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,'

&c.) that the vital air is more than all the members of the series from

name up to hope; it then acknowledges him who knows the vital air to be

an ativadin, i.e. one who makes a statement surpassing the preceding

statements (in the passage, 'Thou art an ativadin. He may say I am an

ativadin; he need not deny it'); and it thereupon (in the passage, 'But

he in reality is an ativadin who declares something beyond by means of

the True'[171]),--not leaving off, but rather continuing to refer to the

quality of an ativadin which is founded on the vital air,--proceeds, by

means of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to the bhuman;

so that we conclude the meaning to be that the vital air is the

bhuman.--But, if the bhuman is interpreted to mean the vital air, how

have we to explain the passage in which the bhuman is characterised.

'Where one sees nothing else?' &c.--As, the purvapakshin replies, in the

state of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all activity, such as

seeing, &c., on the part of the organs merged in the vital air, the

vital air itself may be characterised by a passage such as, 'Where one

sees nothing else.' Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. Up. IV,

2; 3) describes at first (in the words, 'He does not hear, he does not

see,' &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised by the cessation of

the activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring that in that

state the vital air, with its five modifications, remains awake ('The

fires of the pra/n/as are awake in that town'), shows the vital air to

occupy the principal position in the state of deep sleep.--That passage

also, which speaks of the bliss of the bhuman ('The bhuman is bliss,'

Ch. Up. VII, 23), can be reconciled with our explanation, because Pra.

Up. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to the state of deep sleep ('Then

that god sees no dreams and at that time that happiness arises in his

body').--Again, the statement, 'The bhuman is immortality' (Ch. Up. VII,

24, 1), may likewise refer to the vital air; for another scriptural

passage says, 'Pra/n/a is immortality' (Kau. Up. III, 2).--But how can

the view according to which the bhuman is the vital air be reconciled

with the fact that in the beginning of the chapter the knowledge of the

Self is represented as the general topic ('He who knows the Self

overcomes grief,' &c.)?--By the Self there referred to, the purvapakshin

replies, nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage, 'The

vital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air is brother,

the vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the vital air is

Brahma/n/a' (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1), represents the vital air as the Self

of everything. As, moreover, the passage, 'As the spokes of a wheel rest

in the nave, so all this rests in pra/n/a,' declares the pra/n/a to be

the Self of all--by means of a comparison with the spokes and the nave

of a wheel--the pra/n/a may be conceived under the form of bhuman, i.e.

plenitude.--Bhuman, therefore, means the vital air.

To this we make the following reply.--Bhuman can mean the highest Self

only, not the vital air.--Why?--'On account of information being given

about it, subsequent to bliss.' The word 'bliss' (samprasada) means the

state of deep sleep, as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of

the word ('In it he, i.e. man, is altogether

pleased--samprasidati')--and, secondly, from the fact of samprasada

being mentioned in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka together with the state of

dream and the waking state. And as in the state of deep sleep the vital

air remains awake, the word 'samprasada' is employed in the Sutra to

denote the vital air; so that the Sutra means, 'on account of

information being given about the bhuman, subsequently to (the

information given about) the vital air.' If the bhuman were the vital

air itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make statements about

the bhuman in addition to the statements about the vital air. For in the

preceding passages also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement

about name subsequent to the previous statement about name (i.e. the

text does not say 'name is more than name'), but after something has

been said about name, a new statement is made about speech, which is

something different from name (i.e. the text says, 'Speech is more than

name'), and so on up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent

statement referring to something other than the topic of the preceding

one. We therefore conclude that the bhuman also, the statement about

which follows on the statement about the vital air, is something other

than the vital air. But--it may be objected--we meet here neither with a

question, such as, 'Is there something more than vital air?' nor with an

answer, such as, 'That and that is more than vital air.' How, then, can

it be said that the information about the bhuman is given subsequently

to the information about the vital air?--Moreover, we see that the

circumstance of being an ativadin, which is exclusively connected with

the vital air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. 'But in

reality he is an ativadin who makes a statement surpassing (the

preceding statements) by means of the True'). There is thus no

information additional to the information about the vital air.--To this

objection we reply that it is impossible to maintain that the passage

last quoted merely continues the discussion of the quality of being an

ativadin, as connected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the

clause, 'He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of the True,'

states a specification.--But, the objector resumes, this very statement

of a specification may be explained as referring to the vital air. If

you ask how, we refer you to an analogous case. If somebody says, 'This

Agnihotrin speaks the truth,' the meaning is not that the quality of

being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth; that quality rather

depends on the (regular performance of the) agnihotra only, and speaking

the truth is mentioned merely as a special attribute of that special

Agnihotrin. So our passage also ('But in reality he is an ativadin who

makes a statement, &c. by means of the True') does not intimate that the

quality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the truth, but merely

expresses that speaking the truth is a special attribute of him who

knows the vital air; while the quality of being an ativadin must be

considered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air.--This objection

we rebut by the remark that it involves an abandonment of the direct

meaning of the sacred text. For from the text, as it stands, we

understand that the quality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the

truth; the sense being: An ativadin is he who is an ativadin by means of

the True. The passage does not in anyway contain a eulogisation of the

knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected with the latter only

on the ground of general subject-matter (prakara/n/a)[172]; which would

involve an abandonment of the direct meaning of the text in favour of

prakara/n/a[173].--Moreover, the particle but ('But in reality he is,'

&c.), whose purport is to separate (what follows) from the

subject-matter of what precedes, would not agree (with the pra/n/a

explanation). The following passage also, 'But we must desire to know

the True' (VII, 16), which presupposes a new effort, shows that a new

topic is going to be entered upon.--For these reasons we have to

consider the statement about the ativadin in the same light as we should

consider the remark--made in a conversation which previously had turned

on the praise of those who study one Veda--that he who studies the four

Vedas is a great Brahma/n/a; a remark which we should understand to be

laudatory of persons different from those who study one Veda, i.e. of

those who study all the four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume

that a new topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer

only; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is sufficiently

clear from the circumstance that no connexion can be established between

it and the preceding topic. The succession of topics in the chapter

under discussion is as follows: Narada at first listens to the

instruction which Sanatkumara gives him about various matters, the last

of which is Pra/n/a, and then becomes silent. Thereupon Sanatkumara

explains to him spontaneously (without being asked) that the quality of

being an ativadin, if merely based on the knowledge of the vital

air--which knowledge has for its object an unreal product,--is devoid of

substance, and that he only is an ativadin who is such by means of the

True. By the term 'the True' there is meant the highest Brahman; for

Brahman is the Real, and it is called the 'True' in another scriptural

passage also, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'The True, knowledge, infinite is

Brahman.' Narada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry ('Might

I, Sir, become an ativadin by the True?') and Sanatkumara then leads

him, by a series of instrumental steps, beginning with understanding, up

to the knowledge of bhuman. We therefrom conclude that the bhuman is

that very True whose explanation had been promised in addition to the

(knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see that the instruction about the

bhuman is additional to the instruction about the vital air, and bhuman

must therefore mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital

air. With this interpretation the initial statement, according to which

the enquiry into the Self forms the general subject-matter, agrees

perfectly well. The assumption, on the other hand (made by the

purvapakshin), that by the Self we have here to understand the vital air

is indefensible. For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to

the vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place,

cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge of the

highest Self; for, as another scriptural passage declares, 'There is no

other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 15). Moreover, after we have read at

the outset, 'Do, Sir, lead me over to the other side of grief' (Ch. Up.

VII, 1, 3), we meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2),

'To him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumara

showed the other side of darkness.' The term 'darkness' here denotes

Nescience, the cause of grief, and so on.--Moreover, if the instruction

terminated with the vital air, it would not be said of the latter that

it rests on something else. But the brahma/n/a (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 1) does

say, 'The vital air springs from the Self.' Nor can it be objected

against this last argument that the concluding part of the chapter may

refer to the highest Self, while, all the same, the bhuman (mentioned in

an earlier part of the chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the

passage (VII, 24, 1), ('Sir, in what does the bhuman rest? In its own

greatness,' &c.), it appears that the bhuman forms the continuous topic

up to the end of the chapter.--The quality of being the bhuman--which

quality is plenitude--agrees, moreover, best with the highest Self,

which is the cause of everything.

The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes to the bhuman

agree well with the highest Self. The passage, 'Where one sees nothing

else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the bhuman,'

gives us to understand that in the bhuman the ordinary activities of

seeing and so on are absent; and that this is characteristic of the

highest Self, we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'But when

the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' &c. (B/ri/. Up.

IV, 5, 15). What is said about the absence of the activities of seeing

and so on in the state of deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is said with the

intention of declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of

describing the nature of the pra/n/a; for the highest Self (not the

vital air) is the topic of that passage. The bliss also of which

Scripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned only in order

to show that bliss constitutes the nature of the Self. For Scripture

says (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32), 'This is his highest bliss. All other

creatures live on a small portion of that bliss.'--The passage under

discussion also ('The bhuman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which

is little (limited). The bhuman only is bliss') by denying the reality

of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable shows that Brahman only

is bliss as bhuman, i.e. in its plenitude,--Again, the passage, 'The

bhuman is immortality,' shows that the highest cause is meant; for the

immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one, and another

scriptural passage says that 'whatever is different from that (Brahman)

is perishable' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2).--Similarly, the qualities of

being the True, and of resting in its own greatness, and of being

omnipresent, and of being the Self of everything which the text mentions

(as belonging to the bhuman) can belong to the highest Self only, not to

anything else.--By all this it is proved that the bhuman is the highest

things) up to ether.

We read (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 7; 8). 'In what then is the ether woven,

like warp and woof?--He said: O Gargi, the Brahma/n/as call this the

akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so

on.--Here the doubt arises whether the word 'akshara' means 'syllable'

or 'the highest Lord.'

The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'akshara' means 'syllable'

merely, because it has, in such terms as akshara-samamnaya, the meaning

of 'syllable;' because we have no right to disregard the settled meaning

of a word; and because another scriptural passage also ('The syllable Om

is all this,' Ch. Up. II, 23, 4) declares a syllable, represented as the

object of devotion, to be the Self of all.

To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by the word

'akshara.'--Why?--Because it (the akshara) is said to support the entire

aggregate of effects, from earth up to ether. For the sacred text

declares at first that the entire aggregate of effects beginning with

earth and differentiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which

it is 'woven like warp and woof;' leads then (by means of the question,

'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?') over to the

akshara, and, finally, concludes with the words, 'In that akshara then,

O Gargi, the ether is woven, like warp and woof.'--Now the attribute of

supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but

Brahman. The text (quoted from the Ch. Up.) says indeed that the

syllable Om is all this, but that statement is to be understood as a

mere glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain

Brahman.--Therefore we take akshara to mean either 'the Imperishable' or

'that which pervades;' on the ground of either of which explanations it

must be identified with the highest Brahman.

But--our opponent resumes--while we must admit that the above reasoning

holds good so far that the circumstance of the akshara supporting all

things up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending

on a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who

declare the pradhana to be the general cause. How then does the previous

argumentation specially establish Brahman (to the exclusion of the

pradhana)?--The reply to this is given in the next Sutra.

Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only).

The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord

only.--Why?--On account of the command.--For the sacred text speaks of a

command ('By the command of that akshara, O Gargi, sun and moon stand

apart!' III, 8, 9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord

only, not of the non-intelligent pradhana. For non-intelligent causes

such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to

their effects, such as jars and the like.

whose nature is different (from Brahman).

Also on account of the reason stated in this Sutra Brahman only is to be

considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to

ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything

else. The meaning of the Sutra is as follows. Whatever things other than

Brahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term 'akshara,'

from the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara

spoken of as the support of all things up to ether. The scriptural

passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, O Gargi, is unseen but

seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but

knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with

the pradhana also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c., as the

pradhana is non-intelligent.--Nor can the word akshara denote the

embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on

the one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self

('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing

that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it'); and, moreover,

limiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the

passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without

mind,' &c. (III, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting conditions

does not exist[174].--It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the

Imperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman.

highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking

of the meditation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om).

(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the

words, 'O Satyakama, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other

Brahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of

the two.' The text then goes on, 'Again, he who meditates with this

syllable Om of three matras on the highest Person,' &c.--Here the doubt

presents itself, whether the object of meditation referred to in the

latter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman; a doubt

based on the former passage, according to which both are under

The purvapakshin maintains that the other, i.e. the lower Brahman, is

referred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a

certain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is

omnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it

obtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if

the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the

qualification, 'the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital

principal (pra/n/a) may be called 'higher' with reference to the

To this we make the following reply: What is here taught as the object

of meditation is the highest Brahman only.--Why?--On account of its

being spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated

upon is, in a complementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act

of seeing, 'He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body;

purusham puri/s/ayam), higher than that one who is of the shape of the

individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their

objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the

object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of

the act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from

experience; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the

highest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete

intuition[176] is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest

Self we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of

meditation, in consequence of the term, 'the highest person.'--But--an

objection will be raised--as the object of meditation we have the

highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that

one who is himself higher, &c.; how, then, are we to know that those two

are identical?--The two passages, we reply, have in common the terms

'highest' (or 'higher,' para) and 'person.' And it must not by any means

be supposed that the term jivaghana[177] refers to that highest person

which, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been

introduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition

would be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be

different from that highest person which is represented as the object of

meditation. We rather have to explain the word jivaghana as 'He whose

shape[178] is characterised by the jivas;' so that what is really meant

by that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is

owing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of jivas, i.e.

individual souls; a condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in

general) by means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited

condition of the Self may itself be called 'higher,' if viewed with

regard to the senses and their objects.

Another (commentator) says that we have to understand by the word

'jivaghana' the world of Brahman spoken of in the preceding sentence

('by the Saman verses he is led up to the world of Brahman'), and again

in the following sentence (v. 7), which may be called 'higher,' because

it is higher than the other worlds. That world of Brahman may be called

jivaghana because all individual souls (jiva) with their organs of

action may be viewed as comprised (sa@nghata = ghana) within

Hira/n/yagarbha, who is the Self of all organs, and dwells in the

Brahma-world. We thus understand that he who is higher than that

jivaghana, i.e. the highest Self, which constitutes the object of sight,

also constitutes the object of meditation. The qualification, moreover,

expressed in the term 'the highest person' is in its place only if we

understand the highest Self to be meant. For the name, 'the highest

person,' can be given only to the highest Self, higher than which there

is nothing. So another scriptural passage also says, 'Higher than the

person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the

sacred text, which at first distinguishes between the higher and the

lower Brahman ('the syllable Om is the higher and the lower Brahman'),

and afterwards speaks of the highest Person to be meditated upon by

means of the syllable Om, gives us to understand that the highest Person

is nothing else but the highest Brahman. That the highest Self

constitutes the object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the

passage declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of meditation),

'As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil.'--With

reference to the objection that a fruit confined to a certain place is

not an appropriate reward for him who meditates on the highest Self, we

finally remark that the objection is removed, if we understand the

passage to refer to emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the

highest Self by means of the syllable Om, as consisting of three matras,

obtains for his (first) reward the world of Brahman, and after that,

gradually, complete intuition.

We read (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1), 'There is this city of Brahman, and in it

the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now what exists

within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be

understood,' &c.--Here the doubt arises whether the small ether within

the small lotus of the heart of which Scripture speaks, is the elemental

ether, or the individual soul (vij/n/anatman), or the highest Self. This

doubt is caused by the words 'ether' and 'city of Brahman.' For the word

'ether,' in the first place, is known to be used in the sense of

elemental ether as well as of highest Brahman. Hence the doubt whether

the small ether of the text be the elemental ether or the highest ether,

i.e. Brahman. In explanation of the expression 'city of Brahman,' in the

second place, it might be said either that the individual soul is here

called Brahman and the body Brahman's city, or else that the city of

Brahman means the city of the highest Brahman. Here (i.e. in consequence

of this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to the nature of the

small ether, according as the individual soul or the highest Self is

understood by the Lord of the city.

The purvapakshin maintains that by the small ether we have to understand

the elemental ether, since the latter meaning is the conventional one of

the word aka/s/a. The elemental ether is here called small with

reference to its small abode (the heart).--In the passage, 'As large as

this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart,' it is

represented as constituting at the same time the two terms of a

comparison, because it is possible to make a distinction between the

outer and the inner ether[179]; and it is said that 'heaven and earth

are contained within it,' because the whole ether, in so far as it is

space, is one[180].--Or else, the purvapakshin continues, the 'small

one' may be taken to mean the individual soul, on account of the term,

'the city of Brahman.' The body is here called the city of Brahman

because it is the abode of the individual soul; for it is acquired by

means of the actions of the soul. On this interpretation we must assume

that the individual soul is here called Brahman metaphorically. The

highest Brahman cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the

body as its lord. The lord of the city, i.e. the soul, is represented as

dwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a real king

resides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the mind (manas)

constitutes the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, and the mind

chiefly abides in the heart; hence the individual soul only can be

spoken of as dwelling in the heart. Further, the individual soul only

can be spoken of as small, since it is (elsewhere; /S/vet. Up. V, 8)

compared in size to the point of a goad. That it is compared (in the

passage under discussion) to the ether must be understood to intimate

its non difference from Brahman.--Nor does the scriptural passage say

that the 'small' one is to be sought for and to be understood, since in

the clause, 'That which is within that,' &c., it is represented as a

mere distinguishing attribute of something else[181].

To all this we make the following reply:--The small ether can mean the

highest Lord only, not either the elemental ether or the individual

soul.--Why?--On account of the subsequent reasons, i.e. on account of

the reasons implied in the complementary passage. For there, the text

declares at first, with reference to the small ether, which is enjoined

as the object of sight, 'If they should say to him,' &c.; thereupon

follows an objection, 'What is there that deserves to be sought for or

that is to be understood?' and thereon a final decisive statement, 'Then

he should say: As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within

the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' Here the

teacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether within the

heart with the known (universal) ether, precludes the conception that

the ether within the heart is small--which conception is based on the

statement as to the smallness of the lotus, i.e. the heart--and thereby

precludes the possibility of our understanding by the term 'the small

ether,' the elemental ether. For, although the ordinary use of language

gives to the word 'ether' the sense of elemental ether, here the

elemental ether cannot be thought of, because it cannot possibly be

compared with itself.--But, has it not been stated above, that the

ether, although one only, may be compared with itself, in consequence of

an assumed difference between the outer and the inner ether?--That

explanation, we reply, is impossible; for we cannot admit that a

comparison of a thing with itself may be based upon a merely imaginary

difference. And even if we admitted the possibility of such a

comparison, the extent of the outer ether could never be ascribed to the

limited inner ether. Should it be said that to the highest Lord also the

extent of the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since another scriptural

passage declares that he is greater than ether (/S/a. Bra, X, 6, 3, 2),

we invalidate this objection by the remark, that the passage (comparing

the inner ether with the outer ether) has the purport of discarding the

idea of smallness (of the inner ether), which is prima facie established

by the smallness of the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and

has not the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner

ether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sentence[182] would

result.--Nor, if we allowed the assumptive difference of the inner and

the outer ether, would it be possible to represent that limited portion

of the ether which is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing

within itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with the

nature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood, freeness from

sin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the 'small' ether) in the

following passage, 'It is the Self free from sin, free from old age,

from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, of true desires, of true

purposes.'--Although the term 'Self' (occurring in the passage quoted)

may apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons exclude all idea of

the individual soul being meant (by the small ether). For it would be

impossible to dissociate from the individual soul, which is restricted

by limiting conditions and elsewhere compared to the point of a goad,

the attribute of smallness attaching to it, on account of its being

enclosed in the lotus of the heart.--Let it then be assumed--our

opponent remarks--that the qualities of all-pervadingness, &c. are

ascribed to the individual soul with the intention of intimating its

non-difference from Brahman.--Well, we reply, if you suppose that the

small ether is called all-pervading because it is one with Brahman, our

own supposition, viz. that the all-pervadingness spoken of is directly

predicated of Brahman itself, is the much more simple one.--Concerning

the assertion that the term 'city of Brahman' can only be understood, on

the assumption that the individual soul dwells, like a king, in one

particular spot of the city of which it is the Lord, we remark that the

term is more properly interpreted to mean 'the body in so far as it is

the city of the highest Brahman;' which interpretation enables us to

take the term 'Brahman' in its primary sense[183]. The highest Brahman

also is connected with the body, for the latter constitutes an abode for

the perception of Brahman[184]. Other scriptural passages also express

the same meaning, so, for instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, 'He sees the highest

person dwelling in the city' (purusha = puri/s/aya), &c., and B/ri/. Up.

II, 5, 18, 'This person (purusha) is in all cities (bodies) the dweller

within the city (puri/s/aya).'--Or else (taking brahmapura to mean

jivapura) we may understand the passage to teach that Brahman is, in the

city of the individual soul, near (to the devout worshipper), just as

Vish/n/u is near to us in the Salagrama-stone.--Moreover, the text

(VIII, 1, 6) at first declares the result of works to be perishable ('as

here on earth whatever has been acquired by works perishes, so perishes

whatever is acquired for the next world by good actions,' &c.), and

afterwards declares the imperishableness of the results flowing from a

knowledge of the small ether, which forms the general subject of

discussion ('those who depart from hence after having discovered the

Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds').

From this again it is manifest that the small ether is the highest

Self.--We now turn to the statement made by the purvapakshin,'that the

sacred text does not represent the small ether as that which is to be

sought for and to be understood, because it is mentioned as a

distinguishing attribute of something else,' and reply as follows: If

the (small) ether were not that which is to be sought for and to be

understood, the description of the nature of that ether, which is given

in the passage ('as large as this ether is, so large is that ether

within the heart'), would be devoid of purport.--But--the opponent might

say--that descriptive statement also has the purport of setting forth

the nature of the thing abiding within (the ether); for the text after

having raised an objection (in the passage, 'And if they should say to

him: Now with regard to that city of Brahman and the palace in it, i.e.

the small lotus of the heart, and the small ether within the heart, what

is there within it that deserves to be sought for or that is to be

understood?') declares, when replying to that objection, that heaven,

earth, and so on, are contained within it (the ether), a declaration to

which the comparison with the ether forms a mere introduction.--Your

reasoning, we reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would follow

that heaven, earth, &c., which are contained within the small ether,

constitute the objects of search and enquiry. But in that case the

complementary passage would be out of place. For the text carrying on,

as the subject of discussion, the ether that is the abode of heaven,

earth, &c.--by means of the clauses, 'In it all desires are contained,'

'It is the Self free from sin,' &c., and the passage, 'But those who

depart from hence having discovered the Self, and the true desires' (in

which passage the conjunction 'and' has the purpose of joining the

desires to the Self)--declares that the Self as well, which is the abode

of the desires, as the desires which abide in the Self, are the objects

of knowledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning of the passage

also, the small ether abiding within the lotus of the heart, together

with whatever is contained within it as earth, true desires, and so on,

is represented as the object of knowledge. And, for the reasons

explained, that ether is the highest Lord.

Brahman) and of the word (brahmaloka); for thus it is seen (i.e. that

the individual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in Scripture);

and (this going of the souls into Brahman constitutes) an inferential

sign (by means of which we may properly interpret the word

It has been declared (in the preceding Sutra) that the small (ether) is

the highest Lord, on account of the reasons contained in the subsequent

passages. These subsequent reasons are now set forth.--For this reason

also the small (ether) can be the highest Lord only, because the passage

complementary to the passage concerning the small (ether) contains a

mention of going and a word, both of which intimate the highest Lord. In

the first place, we read (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), 'All these creatures, day

after day going into that Brahma-world, do not discover it.' This

passage which refers back, by means of the word 'Brahma-world,' to the

small ether which forms the general subject-matter, speaks of the going

to it of the creatures, i.e. the individual souls, wherefrom we conclude

that the small (ether) is Brahman. For this going of the individual

souls into Brahman, which takes place day after day in the state of deep

sleep, is seen, i.e. is met with in another scriptural passage, viz. Ch.

Up. VI, 8, 1, 'He becomes united with the True,' &c. In ordinary life

also we say of a man who lies in deep sleep, 'he has become Brahman,'

'he is gone into the state of Brahman.'--In the second place, the word

'Brahma-world,' which is here applied to the small (ether) under

discussion, excludes all thought of the individual soul or the elemental

ether, and thus gives us to understand that the small (ether) is

Brahman.--But could not the word 'Brahma-world' convey as well the idea

of the world of him whose throne is the lotus[185]?--It might do so

indeed, if we explained the compound 'Brahma-world' as 'the world of

Brahman.' But if we explain it on the ground of the coordination of both

members of the compound--so that 'Brahma-world' denotes that world which

is Brahman--then it conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only.--And

that daily going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned above) is,

moreover, an inferential sign for explaining the compound

'Brahma-world,' on the ground of the co-ordination of its two

constituent members. For it would be impossible to assume that all those

creatures daily go into the world of the effected (lower) Brahman; which

world is commonly called the Satyaloka, i.e. the world of the True.

ether must be the Lord) because that greatness is observed in him

(according to other scriptural passages).

And also on account of the 'supporting' the small ether can be the

highest Lord only.--How?--The text at first introduces the general

subject of discussion in the passage, 'In it is that small ether;'

declares thereupon that the small one is to be compared with the

universal ether, and that everything is contained in it; subsequently

applies to it the term 'Self,' and states it to possess the qualities of

being free from sin, &c.; and, finally, declares with reference to the

same general subject of discussion, 'That Self is a bank, a limitary

support (vidh/ri/ti), that these worlds may not be confounded.' As

'support' is here predicated of the Self, we have to understand by it a

supporting agent. Just as a dam stems the spreading water so that the

boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self acts like a

limitary dam in order that these outer and inner worlds, and all the

different castes and a/s/ramas may not be confounded. In accordance with

this our text declares that greatness, which is shown in the act of

holding asunder, to belong to the small (ether) which forms the subject

of discussion; and that such greatness is found in the highest Lord

only, is seen from other scriptural passages, such as 'By the command of

that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun and moon; are held apart' (B/ri/. Up.

III, 8, 9). Similarly, we read in another passage also, about whose

referring to the highest Lord there is no doubt, 'He is the Lord of all,

the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a

limitary support, so that these worlds may not be confounded' (B/ri/.

Up. IV, 4, 22)--Hence, on account of the 'supporting,' also the small

(ether) is nothing else but the highest Lord.

The small ether within cannot denote anything but the highest Lord for

this reason also, that the word 'ether' has (among other meanings) the

settled meaning of 'highest Lord.' Compare, for instance, the sense in

which the word 'ether' is used in Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'He who is called

ether is the revealer of all forms and names;' and Ch. Up. I, 9, 1, 'All

these beings take their rise from the ether,' &c. On the other hand, we

do not meet with any passage in which the word 'ether' is used in the

sense of 'individual soul.'--We have already shown that the word cannot,

in our passage, denote the elemental ether; for, although the word

certainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it here, because the

elemental ether cannot possibly be compared to itself, &c. &c.

meant) on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary

passage), (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.

If the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on account

of a complementary passage, then, the purvapakshin resumes, we point out

that another complementary passage contains a reference to the other

one, i.e. to the individual soul: 'Now that serene being (literally:

serenity, complete satisfaction), which after having risen out from this

earthly body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true

form, that is, the Self; thus he spoke' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4). For there

the word 'serenity,' which is known to denote, in another scriptural

passage, the state of deep sleep, can convey the idea of the individual

soul only when it is in that state, not of anything else. The 'rising

from the body' also can be predicated of the individual soul only whose

abode the body is; just as air, &c., whose abode is the ether, are said

to arise from the ether. And just as the word 'ether,' although in

ordinary language not denoting the highest Lord, yet is admitted to

denote him in such passages as, 'The ether is the revealer of forms and

names,' because it there occurs in conjunction with qualities of the

highest Lord, so it may likewise denote the individual soul Hence the

term 'the small ether' denotes in the passage under discussion the

individual soul, 'on account of the reference to the other.'

Not so, we reply, 'on account of the impossibility.' In the first place,

the individual soul, which imagines itself to be limited by the internal

organ and its other adjuncts, cannot be compared with the ether. And, in

the second place, attributes such as freedom from evil, and the like,

cannot be ascribed to a being which erroneously transfers to itself the

attributes of its limiting adjuncts. This has already been set forth in

the first Sutra of the present adhikara/n/a, and is again mentioned here

in order to remove all doubt as to the soul being different from the

highest Self. That the reference pointed out by the purvapakshin is not

to the individual soul will, moreover, be shown in one of the next

Sutras (I, 3, 21).

individual soul is meant), (we point out that what is there referred to

is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its true nature has become

manifest (i.e. as it is non-different from Brahman).

The doubt whether, 'on account of the reference to the other,' the

individual soul might not possibly be meant, has been discarded on the

ground of 'impossibility.' But, like a dead man on whom am/ri/ta has

been sprinkled, that doubt rises again, drawing new strength from the

subsequent chapter which treats of Prajapati. For there he (Prajapati)

at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the

like, is that which is to be searched out, that which we must try to

understand (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); after that he points out that the seer

within the eye, i.e. the individual soul, is the Self ('that person that

is seen in the eye is the Self,' VIII, 7, 3); refers again and again to

the same entity (in the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you,'

VIII, 9, 3; VIII, 10, 4); and (in the explanations fulfilling the given

promises) again explains the (nature of the) same individual soul in its

different states ('He who moves about happy in dreams is the Self,'

VIII, 10, 1; 'When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest

sees no dreams, that is the Self,' VIII, 11, 1). The clause attached to

both these explanations (viz. 'That is the immortal, the fearless; that

is Brahman') shows, at the same time, the individual soul to be free

from sin, and the like. After that Prajapati, having discovered a

shortcoming in the condition of deep sleep (in consequence of the

expostulation of Indra, 'In that way he does not know himself that he is

I, nor does he know these beings,' VIII, 11, 2), enters on a further

explanation ('I shall explain him further to you, and nothing more than

this'), begins by blaming the (soul's) connexion with the body, and

finally declares the individual soul, when it has risen from the body,

to be the highest person. ('Thus does that serene being, arising from

this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the

highest light. That is the highest person.')--From this it appears that

there is a possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord belonging to

the individual soul also, and on that account we maintain that the term,

'the small ether within it,' refers to the individual soul.

This position we counter-argue as follows. 'But in so far as its nature

has become manifest.' The particle 'but' (in the Sutra) is meant to set

aside the view of the purvapakshin, so that the sense of the Sutra is,

'Not even on account of the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small

ether being the individual soul is possible, because there also that

which is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so far only as

its (true) nature has become manifest.' The Sutra uses the expression

'he whose nature has become manifest,' which qualifies jiva., the

individual soul, with reference to its previous condition[186].--The

meaning is as follows. Prajapati speaks at first of the seer

characterised by the eye ('That person which is within the eye,' &c.);

shows thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the

waterpan, that he (viz. the seer) has not his true Self in the body;

refers to him repeatedly as the subject to be explained (in the clauses

'I shall explain him further to you'); and having then spoken of him as

subject to the states of dreaming and deep sleep, finally explains the

individual soul in its real nature, i.e. in so far as it is the highest

Brahman, not in so far as it is individual soul ('As soon as it has

approached the highest light it appears in its own form'). The highest

light mentioned, in the passage last quoted, as what is to be

approached, is nothing else but the highest Brahman, which is

distinguished by such attributes as freeness from sin, and the like.

That same highest Brahman constitutes--as we know from passages such as

'that art thou'--the real nature of the individual soul, while its

second nature, i.e. that aspect of it which depends on fictitious

limiting conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the

individual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of

duality--which Nescience may be compared to the mistake of him who in

the twilight mistakes a post for a man--and does not rise to the

knowledge of the Self, whose nature is unchangeable, eternal

Cognition--which expresses itself in the form 'I am Brahman'--so long it

remains the individual soul. But when, discarding the aggregate of body,

sense-organs and mind, it arrives, by means of Scripture, at the

knowledge that it is not itself that aggregate, that it does not form

part of transmigratory existence, but is the True, the Real, the Self,

whose nature is pure intelligence; then knowing itseif to be of the

nature of unchangeable, eternal Cognition, it lifts itself above the

vain conceit of being one with this body, and itself becomes the Self,

whose nature is unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such

scriptural passages as 'He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even

Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). And this is the real nature of the

individual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in

Here an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we speak of the

true nature (svarupa) of that which is unchanging and eternal, and then

say that 'it appears in its own form (true nature)?' Of gold and similar

substances, whose true nature becomes hidden, and whose specific

qualities are rendered non-apparent by their contact with some other

substance, it may be said that their true nature is rendered manifest

when they are cleaned by the application of some acid substance; so it

may be said, likewise, that the stars, whose light is during daytime

overpowered (by the superior brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in

their true nature at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But

it is impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the eternal

light of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like ether, it is free

from all contact, and since, moreover, such an assumption would be

contradicted by what we actually observe. For the (energies of) seeing,

hearing, noticing, cognising constitute the character of the individual

soul, and that character is observed to exist in full perfection, even

in the case of that individual soul which has not yet risen beyond the

body. Every individual soul carries on the course of its practical

existence by means of the activities of seeing, hearing, cognising;

otherwise no practical existence at all would be possible. If, on the

other hand, that character would realise itself in the case of that soul

only which has risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical

existence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul's rising,

would thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask: Wherein consists that

(alleged) rising from the body? Wherein consists that appearing (of the

soul) in its own form?

To this we make the following reply.--Before the rise of discriminative

knowledge the nature of the individual soul, which is (in reality) pure

light, is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts

consisting of body, senses, mind, sense-objects and feelings, and

appears as consisting of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly--to

quote an analogous case from ordinary experience--the true nature of a

pure crystal, i.e. its transparency and whiteness, is, before the rise

of discriminative knowledge (on the part of the observer),

non-discriminated as it were from any limiting adjuncts of red or blue

colour; while, as soon as through some means of true cognition

discriminative knowledge has arisen, it is said to have now accomplished

its true nature, i.e. transparency and whiteness, although in reality it

had already done so before. Thus the discriminative knowledge, effected

by /S/ruti, on the part of the individual soul which previously is

non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts, is (according

to the scriptural passage under discussion) the soul's rising from the

body, and the fruit of that discriminative knowledge is its

accomplishment in its true nature, i.e. the comprehension that its

nature is the pure Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness

of the Self are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimination, in

agreement with the mantra, 'Bodiless within the bodies,' &c. (Ka. Up. I,

2, 22), and the statement of Sm/ri/ti as to the non-difference between

embodiedness and non-embodiedness 'Though dwelling in the body, O

Kaunteya, it does not act and is not tainted' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 31). The

individual soul is therefore called 'That whose true nature is

non-manifest' merely on account of the absence of discriminative

knowledge, and it is called 'That whose nature has become manifest' on

account of the presence of such knowledge. Manifestation and

non-manifestation of its nature of a different kind are not possible,

since its nature is nothing but its nature (i.e. in reality is always

the same). Thus the difference between the individual soul and the

highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality,

since, like ether, the highest Self is not in real contact with

And wherefrom is all this to be known?--From the instruction given by

Prajapati who, after having referred to the jiva ('the person that is

seen in the eye,' &c.), continues 'This is the immortal, the fearless,

this is Brahman.' If the well-known seer within the eye were different

from Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fearless, it

would not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the immortal, the

fearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on the other hand, is not

spoken of as he who is characterised by the eye (the seer within the

eye), for that would render Prajapati obnoxious to the reproach of

saying deceitful things.--So also, in the second section, the passage,

'He who moves about happy in dreams,' &c. does not refer to a being

different from the seeing person within the eye spoken of in the first

chapter, (but treats of the same topic) as appears from the introductory

clause, 'I shall explain him further to you.' Moreover[187], a person

who is conscious of having seen an elephant in a dream and of no longer

seeing it when awake discards in the waking state the object which he

had seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself when awake to be the

same person who saw something in the dream.--Thus in the third section

also Prajapati does indeed declare the absence of all particular

cognition in the state of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity

of the cognising Self ('In that way he does not know himself that he is

I, nor all these beings'). The following clause also, 'He is gone to

utter annihilation,' is meant to intimate only the annihilation of all

specific cognition, not the annihilation of the cogniser. For there is

no destruction of the knowing of the knower as--according to another

scriptural passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 30)--that is imperishable.--Thus,

again, in the fourth section the introductory phrase of Prajapati is, 'I

shall explain him further to you and nothing different from this;' he

thereupon refutes the connexion (of the Self) with the body and other

limiting conditions ('Maghavat, this body is mortal,' &c.), shows the

individual soul--which is there called 'the serene being'--in the state

when it has reached the nature of Brahman ('It appears in its own

form'), and thus proves the soul to be non-different from the highest

Brahman whose characteristics are immortality and fearlessness.

Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self is meant

(in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to understand the

words 'This (him) I will explain further,' &c., as referring to the

individual soul, and therefore suppose that the reference is (not to the

individual soul forming the topic of the three preceding sections, but)

to the Self possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which

Self is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII,

1).--Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it

disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i.e. the 'this' in

'this I will explain') which rests on something approximate (i.e. refers

to something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is

opposed to the word 'further' (or 'again') met with in the text, since

from that interpretation it would follow that what had been discussed in

the preceding sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section.

Moreover, if Prajapati, after having made a promise in the clause, 'This

I shall explain' (where that clause occurs for the first time), did

previously to the fourth section explain a different topic in each

section, we should have to conclude that he acted deceitfully.--Hence

(our opinion about the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz.

that it sets forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as

such--which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the

desires and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is connected

with evils of various kinds--is dissolved by true knowledge, and how the

soul is thus led over into the opposite state, i.e. into its true state

in which it is one with the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom

from sin and similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by

which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of

the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous imagination.

Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadiya/s/ /k/a. ke/k/it),

are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real. To the end of

refuting all these speculators who obstruct the way to the complete

intuition of the unity of the Self this /s/ariraka-/s/astra has been set

forth, whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever

unchanging, whose substance is cognition[188], and who, by means of

Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg

appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that

Lord there is no other substance of cognition.--If, now, the Sutrakara

raises and refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in

reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul, as he

does in this and the preceding Sutras[189], he does so for the following

purpose. To the highest Self which is eternally pure, intelligent and

free, which is never changing, one only, not in contact with anything,

devoid of form, the opposite characteristics of the individual soul are

erroneously ascribed; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the

colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of

Vedic passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to

disprove the doctrine of duality--which passages he strengthens by

arguments--he insists on the difference of the highest Self from the

individual soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul is

different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of the soul,

refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming an item of ordinary

thought, due to the power of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic

injunctions of works which are given with a view to the states of acting

and enjoying, natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not

stultified.--That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real

purport of the /s/astra's teaching, the Sutrakara declares, for

instance, in I, 1, 30[190]. The refutation of the reproach of futility

raised against the injunctions of works has already been set forth by

us, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess

full knowledge, and such as do not.

The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out

(by the purvapakshin) in the passage complementary to the passage about

the small ether ('Now that serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if

the small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the

worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject

under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of

meaning.--On that account the Sutra declares that the reference has

another meaning, i.e. that the reference to the individual soul is not

meant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the

nature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The individual soul

which, in the passage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in

the waking state as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and

the sense-organs; permeates in sleep the na/d/is of the body, and enjoys

the dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state;

and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state

of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the

subtle body, reaches the highest light, i.e. the highest Brahman

previously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of

specific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light

which the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its

true nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there

represented as the object of worship.--In this sense the reference to

the individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in

reality the highest Lord is meant.

smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant; we reply that) that

has been explained (before).

The purvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by

Scripture ('In it is that small ether') does not agree with the highest

Lord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in

another passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark

calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it

having been shown--under I, 2, 7--that a relative smallness may be

attributed to the Lord. The same refutation is--as the Sutra points

out--to be applied here also.--That smallness is, moreover, contradicted

by that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart)

with the known (universal) ether. ('As large as is this ether so large

is the ether within the heart.')

which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and

(because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The sun does not shine

there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less this

fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him

all this is lighted.' The question here arises whether he 'after whom

when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is

lighted,' is some luminous substance, or the highest Self (praj/n/a

A luminous substance, the purvapakshin maintains.--Why?--Because the

passage denies the shining only of such luminous bodies as the sun and

the like. It is known (from every-day experience) that luminous bodies

such as the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun,

which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that

thing on account of which all this, including the moon, the stars, and

the sun himself, does not shine is likewise a thing of light. The

'shining after' also is possible only if there is a luminous body

already, for we know from experience that 'acting after' (imitation) of

any kind takes place only when there are more than one agent of similar

nature; one man, for instance, walks after another man who walks

himself. Therefore we consider it settled that the passage refers to

some luminous body.

To this we reply that the highest Self only can be meant.--Why?--On

account of the acting after. The shining after mentioned in the passage,

'After him when he shines everything shines,' is possible only if the

praj/n/a Self, i.e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that praj/n/a

Self another scriptural passage says, 'His form is light, his thoughts

are true' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2). On the other hand, it is not by any

means known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body.

Moreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies

such as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other

luminous body after which they should shine; for we see that a lamp, for

instance, does not 'shine after' another lamp. Nor is there any such

absolute rule (as the purvapakshin asserted) that acting after is

observed only among things of similar nature. It is rather observed

among things of dissimilar nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts

after, i.e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust of the ground

blows (is blown) after the blowing wind.--The clause 'on account of the

acting after' (which forms part of the Sutra) points to the shining

after (mentioned in the scriptural /s/loka under discussion); the clause

'and of him' points to the fourth pada of the same /s/loka. The meaning

of this latter clause is that the cause assigned for the light of the

sun, &c. (in the passage 'by the light of him everything is lighted')

intimates the praj/n/a Self. For of that Self Scripture says, 'Him the

gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time' (B/ri/. Up. IV,

4, 16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the moon, &c,

should shine by some other (physical) light is, in the first place, not

known; and, in the second place, absurd as one (physical) light is

counteracted by another.--Or else the cause assigned for the shining

does not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the

/s/loka; but the meaning (of the last pada) rather is--as we may

conclude from the comprehensive statement 'all this'--that the

manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts,

agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the

light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the

cause of the manifestation of all form and colour.--Moreover, the text

shows by means of the word 'there' ('the sun does not shine there,' &c.)

that the passage is to be connected with the general topic, and that

topic is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, 'In whom the heaven,

the earth, and the sky are woven,' &c. The same appears from a passage

subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately preceding the passage

under discussion). 'In the highest golden sheath there is the Brahman

without passion and without parts; that is pure, that is the light of

lights, that is it which they know who know the Self.' This passage

giving rise to the question, 'How is it the light of lights?' there is

occasion for the reply given in 'The sun does not shine there,' &c.--In

refutation of the assertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as

the sun and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another

luminous body--as, for instance, the light of the moon and the stars is

denied only when the sun is shining--we point out that it has been shown

that he (the Self) only can be the luminous being referred to, nothing

else. And it is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so

on with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the

light of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it;

while Brahman as self-luminous is not perceived by means of any other

light. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by

anything else; according to such scriptural passages as, 'By the Self

alone as his light man sits,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 6), and 'He is

incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended '(B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).

being the universal light).

Moreover that aspect of the praj/n/a Self is spoken of in Sm/ri/ti also,

viz. in the Bhagavad Gita (XV, 6, 12), 'Neither the sun, nor the moon,

nor the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return,

that is my highest seat.' And 'The light which abiding in the sun

illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which

is in the fire, all that light know to be mine.'

(person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).

We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of a thumb stands

in the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II, 4, 13), 'That person, of the

size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of

the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that.'--The

question here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned

in the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that on account of the declaration of the

person's size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self

which is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the

measure of a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is

connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may,

by means of some fictitious assumption, be predicated. Sm/ri/ti also

confirms this, 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of

Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and

helpless' (Mahabh. III, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force

the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer to the

transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence

infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage under discussion.

To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only be the highest

Lord.--Why?--On account of the term 'lord of the past and of the

future.' For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past

and the future.--Moreover, the clause 'this is that' connects the

passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the

topic of discussion. And what had been enquired about is Brahman, 'That

which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause,

as neither past nor future, tell me that' (I, 2, 14).--'On account of

the term,' i.e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a

designation, viz. the term 'Lord,' we understand that the highest Lord

is meant[191].--But still the question remains how a certain extension

can be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.--The reply to this is

given, in the next Sutra.

the size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the Veda).

The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although

omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as to

ether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the

joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be

ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on

the other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be

meant here, on account of the term 'Lord,' and so on.--But--an objection

may be raised--as the size of the heart varies in the different classes

of living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration of the

highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with

reference to the heart.--To this objection the second half of the Sutra

replies: On account of men (only) being entitled. For the /s/astra,

although propounded without distinction (i.e. although not itself

specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its

precepts), does in reality entitle men[192] only (to act according to

its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly,

capable (of complying with the precepts of the /s/astra); are, secondly,

desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the /s/astra); are,

thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the

precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on[193]. This point has

been explained in the section treating of the definition of adhikara

(Purva Mim. S. VI, 1).--Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size,

and hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb.

Hence, as men (only) are entitled to study and practise the /s/astra,

the highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart,

be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.--In reply to the

purvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on

account of Sm/ri/ti we can understand by him who is of the size of a

thumb the transmigrating soul only, we remark that--analogously to such

passages as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou'--our passage teaches

that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in

reality) Brahman. For the Vedanta-passages have a twofold purport; some

of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at

teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our

passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self,

not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the

Upanishad, 'The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always

settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his

body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know

that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal' (II, 6, 17).

and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it),

according to Badaraya/n/a.

It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of

a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to

study and act according to the /s/astra. This gives us an occasion for

the following discussion.--It is true that the /s/astra entitles men,

but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to

the knowledge of Brahman; the teacher, Badaraya/n/a, rather thinks that

the /s/astra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above

men, viz. gods, and so on.--On what account?--On the account of

possibility.--For in their cases also the different causes on which the

qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may

exist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final

release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers

are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as

their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavadas, itihasas,

pura/n/as, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no

prohibition (excluding them like /S/udras). Nor does, in the fourth

place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their

title; for that ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to

the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods,

moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship,

and the like, appears from such scriptural passages as 'One hundred and

one years Indra lived as a disciple with Prajapati' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11,

3), and 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father Varu/n/a, saying, "Sir,

teach me Brahman"' (Taitt. Up. III, 1).--And the reasons which have been

given above against gods and /ri/shis being entitled to perform

religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there

being no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of

there being no other /ri/shis (who could be invoked during the

sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra

and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts

to perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bh/ri/gu and other

/ri/shis, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of

their belonging to the same gotra as Bh/ri/gu, &c. What, then, should

stand in the way of the gods' and /ri/shis' right to acquire

knowledge?--Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a

thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted;

it has then only to be explained in each particular case by a reference

to the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).

involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on

account of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the gods)

of several (forms).

If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the

acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their

corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in consequence of that

corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of

subordinate members (a@nga) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being

present in person just as the priests are. But this admission will lead

to 'a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance

of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their

personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is

not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be

present in person at many sacrifices.

To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.--Why?--On account

of the assumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the

same divine Self to assume several forms at the same time.--How is that

known?--From observation.--For a scriptural passage at first replies to

the question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are

'Three and three hundred, three and three thousand,' and subsequently,

on the question who they are, declares 'They (the 303 and 3003) are only

the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods'

(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 1, 2); showing thereby that one and the same divine

Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds

to show that these thirty-three gods themselves are in reality contained

in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is

the one god?' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all

forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear

in many forms.--Sm/ri/ti also has a similar statement, 'A Yogin, O hero

of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand

shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the

objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may

again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his

rays.' If such Sm/ri/ti passages as the above declare that even Yogins,

who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety

of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how

much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess

all supernatural powers. The gods thus being able to assume several

shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation

with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the while unseen by

others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.

The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner

also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality

are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one

action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time

enter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brahma/n/a,

for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many entertainers.

But in other cases one individual stands in subordinate relation to many

actions at the same time; one Brahma/n/a, for instance, may constitute

the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same

time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the

parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view

(to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their

respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same

individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore,

involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.

word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates

from the word, as is shown by perception and inference.

Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal

individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of

sacrificial works. Still a contradiction will result in respect of the

'word' (/s/abda).--How?--The authoritativeness of the Veda has been

proved 'from its independence,' basing on the original (eternal)

connection of the word with its sense ('the thing signified')[194]. But

now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as

admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to

enjoy at the same time the oblations which form part of several

sacrifices yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject

to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion

of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a

contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritativeness proved to

belong to the word of the Veda.

To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.--Why?--'On account

of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the

world, with the gods and other beings, originates.--But--an objection

will be raised--in Sutra I, 1, 2 ('That whence there is the origin, &c.

of this world') it has been proved that the world originates from

Brahman; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word?

And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda

be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed

thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the

Vi/s/vedevas, and the Maruts[195] are non-eternal beings, because

produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the

non-eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is

known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born,

the name Yaj/n/adatta is given to him (lit. made for him)[196]. Hence we

adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the

This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity

of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things

denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted

by the word) cow have an origin, their species[197] does not have an

origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and

actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with

the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals,

which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into

that connexion. Hence, although the individuals do not originate, no

contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like,

since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are

admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such

words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are

eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is

to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal

appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as

'Indra' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some

particular place, analogously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence,

whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular

name.--The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be

understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause

of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting

words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their

eternal sense (i.e. the ak/r/itis denoted), the accomplishment of such

individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them

is called an origination from those words.

How then is it known that the world originates from the word?--'From

perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in

order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else).

'Inference' denotes Sm/r/iti which, in order to be authoritative,

depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that

creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At

the word these Prajapati created the gods; at the words were poured out

he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words

through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones

he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the /s/astra; at

the word blessings he created the other beings.' And another passage

says, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of the

Veda.--B/ri/. Up. I, 2, 4). Thus Scripture declares in different places

that the word precedes the creation.--Sm/r/ti also delivers itself as

follows, 'In the beginning a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or

end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which all

activities proceeded.' By the 'uttering' of the voice we have here to

understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of

a voice without beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be

predicated.--Again, we read, 'In the beginning Mahe/s/vara shaped from

the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the

procedure of all actions.' And again, 'The several names, actions, and

conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of

the Veda' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observation that any

one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first

remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We

therefore conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became

manifest in the mind of Prajapati the creator, and that after that he

created the things conesponding to those words. Scripture also, where it

says (Taitt. Bra. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhur he created the earth,'

&c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e.

were created from the words bhur, &c. which had become manifest in the

mind (of Prajapati).

Of what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is said that

the world originates from the 'word?'--It is the spho/t/a, the

purvapakshin says.[198] For on the assumption that the letters are the

word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from

the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the

letters perish as soon as they are produced (i.e. pronounced). These

perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to

the pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able

to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person

whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta

or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of

difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not

apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to

maintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the

letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself

intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assumption;[199]

nor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole

aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor

can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together

with the impressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters

is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us

apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having

reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and

the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when

it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter

combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not

actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of

perception.[200] Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those

impressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from

their effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter

combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters--which

impressions are apprehended from their effects--is that which intimates

the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the

remembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts

which succeed each other in time.--From all this it follows that the

spho/t/a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i.e. the buddhi,

has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word,

received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been

matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the spho/t/a

presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental

act of apprehension.--And it must not be maintained that that one act of

apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the

letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form

the object of one act of apprehension.--As that spho/t/a is recognised

as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the

apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the

letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the

spho/t/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object

denoted, i.e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results

Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters

only are the word.--But--an objection is raised--it has been said above

that the letters no sooner produced pass away!--That assertion is not

true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time

they are produced anew).--Nor can it be maintained that the recognition

is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for

the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of

the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.--Nor, again,

can it be said that the recognition has its cause in the species (so

that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a

letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before);

for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised.

That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be

maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different

individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are

apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But

this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are

recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word

cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been

pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.--But,

our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are

apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as

appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing

the sound of Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta reading.--Although, we reply, it

is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we

admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but

as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and

disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those

differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the

articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters

themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters

are different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to

assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of

difference is conditioned by external factors. Is it then not much

simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is

conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the

intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is

that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension

of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent

was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should,

for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in the same

moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz.

accented with the udatta, the anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as

well as non-nasal[201]? Or else[202]--and this is the preferable

explanation--we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not

by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to

understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a

distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which,

for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own

distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone

that all the distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not

on the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the

same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis

for the distinctive apprehension of the udatta, the anudatta, and the

like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should

have to assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due to the

processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the

letters themselves, which are ever recognised as the same, are not

different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not

matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any

differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the

udatta and so on remains without a basis.--Nor should it be urged that

from the difference of the udatta and so on there results also a

difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter

does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is

free from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the

individuals are different from each other the species also contains a

difference in itself.

The assumption of the spho/t/a is further gratuitous, because the sense

of the word may be apprehended from the letters.--But--our opponent here

objects--I do not assume the existence of the spho/t/a. I, on the

contrary, actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed

by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/t/a

all at once presents itself as the object of cognition.--You are

mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak

is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition

which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the

word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting

the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance

that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those

letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other

letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/t/a--i.e.

something different from the letters of the given word--then those

letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any

other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final

comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance

which has the letters of the word for its object.--Our opponent has

asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the

object of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which

we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers

ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as

comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same

cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole

is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one

sense in many letters[203]; in the same way as the idea of a wood, an

army, and so on. But--our opponent may here object--if the word were

nothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object

of one mental act, such couples of words as jara and raja or pika and

kapi would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters

are presented to consciousness in each of the words constituting one

couple.--There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive

consciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants

constitute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so

the letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they

follow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason

that the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of

the different order in which they are arranged.

The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may

therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word

consists--assisted by a certain order and number--have, through

traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the

time when they are employed they present themselves as such (i.e. in

their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having

apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the

entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their

definite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the

complicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the spho/t/a is

the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to

assume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a

definite order are said to manifest the spho/t/a, and the spho/t/a in

its turn is said to manifest the sense.

Or let it even be admitted that the letters are different ones each time

they are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must assume

species of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual

letters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demonstrated

in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the

From all this it follows that the theory according to which the

individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is

unobjectionable.

As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance

of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the

doctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That

doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sutra.--The present Sutra now

confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of

the word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the

world with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on,

originates from it.--A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice they

followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the /ri/shis,'

/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the

/ri/shis) was permanent.--On this point Vedavyasa also speaks as

follows: 'Formerly the great /ri/shis, being allowed to do so by

Svayambhu, obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the

itihasas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'

contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the

renovation (of the world); as is seen from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti.

If--the purvapakshin resumes--the individual gods and so on did, like

the individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken

succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical

existence including denominations, things denominated and agents

denominating; the connexion (between word and thing) would be eternal,

and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word

(raised in Sutra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as /S/ruti and

Sm/ri/ti declare, the whole threefold world periodically divests itself

of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and

is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to

have been removed?

To this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and form.'--Even

then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a

point which the teacher will prove later on: II, 1, 36). And in the

beginningless sa/m/sara we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and

the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we

look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them

according to Scripture (a kind of) dissolution and origination take

place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking

state (subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is

carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the

waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush.

Up. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes

one with that pra/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the

eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts.

And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all

directions, thus from that Self the pra/n/as proceed, each towards its

place; from the pra/n/as the gods, from the gods the worlds.'

Well, the purvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises

in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical

existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping

person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of

practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a

mahapralaya (i.e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a

different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is

interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be

resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that

form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.

This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahapralaya does

cut short the entire current of practical existence, yet, by the favour

of the highest Lord, the Lords (i/s/vara), such as Hira/n/yagarbha and

so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in

the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we

see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former

birth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings.

For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of

grass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is

observed--although they all have the common attribute of being

animated--so in the ascending series extending from man up to

Hira/n/yagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge,

power, &c. takes place; a circumstance which /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti

mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that

account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as

Hira/n/yagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by

superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the

present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the

present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the

preceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same

form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus

Scripture also declares, 'He who first creates Brahman (Hira/n/yagarbha)

and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own

thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18).

/S/aunaka and others moreover declare (in the Anukrama/n/is of the Veda)

that the ten books (of the /Ri/g-veda) were seen by Madhu/kkh/andas and

other /ri/shis.[204] And, similarly, Sm/ri/ti tells us, for every Veda,

of men of exalted mental vision (/ri/shis) who 'saw' the subdivisions of

their respective Vedas, such as ka/nd/as and so on. Scripture also

declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the

mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the /ri/shi and so on, 'He

who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which

he does not know the /ri/shi, the metre, the divinity, and the

Brahma/n/a, runs against a post, falls into a pit[205], &c. &c.,

therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra' (Arsheya

Brahma/n/a, first section).--Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and

its opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain

pleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects

pleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and

do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new

creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit

(of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with

a nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Sm/ri/ti also

declares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had

turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again

and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or

cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed;

hence a certain person delights in actions of a certain

kind.'--Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in a mahapralaya) is

dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (/s/akti) of the

world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the

root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect

without a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of

different kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although

the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different

classes of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the

different conditions based on caste, a/s/rama, religious duty and fruit

(of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted

and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in

the beginningless sa/m/sara, subject to a certain determinateness

analogous to the determinateness governing the connexion between the

senses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the

relation of senses and sense-objects should be a different one in

different creations, so that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth

sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves.

As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the

Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there

manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same

names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and,

owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical

renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general

creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the

Veda. The permanent identity of names and forms is declared in /S/ruti

as well as Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, /Ri/k. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3,

'As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air,

and the heavenly world;' which passage means that the highest Lord

arranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun

and moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding

kalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brahm. III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni desired: May I

become the consumer of the food of the gods; for that end he offered a

cake on eight potsherds to Agni and the K/ri/ttikas.' This passage,

which forms part of the injunction of the ish/t/i to the Nakshatras,

declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and

the Agni to whom he offered.[206]

Sm/ri/ti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for

instance, 'Whatever were the names of the /ri/shis and their powers to

see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are

produced afresh at the end of the night (the mahapralaya). As the

various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time,

thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of

whatever individuality the gods of the past ages were, equal to them are

the present gods in name and form.'

the madhu-vidya, &c., Jaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the

gods for the Brahma-vidya).

A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also

are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Jaimini,

considers the gods and similar beings not to have any claim.--Why?--On

account of the impossibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidya,

&c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should

have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidya ('the knowledge of the

honey') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different

(from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not

possible; for, according to the passage, 'The Sun is indeed the honey of

the devas' (Ch. Up. III, 1, 1), men are to meditate on the sun (the god

Aditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods themselves are

admitted as meditating worshippers, can Aditya meditate upon another

Aditya?--Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar,

the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the

five classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Maruts, and

Sadhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he who thus

knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he

sees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates thereby that those who

know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the

Vasus, &c.' But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus

enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to

attain?--We have also to compare the passages 'Agni is one foot, Aditya

is one foot, the quarters are one foot' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2); 'Air is

indeed the absorber' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1); 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the

doctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of

certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities themselves are

not qualified.--So it is likewise impossible that the /ri/shis

themselves should be qualified for meditations connected with /ri/shis,

such as expressed in passages like B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 4, 'These two are

the /ri/shis Gautama and Bharadvaja; the right Gautama, the left

Bharadvaja.'--Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is

stated in the following Sutra.

denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.

To that sphere of light, the purvapakshin resumes, which is stationed in

the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms

such as Aditya, i.e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from

the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary

passages[207]. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it

should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and

the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes[208]. For

mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence.

The same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps

be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the

devas is known from the mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura/n/as, and

from the conceptions of ordinary life[209]; but we contest the relevancy

of this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not constitute

an independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is known

from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of

knowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of

knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the matter under

discussion. Itihasas and pura/n/as again being of human origin, stand

themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The

arthavada passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the

injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is

enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by

themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the

devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation,

&c., are to be employed (at the different stages of the sacrificial

action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the

sacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of

authoritative knowledge for anything[210].--For these reasons the devas,

and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

qualification for Brahma-vidya on the part of the gods); for there are

(passages indicatory of that).

The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the purvapaksha.

The teacher, Badaraya/n/a, maintains the existence of the qualification

on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods

cannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidya, and similar topics

of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they

may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in

general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.[211] Nor

does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with

the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not

impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the

case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything,

Brahma/n/as, for instance, not for the rajasuya-sacrifice[212].

And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover,

contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare,

for instance, /Br/i. Up. I, 4, 10, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to

know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with /ri/shis;' Ch.

Up. VIII, 7, 2, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which,

if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained.

Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro/k/ana from the

Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in Sm/ri/ti, so, for instance,

in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yaj/n/avalkya[213].--Against the

objection raised in the preceding Sutra (32) we argue as follows. Words

like aditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to

light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs

(persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are

used in that sense in mantras and arthavada passages. For the devas

possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of

residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like.

Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavada passage explaining the words

'ram of Medhatithi,' which form part of the Subrahma/n/ya-formula, that

'Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhatithi, the

descendant of Ka/n/va' (Sha/d/v. Br. I, 1). And thus Sm/ri/ti says that

'Aditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kunti.' Moreover,

even in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be

admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as

'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light

and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted

in the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also; but--as already

remarked--from the use of the words in mantras and arthavadas it appears

that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those

material elements).

We now turn to the objection (raised above by the purvapakshin) that

mantras and arthavadas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no

power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not

the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other

purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes

a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is

exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other

purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves,

grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the

purvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly

analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the

grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception

of their existence. In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand,

which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory

passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is

impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own.

For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more

comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not

possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for

instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words

constituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning

only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an

additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of

the last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the

instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion).

The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one

whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor

syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be

accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the other hand,

the words constituting the arthavada form a separate group of their own

which refers to some accomplished thing[214], and only subsequently to

that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they

enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as

an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of

prosperity is to offer to Vayu a white animal.' All the words contained

in this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is,

however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding

arthavada passage, 'For Vayu is the swiftest deity; Vayu he approaches

with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of

this arthavada are not grammatically connected with the single words of

the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which

contains the praise of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far

as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with

a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate

(arthavada) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the

arthavada acts as a mere anuvada, i.e. a statement referring to

something (already known)[215]. When its contents are contradicted by

other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/n/avada, i.e. a

statement of a quality[216]. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned

conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavada is to be

taken as a gu/n/avada on account of the absence of other means of

knowledge, or as an arthavada referring to something known (i.e. an

anuvada) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of

proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting

people.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.

There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The

Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the

other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual

divinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent

Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not

represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to

it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is

taken he is to think when about to say vausha/t/' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1).

Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a

thing to consist in the word only[217]; for word (denoting) and thing

(denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness

of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and

the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and

arthavadas.--Moreover, itihasas and pura/n/as also--because based on

mantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in the manner

described--are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the

devas. Itihasa and pura/n/a can, besides, be considered as based on

perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have

been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times.

Sm/ri/ti also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the gods

face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were

no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would

thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well

maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the

whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by

which the scriptural injunction of the rajasuya-sacrifice[218] would be

stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of

duty of the different castes and a/s/ramas were as generally unsettled

as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture

which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore

altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in

consequence of their eminent religious merit, conversed with the gods

face to face. Sm/ri/ti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda

there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sutra II,

44). And that Yoga does, as Sm/ri/ti declares, lead to the acquirement

of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact

which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also

proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat,

and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is

no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body

produced by the fire of Yoga' (/S/vet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the

right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the /ri/shis who

see the mantras and brahma/n/a passages (i.e. the Veda).--From all this

it appears that the itihasas and pura/n/as have an adequate basis.--And

the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be

unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.

The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as

possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavadas,

itihasas, pura/n/as, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods

may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be

considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the

declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation[219]

agree with this latter supposition only.

a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of

that (grief) (Raikva called him /S/udra); for it (the grief) is pointed

at (by Raikva).

(In the preceding adhikara/n/a) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to

knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c.

also possess such a claim. The present adhikara/n/a is entered on for

the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the

claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the /S/udras also

possess such a claim.

The purvapakshin maintains that the /S/udras also have such a claim,

because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and

because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural

prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text,

'Therefore[220] the /S/udra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Sa/m/h.

VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the /S/udras for

sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not

invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be

apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an

inferential mark supporting the claim of the /S/udras; for in the

so-called sa/m/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Jana/s/ruti

Pautraya/n/a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of /S/udra 'Fie,

necklace and carnage be thine, O /S/udra, together with the cows' (Ch.

Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm/ri/ti moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were

born from /S/udra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.--Hence the

/S/udra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.

To this we reply that the /S/udras have no such claim, on account of

their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and

understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a

/S/udra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its

antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the

three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a

condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if

capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute

a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in

spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the

/S/udras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the

Veda.--The Vedic statement, moreover, that the /S/udra is unfit for

sacrifices intimates, because founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for

knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both

cases[221].--With reference to the purvapakshin's opinion that the fact

of the word '/S/udra' being enounced in the sa/m/varga-knowledge

constitutes an inferential mark (of the /S/udra's qualification for

knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on

account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential

mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments

being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage

quoted.[222] Besides, the word '/S/udra' which occurs in the

sa/m/varga-vidya would establish a claim on the part of the /S/udras to

that one vidya only, not to all vidyas. In reality, however, it is

powerless, because occurring in an arthavada, to establish the /S/udras'

claim to anything.--The word '/S/udra' can moreover be made to agree

with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When

Jana/s/ruti Pautraya/n/a heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the

flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were

like Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, 3), grief (su/k/) arose in his mind,

and to that grief the /ri/shi Raikva alludes with the word /S/udra, in

order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation

must be accepted because a (real) born /S/udra is not qualified (for the

sa/m/varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief (su/k/) which had arisen

in Janasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word /S/udra, we

reply: On account of the rushing on (adrava/n/a) of the grief. For we

may etymologise the word /S/udra by dividing it into its parts, either

as 'he rushed into grief (/S/u/k/am abhidudrava) or as 'grief rushed on

him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand

it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense.

The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover

expressly touched upon in the legend[223].

the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with

/K/aitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).

Jana/s/ruti cannot have been a /S/udra by birth for that reason also

that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz.

his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya

/K/aitraratha Abhipratarin. For, later on, i.e. in the passage

complementary to the sa/m/varga-vidya, a kshattriya /K/aitrarathi

Abhipratarin is glorified, 'Once while /S/aunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin

Kakshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged

of them' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratarin was a /K/aitrarathi

(i.e. a descendant of /K/itraratha) we have to infer from his connexion

with a Kapeya. For we know (from /S/ruti) about the connexion of

/K/itraratha himself with the Kapeyas ('the Kapeyas made /K/itraratha

perform that sacrifice;' Ta/nd/ya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule

sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one

and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture ('from

him a /K/aitrarathi descended who was a prince[224]') that he

(/K/aitraratha) was a prince, we must understand him to have been a

kshattriya. The fact now of Jana/s/ruti being praised in the same vidya

with the kshattriya Abhipratarin intimates that the former also was a

kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals.

That Jana/s/ruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending

his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the

text).--Hence the /S/udras are not qualified (for the knowledge of

of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in

the case of the /S/udras).

That the /S/udras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also

that in different places of the vidyas such ceremonies as the upanayana

and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, /S/at. Br. XI, 5,

3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Ch. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir!

thus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in

Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their

hands, approached the venerable Pippalada, thinking that he would teach

them all that.'--Thus the following passage also, 'He without having

made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them' (Ch. Up. V, 11, 7),

shows that the upanayana is a well-established ceremony[225].--With

reference to the /S/udras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies

is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are

spoken of as 'once born' only ('the /S/udra is the fourth caste,

once-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the /S/udra there is not any sin, and

he is not fit for any ceremony.'

ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a /S/udra).

The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having

ascertained Jabala not to be a /S/udra from his speaking the truth,

proceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brahma/n/a

would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you.

You have not swerved from the truth' (Ch. Up. IV, 4, 5); which

scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the /S/udras not

being capable of initiation).

hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic)

The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Sm/ri/ti

prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their

understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing

the Veda is conveyed by the following passages: 'The ears of him who

hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a

/S/udra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in

the vicinity of a /S/udra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of

studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in

whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express

prohibition (of the /S/udras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be

slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves

it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the

prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there

are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart

knowledge to the /S/udra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study,

sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'--From those /S/udras, however,

who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in

consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their

knowledge cannot be withheld, since knowledge in all cases brings about

its fruit. Sm/ri/ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are

qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and pura/n/as;

compare the passage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (Mahabh.).--It

remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such

qualification with regard to the Veda.

the whole world).

The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge--on which we

entered as an opportunity offered--being finished we return to our chief

topic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedanta-texts.--We read

(Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth

trembles in the pra/n/a. It (the pra/n/a) is a great terror, a raised

thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal[226].'--This passage

declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in pra/n/a, and that

there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that

through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not

immediately clear what the pra/n/a is, and what that terrible

thunderbolt, a discussion arises.

The purvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning

of the term, pra/n/a denotes the air with its five modifications, that

the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and

that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he

says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five

forms--which is here called pra/n/a--and the terrible thunderbolts also

spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say,

when it manifests itself in the form of Parjanya, lightning, thunder,

rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.--Through the knowledge of

that air immortality also can be obtained; for another scriptural

passage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things

together. He who knows this conquers death.'--We therefore conclude that

the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.

To this we make the following reply.--Brahman only can be meant, on

account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as

well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of;

how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once

the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as

follows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that

alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one

goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our

passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from

the circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in

pra/n/a' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the

abode of the whole world. That the word pra/n/a can denote the highest

Self also, appears from such passages as 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a'

(B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a

quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere

air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the pra/n/a and the breath

that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up.

II, 5 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under

discussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns,

from terror Indra and Vayu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman,

and not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of

that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the

whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that

the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the

ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of

Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great

terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to

denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man

strictly carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in

his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's wrath, or threatened

punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry

out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire,

air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from

fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a

thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is

Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the

sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the

fifth.'--That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further

follows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is

immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of

Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him

only passes over death, there is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI,

15).--That immortality which the purvapakshin asserts to be sometimes

represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely

relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is

quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic

being started (B/ri/. Up. III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of

the air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')--That in

the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally

from the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Na/k/iketas

in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither

effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to

the highest Self.

the scriptural passage).

We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this

body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest

light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word

'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and

dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.

The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known

(physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word.

For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under

I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the

chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there

is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning

aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the na/d/is of

the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he

departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' Ch.

Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our

passage, the ordinary light.

To this we make the following reply.--The word 'light' can denote the

highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the

whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the

Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general

subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin'); it is

thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be

understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I

shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom

from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when

he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,'

VIII, 12, 1)--and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman--and

it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person'

(VIII, 12, 3).--Against the statement, made by the purvapakshin, that

Scripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we

remark, that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one,

since it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That

the ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards

we shall show later on.

&c. (from name and form).

Scripture says, 'He who is called ether, (aka/s/a) is the revealer of

all forms and names. That within which these forms and names are

contained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1).

There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the

highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the purvapakshin

declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because

it is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and,

secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very

well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room

(for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory

mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.

To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest

Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the

clause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,'

designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But,

excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and

form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names

and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be

accomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which

declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings)

with this living Self (jiva atman), and evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up.

VI, 3, 2). But--it may be said--from this very passage it is apparent

that the living Self also (i.e. the individual soul) possesses revealing

power with regard to names and forms.--True, we reply, but what the

passage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the

individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement

concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of

signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the

like.--Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII,

14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.

different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and

In the sixth prapa/th/aka of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka there is given, in

reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the

nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the pra/n/as, the

person of light, consisting of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here

the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an

additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known

already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the

non-transmigrating Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature

of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and

concluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the

pra/n/as who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the

embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great

unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must

therefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages

also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self,

represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.

In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving

information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements

about the embodied soul.--Why?--On account of the highest Lord being

designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep

sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied

soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage,

'This person embraced by the intelligent (praj/n/a) Self knows nothing

that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,'

must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he

knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and

without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord,

because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i.e.--in his

case--all-embracing knowledge.--Similarly, the passage treating of

departure, i.e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self

moves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the

individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one'

the individual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the

'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account

of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep

sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the

passage.--With reference to the purvapakshin's assertion that the entire

chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the

latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in

the first place the introductory passage ('He among the pra/n/as who

consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of

the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the

nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at

declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that

the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving'[227],

aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The

concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words,

'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that

that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the pra/n/as, is the

great unborn Self, i.e. the highest Lord--He, again, who imagines that

the passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth

the nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking

state, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants

to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the

states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the

soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as

free from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident

from the circumstance that on Janaka's question, which is repeated in

every section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yaj/n/avalkya

replies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is

not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he

says (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for

he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore,

to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the

nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the

non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also

that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the

nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature

of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance,

'He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all

things.' To the latter class belongs the passage, 'He does not become

greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.'--From all which we

conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.

[Footnote 164: From passages of which nature we may infer that in the

passage under discussion also the 'abode' is Brahman.]

[Footnote 165: From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage

under discussion also refers to Brahman.]

[Footnote 166: Yat sarvam avidyaropita/m/ tat sarva/m/ paramarthato

brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity artha/h/. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 167: So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That,

viz. knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.']

[Footnote 168: Bhogyasya bhokt/ris/eshatvat tasyayatanatvam uktam

a/s/a@nkyaha na /k/eti, jivasyad/ri/sh/t/advara dyubhvadinimittatvezpi

na sakshat tadayatanatvam aupadhikatvenavibhutvad ity artha/h/. Ananda

[Footnote 169: It would not have been requisite to introduce a special

Sutra for the individual soul--which, like the air, is already excluded

by the preceding Sutra--if it were not for the new argument brought

forward in the following Sutra which applies to the individual soul

[Footnote 170: If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven,

earth, &c., the statement regarding I/s/vara made in the passage about

the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground

objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard

to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to

everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made.--I

subjoin Ananda Giri's commentary on the entire passage:

Jivasyopadhyaikyenavivakshitatvat tadj/n/anezpi sarvaj/n/anasiddhes

tasyayatanatvadyabhave hetvantara/m/ va/k/yam ity a/s/a@nkya sutre/n/a

pariharati kuta/sk/etyadina. Tad vya/k/ash/t/e dyubhvaditi. Nirde/s/am

eva dar/s/ayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham aha tabhya/m/ /k/eti.

Sthitye/s/varasyadanaj jivasa/m/grahezpi katham i/s/varasyaiva

vi/s/vayatanatva/m/ tadaha yaditi. I/s/varasyayanatvenaprak/ri/tatve

jivap/ri/thakkathananupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvaraha anyatheti.

Jivasyayatanatvenaprak/ri/tatve tulyanupapattir iti /s/a@nkate nanviti.

Tasyaikyartha/m/ lokasiddhasyanuvadatvan naivam ity aha neti.

Jivasyapurvatvabhavenapratipadyatvam eva praka/t/ayati kshetraj/n/o

hiti. I/s/varasyapi lokavadisiddhatvad apratipadyatety a/s/a@nkyaha

i/s/varas tv iti.]

[Footnote 171: As might be the prima facie conclusion from the particle

'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.]

[Footnote 172: It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be

viewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding

past of the chapter.]

[Footnote 173: And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental

principle of the Mima/m/sa.]

[Footnote 174: A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain

the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.]

[Footnote 175: Pi/nd/a/h/ sthulo deha/h/, pra/n/a/h/ sutratma. Ananda

Giri.-The lower Brahman (hira/n/yagarbha on sutratman) is the vital

principle (pra/n/a) in all creatures.]

[Footnote 176: Sa/m/yagdar/s/ana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the

same term which in other places--where it is not requisite to insist on

the idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from 'reflecting' or

'meditating'--is rendered by perfect knowledge.]

[Footnote 177: Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual

[Footnote 178: Pa/n/ini III, 3, 77, 'murtta/m/ ghana/h/.']

[Footnote 179: So that the interpretation of the purvapakshin cannot be

objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to

[Footnote 180: So that no objection can be raised on the ground that

heaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.]

[Footnote 181: Viz. of that which is within it. Ananda Giri proposes two

explanations: na /k/eti, paravi/s/esha/n/atvenety atra paro daharaka/s/a

upadanat tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta/kkh/abdasyeti /s/esha/h/. Yadva

para/s/abdo s nta/h/sthavastuvishayas tadvi/s/esha/n/alvena tasminn iti

daharaka/s/asyokter ity artha/h/. Ta/kkh/abdasya

samnik/ri/sh/t/anvayayoge viprak/ri/sh/t/anvayasya jaghanyatvad

aka/s/antargata/m/ dhyeyam iti bhava/h/.]

[Footnote 182: A vakyabheda--split of the sentence--takes place

according to the Mimam/s/a when one and the same sentence contains two

new statements which are different.]

[Footnote 183: While the explanation of Brahman by jiva would compel us

to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual

[Footnote 184: Upalabdher adhish/th/anam brahma/n/a deha ishyate.

Tenasadhara/n/atvena deho brahmapuram bhavet. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 185: I.e. Brahma, the lower Brahman.]

[Footnote 186: The masculine 'avirbhutasvarupa/h/' qualifies the

substantive jiva/h/ which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the jiva

whose true nature has become manifest, i.e. which has become Brahman, is

no longer jiva; hence the explanatory statement that the term jiva is

used with reference to what the jiva was before it became Brahman.]

[Footnote 187: To state another reason showing that the first and second

chapters of Prajapati's instruction refer to the same subject.]

[Footnote 188: I.e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.]

[Footnote 189: Although in reality there is no such thing as an

individual soul.]

[Footnote 190: Nanu jivabrahma/n/or aikyam na kvapi sutrakaro mukhato

vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/t/am tatraha

pratipadyam tv iti.]

[Footnote 191: This last sentence is directed against the possible

objection that '/s/abda,' which the Sutra brings forward as an argument

in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of 'sentence'

(vakya), and is therefore of less force than li@nga, i.e. indicatory or

inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the

a@ngush/th/amatrata of the purusha, and favours the jiva interpretation.

/S/abda, the text remarks, here means /s/ruti, i.e. direct enunciation,

and /s/ruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than li@nga.]

[Footnote 192: I.e. men belonging to the three upper castes.]

[Footnote 193: The first reason excludes animals, gods, and /ri/shis.

Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of

which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering

meant for the gods. /Ri/shis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of

whose performance the ancestral /ri/shis of the sacrificer are

invoked.--The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is

emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of

sacrifices.--The third and fourth reasons exclude the /S/udras who are

indirectly disqualified for /s/astric works because the Veda in

different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for

whom the ceremony of the upanayana--indispensable for all who wish to

study the Veda--is not prescribed.--Cp. Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras VI, 1.]

[Footnote 194: The reference is to Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not

to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).]

[Footnote 195: In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.]

[Footnote 196: Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the

thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.]

[Footnote 197: Ak/ri/ti, best translated by [Greek: eidos].]

[Footnote 198: The purvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for

the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words

a supersensuous entity called spho/t/a which is manifested by the

letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests

the sense of the word. The term spho/t/a may, according as it is viewed

in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which

is manifested.--The spho/t/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so

far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it

with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from

its being distinctly called va/k/aka or abhidhayaka, and its being

represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word

(arthadhihetu).]

[Footnote 199: For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not

observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to

be declared useless.]

[Footnote 200: In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the

word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus

the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to

infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the

smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the

impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.]

[Footnote 201: 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that

account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters

themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.]

[Footnote 202: With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally

accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as

different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the

upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between

articulated letters and non-articulated tone.]

[Footnote 203: I.e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its

object more than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary

sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the

letters, although more than one, express one sense only.]

[Footnote 204: Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge

appertains not only to Hira/n/yagarbha, but to many beings.]

[Footnote 205: Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.]

[Footnote 206: Asmin kalpe sarvesham pra/n/inam dahapakapraka/s/akari

yozyam agnir d/ris/yate sozyam agni/h/ purvasmin kalpe manushya/h/ san

devatvapadaprapaka/m/ karmanush/th/ayasmin kalpa etaj janma labdhavan

ata/h/ purvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhavini/m/ sa/m/j/n/am a/sri/tyagnir

iti vyapadi/s/yate.--Saya/n/a on the quoted passage.]

[Footnote 207: As, for instance, 'So long as Aditya rises in the east

and sets in the west' (Ch. Up. III, 6, 4).]

[Footnote 208: Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings,

and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.]

[Footnote 209: Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a

person with a staff in his hand, Varu/n/a with a noose, Indra with a

thunderbolt, &c. &c.]

[Footnote 210: On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according

to the Mima/m/sa, cp. Arthasa/m/graha, Introduction.]

[Footnote 211: See above, p. 197.]

[Footnote 212: Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.]

[Footnote 213: /S/rautali@ngenanumanabadha/m/ dar/s/ayitva smartenapi

tadbadha/m/ dar/s/ayati smartam iti. Ki/m/ atra brahma am/ri/tam ki/m/

svid vedyam anuttamam, /k/intayet tatra vai gatva gandharvo mam

ap/rikkh/ata, Vi/s/vavasus tato rajan vedantaj/n/anakovida iti

mokshadharme janakayaj/n/avalkyasa/m/vadat prahladajagarasa/m/vada/k/

/k/oktanumanasiddhir ity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 214: As opposed to an action to be accomplished.]

[Footnote 215: Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavada, 'Fire is

a remedy for cold.']

[Footnote 216: Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the

sacrificial post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun,

luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).]

[Footnote 217: And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a

certain word forming part of a mantra.]

[Footnote 218: The rajasuya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who

wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.]

[Footnote 219: In one of whose stages the being desirous of final

emancipation becomes a deva.]

[Footnote 220: The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of

his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not,

however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sa/m/h.]

[Footnote 221: The /S/udra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic

matters in the legitimate way, i.e. through the study of the Veda under

the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidya.]

[Footnote 222: The li@nga contained in the word '/S/udra' has no proving

power as it occurs in an arthavada-passage which has no authority if not

connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the

li@nga in the arthavada-passage is even directly contradicted by those

injunctions which militate against the /S/udras' qualification for Vedic

[Footnote 223: Ha/m/savakyad atmanoznadara/m/ /s/rutva jana/s/rute/h/

/s/ug utpannety etad eva katha/m/ gamyate yenasau /s/udra/s/abdena

sa/k/yate tatraha sp/ris/yate /k/eti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 224: I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of

/S/a@nkara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read

/k/aitrarathinamaika/h/). Ananda Giri expressly explains tasmad by

/k/aitrarathad ity artha/h/.--The text of the Ta/nd/ya Br. runs:

tasma/k/ /k/aitrarathinam eka/h/ kshatrapatir gayate, and the commentary

explains: tasmat kara/n/ad adyapi /k/itrava/ms/otpannana/m/ madhye eka

eva raja kshatrapatir baladhipatir bhavati.--Grammar does not authorise

the form /k/ahraratha used in the Sutra.]

[Footnote 225: The king A/s/vapati receives some Brahma/n/as as his

pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the

upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the

[Footnote 226: As the words stand in the original they might be

translated as follows (and are so translated by the purvapakshin),

'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the pra/n/a, there goes

forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.']

[Footnote 227: The stress lies here on the 'as if.' which intimate that

the Self does not really think or move.]

(i.e. the pradhana); we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers

to what is contained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself);

and (that the text) shows.

In the preceding part of this work--as whose topic there has been set

forth an enquiry into Brahman--we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1,

2); we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies

to the pradhana also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority

for the latter (I, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common

purport of all Vedanta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman,

and not the pradha/n/a, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the

Sa@nkhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been

finally disposed of.

It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no

scriptural authority for the pradhana; for some /s/akhas contain

expressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhana. From this it

follows that Kapila and other supreme /ri/shis maintain the doctrine of

the pradhana being the general cause only because it is based on the

Veda.--As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages

to which the Sa@nkhyas refer have a different meaning (i.e. do not

allude to the pradhana), all our previous argumentation as to the

omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as

unsettled. We therefore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving

that those passages actually have a different meaning.

The Sa@nkhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i.e.

the pradhana, is perceived in the text of some /s/akhas. We read, for

instance, they say, in the Ka/th/aka (I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there

is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There

we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order,

the three entities with which we are acquainted from the

Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, viz. the great principle, the Undeveloped (the

pradhana), and the soul[228]. That by the Undeveloped is meant the

pradhana is to be concluded from the common use of Sm/ri/ti and from the

etymological interpretation of which the word admits, the pradhana being

called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It

cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for

the pradhana. And this pradhana vouched for by Scripture we declare to

be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Sm/ri/ti, and

Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Ka/th/aka

quoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great

principle and that Undeveloped which are known from the

Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti. We do not recognise there the pradhana of the

Sa@nkhyas, i.e. an independent general cause consisting of three

constituting elements; we merely recognise the word 'Undeveloped,' which

does not denote any particular determined thing, but may--owing to its

etymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not

manifest'--denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The

Sa@nkhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to

the pradhana; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and

has no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does

mere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be

recognised independently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a

horse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We,

moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-matter, that

the passage does not refer to the pradhana the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas,

'on account of there being referred to that which is contained in the

simile of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the

simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer

this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the

circumstance of nothing else remaining.--The immediately preceding part

of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so

on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c., 'Know the

Self to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the

intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call

the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Self) is

in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call

him the enjoyer.' The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c.

are not well controlled enters into sa/m/sara, while he who has them

under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of

Vish/n/u. The question then arises: What is the end of the journey, the

highest place of Vish/n/u? Whereupon the text explains that the highest

Self which is higher than the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the

journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u. 'Beyond the senses there are the

objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is

the intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great

there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.

Beyond the Person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest Road.'

In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding

simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the

mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject.

The senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages

under the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the

objects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the

senses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known

from the scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i.e.

graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i.e. superior to the grahas

(B/ri/ Up. III, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects,

because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the

mind. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects

of enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher

than the intellect is the great Self which was represented as the lord

of the chariot in the passage, 'Know the Self to be the lord of the

chariot.' That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest

from the repeated use of the word 'Self;' that the Self is superior to

intelligence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally

superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately

called great as it is the master.--Or else the phrase 'the great Self'

may here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira/n/yagarbha which is

the basis of all intellects; in accordance with the following

Sm/ri/ti-passage it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman;

the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge,

consciousness; thought, remembrance[229], and likewise with the

following scriptural passage, 'He (Hira/n/ya-garbha) who first creates

Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18). The

intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its

common name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be

represented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter

explanation of the term 'the great Self,' we must assume that the

personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer

is, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned

last); to which there is no objection, since in reality the personal

Self and the highest Self are identical.--Thus there remains now the

body only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore

conclude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the

other things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place,

points out by means of the one remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only

thing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the

body. The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of

the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through

sa/m/sara and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c.

of the soul--which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a

body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.--are compared to

a chariot, and so on.--In accordance with this the subsequent verse

states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vish/n/u ('the

Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by

subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect'), and after that

the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that

cognition. 'A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should

keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down

within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet

Self.'--That means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the

outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he

should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external

objects within intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision,

recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain

intelligence within the great Self, i.e. the individual soul or else the

fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm

Self, i.e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole

chapter treats.--If we in this manner review the general context, we

perceive that there is no room for the pradhana imagined by the

capability (of being so designated).

It has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the term 'the

Undeveloped' signifies, on account of the general subject-matter and

because the body only remains, the body and not the pradhana of the

Sa@nkhyas.--But here the following doubt arises: How can the word

'undeveloped' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and

clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i.e. that which

is developed or manifested?

To this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is

the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped.

The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed 'undeveloped,' but the

subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be

called so, and that the term denoting the causal substance is applied to

the effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance,

the phrase 'mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk' (/Ri/g-veda. S. IX, 46,

4). Another scriptural passage also--'now all this was then undeveloped'

(B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7)--shows that this, i.e. this developed world with

its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed

undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely

seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of

account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is)

according to reason.

Here a new objection is raised.--If, the opponent says, in order to

prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit

that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names

or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede

the doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For we

Sa@nkhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing but that antecedent

condition of the world.

Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state

of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should

indeed implicitly, admit the pradhana doctrine. What we admit is,

however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an

independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed

by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and

reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as

creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the

potentiality of action. The existence of such a causal potentiality

renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on

new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For

that causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly

denoted by the term 'undeveloped;' it has the highest Lord for its

substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep

in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of