The Refutation of Erroneous Views

would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis;

we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our

doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other

It has been shown in the first adhyaya that the omniscient Lord of all

is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the

material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his

rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once

originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the

magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted

world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four

classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been

proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the

Vedanta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the

doctrines of the pradhana, and so on, being the cause of this world have

been refuted as not being scriptural.--The purport of the second

adhyaya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the

doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Sm/ri/ti and

Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhana, &c. have only

fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedanta-texts

do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and

similar topics.--The first point is to refute the objections based on

Your doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient Brahman only

is the cause of this world cannot be maintained, 'because there results

from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis.' Such

Sm/ri/tis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a /ri/shi and

is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Sm/ri/tis based on

it[253]; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation

of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the

non-intelligent pradhana is the independent cause of the world. There is

indeed room (a raison d'etre) for Sm/ri/tis like the Manu-sm/ri/ti,

which give information about matters connected with the whole body of

religious duty, characterised by injunction[254] and comprising the

agnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with

what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how

the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to

take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further

lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four

castes and a/s/ramas[255]. The Kapila Sm/ri/ti, on the other hand, and

similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were

composed with exclusive reference to perfect knowledge as the means of

final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion

also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain

the Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict

with the Sm/ri/tis mentioned[256].--But how, somebody may ask the

purvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for

certain Sm/ri/tis be used as an objection against that sense of /S/ruti

which--from various reasons as detailed under I, 1 and ff.--has been

ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman

alone is the cause of the world?--Our objection, the purvapakshin

replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent

thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are

unable to ascertain by themselves the sense of /S/ruti, they naturally

rely on Sm/ri/tis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive

at the sense of /S/ruti with their assistance; while, owing to their

esteem for the authors of the Sm/ri/tis, they have no trust in our

explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Sm/ri/ti declares to have

been /ri/shi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following

/S/ruti-passage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts

the son, the /ri/shi, kapila[257], whom he wishes to look on while he is

born' (/S/ve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be

erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by

argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore

attempt to explain the Vedanta-texts in conformity with the Sm/ri/tis.

This objection we dispose of by the remark, 'It is not so because

therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other

Sm/ri/tis.'--If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause

of the world on the ground that it would render certain Sm/ri/tis

purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Sm/ri/tis which

declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter

Sm/ri/ti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest

Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, 'That which is

subtle and not to be known;' the text then goes on, 'That is the

internal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks

'From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu/n/as, O best

of Brahma/n/as.' And in another place it is said that 'the Unevolved is

dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brahma/n/a.'--Thus we

read also in the Pura/n/a, 'Hear thence this short statement: The

ancient Naraya/n/a is all this; he produces the creation at the due

time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in

the Bhagavadgita also (VII, 6), 'I am the origin and the place of

reabsorption of the whole world.' And Apastamba too says with reference

to the highest Self, 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary

cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In

this way Sm/ri/ti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient

as well as the material cause of the world. As the purvapakshin opposes

us on the ground of Sm/ri/ti, we reply to him on the ground of Sm/ri/ti

only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been

shown already that the /S/ruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that

the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Sm/ri/tis

conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which

maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Sm/ri/tis which

follow /S/ruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others

are to be disregarded; according to the Sutra met with in the chapter

treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), 'Where there is

contradiction (between /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti) (Sm/ri/ti) is to be

disregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Sm/ri/ti is to

be recognised) as there is inference (of Sm/ri/ti being founded on

/S/ruti).'--Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive

supersensuous matters without /S/ruti, as there exists no efficient

cause for such perception. Nor, again, can it be said that such

perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed

supernatural powers, and consequently unobstructed power of cognition.

For the possession of supernatural powers itself depends on the

performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is

characterised by injunction[258]; hence the sense of injunctions (i.e.

of the Veda) which is established first must not be fancifully

interpreted in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i.e. made

perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) afterwards only.

Moreover, even if those 'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be

appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have,

in all those cases where the Sm/ri/tis contradict each other in the

manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to

/S/ruti.--As to men destitute of the power of independent judgment, we

are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach

themselves to some particular Sm/ri/ti; for if men's inclinations were

so altogether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity

of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their

judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the

Sm/ri/tis, and the distinction founded on some of them following /S/ruti

and others not.--The scriptural passage which the purvapakshin has

quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify

us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e. of some Kapila) as are

contrary to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila

(without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition

with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had

the surname Vasudeva. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose,

(viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on

that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means,

(viz. the supereminence of Kapila's knowledge.) On the other hand, we

have a /S/ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu[259], viz.

'Whatever Manu said is medicine' (Taitt. Sa/m/h. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu

himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything

('he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self,

he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-luminousness,' i.e. becomes

Brahman, Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of

Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not

admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahabharata

also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or

one; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many

persons, O King, according to the Sa@nkhya and Yoga philosophers;' that

opinion is controverted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the

earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal

person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there

is one universal Self, 'He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of

all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be

apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed,

all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will

and liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one universal

Self, 'When to a man who understands the Self has become all things,

what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that

unity?' (I/s/. Up 7); and other similar passages. All which proves that

the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who

follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not

only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness

of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and

direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our

knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on

the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an

extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by

a chain of teachers and tradition.

Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room

for certain Sm/ri/tis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda,

furnishes no valid objection.--An additional reason for this our opinion

is supplied by the following Sutra.

of the pradhana, according to the Sa@nkhya system).

The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its

modifications which the (Sa@nkhya) Sm/ri/ti assumes, as, for instance,

the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary

experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense

organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience,

may be referred to in Sm/ri/ti; but with regard to things which, like

Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from

experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth

sense--Sm/ri/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages

which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in

reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1.

But if that part of Sm/ri/ti which is concerned with the effects (i.e.

the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which

refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the

Sutra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving

that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Sm/ri/tis

does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of

the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sa@nkhya doctrine) will

be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and

remarks that by the refutation of the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti the

Yoga-sm/ri/ti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also

assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause

of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although

neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the

same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already

disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally

to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.)--We reply that here an

additional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being

enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for

instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be

thought, to be meditated upon[260].' In the /S/veta/s/vatara Upanishad,

moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with

the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for

instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II,

Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly

enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11,

'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;'

'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II,

6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-/s/astra itself the passage, 'Now

then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as

a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the /s/astra

at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the

entire Yoga-sm/ri/ti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just

as the Sm/ri/ti referring to the ash/t/akas[261].--To this we reply that

the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed

against the Sa@nkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt

stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-sm/ri/ti

being authoritative, the disagreement (between Sm/ri/ti and /S/ruti) on

other topics remains as shown above.--Although[262] there are many

Sm/ri/tis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the

Sa@nkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means

for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many

competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic

passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be

apprehended by Sa@nkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (/S/ve.

Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might

be set up for the Sa@nkhya and Yoga-sm/ri/tis in their entirety) we

refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man)

is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti

irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For

Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the

highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is

conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him;

there is no other path to go' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). And the Sa@nkhya and

Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In

the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sa@nkhya

and Yoga') the terms 'Sa@nkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and

meditation, as we infer from proximity[263]. We willingly allow room for

those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In

their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities

the Sa@nkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person

(purusha) is essentially pure; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that

person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for

the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of

retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural

passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrajaka with

discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c.

(Jabala Upan. IV).

The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all

argumentative Sm/ri/tis. If it be said that those Sm/ri/tis also assist,

by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to

so much, but we maintain all the same that the truth can be known from

the Vedanta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as

'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br.

III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads'

(B/ri/. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.

difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such,

(i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.

The objections, founded on Sm/ri/ti, against the doctrine of Brahman

being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been

refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to

raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections

founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been

settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely

authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious

duty (dharma).--(To this the purvapakshin replies), The analogy between

Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be

known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the

other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties,

i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now

we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing,

and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of

right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other

elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting

scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make

them accord with one, so /S/ruti, if in conflict with other means of

right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter.

Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually

perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes

with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than

/S/ruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge

of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates

in a perception (viz. the intuition--sakshatkara--of Brahman), and as

such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like

dharma)[264]. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to

be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows

that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence

an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of

the difference of nature of this (effect).'--The Vedantic opinion that

the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable

because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different

character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedantin considers

as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure,

consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is

declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the

world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different

character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause

and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have

earth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of

earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth

and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this

world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and

dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and

made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of

an altogether different character. The difference in character of this

world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its

want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of

pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief,

despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various

character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence

because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the

relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the

relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the

basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be

subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will

be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the

enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his

master.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case

of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the

former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed

with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the

non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense

organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither

for nor against any other being. For the Sa@nkhyas are of opinion that

the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking

in or giving out anything[265], and are non-active. Hence that only

which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor[266] is there

anything to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are

of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things

which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent

is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause

in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.--Here

somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has

originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the

observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I

assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation

of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular

nature of the modification[267]. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings

do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep,

swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest

(although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the

manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men,

animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side),

and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the

one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of

action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of

a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally

of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth,

pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in

the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all

of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in

the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to

the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and

non-intelligent).--This reasoning--the purvapakshin replies--if valid

might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between

Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being

intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still

remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is

pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the

objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared

in the latter part of the Sutra, 'And its being such we learn from

Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire

world--which is supported neither by perception nor by inference,

&c.--must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the

latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent

cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other

texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature

different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage,

'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of

knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of

beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the

non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent

Brahman.--But--somebody might again object--the sacred texts themselves

sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are

generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent

beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to

the elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (/S/at. Br. VI, 1,

3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3;

4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These

pra/n/as when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to

Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do

thou sing out for us' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 2).--To this objection the

purvapakshin replies in the following Sutra.

on account of the difference and the connexion.

The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are not entitled to base

the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an

intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because

'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of

actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence,

the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and

organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth,

&c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so?

'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the

one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand,

and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is

founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent

beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were

intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of the dispute

of the pra/n/as make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to

preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order

to include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities

contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these

deities having recognised the pre-eminence in pra/n/a' (Kau. Up. II,

14).--And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas, Itihasas, Pura/n/as, &c. all

declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with

everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become

Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each

bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the

passages supplementary to the quarrel of the pra/n/as we read in one

place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they

went to Prajapati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of

presence and absence, each of them, as Prajapati had advised, departing

from the body for some time ('They went to their father Prajapati and

said,' &c,; Ch. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they

made an offering to pra/n/a (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of them

proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore

strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending

deities. In the case of such passages as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume

that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is

connected with its effects as a superintending principle.--From all this

it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and

hence cannot have it for its material cause.

To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next Sutra replies.

The word 'but' discards the purvapaksha.

Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on

account of the difference of its character is not founded on an

absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to

be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate,

and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such

as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state

an objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is

the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent

bodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung.--Even

thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the

cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of

the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is

the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other

non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of

nature--due to the cause passing over into the effect--between the

bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is,

on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable

after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the

bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the

case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material

cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two)

would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men

and hair as well as in that of scorpions and cow-dung there is one

characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well

as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply

that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic

feature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which

are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He,

moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to

invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must

assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the

non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the

characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other)

characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of

intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the

relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the

fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause

(for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be

distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running

counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the

characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found

likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite

proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought

forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general

assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an

effect of Brahman? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any

such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things

has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are

contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the

purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the

world. It has indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin that the other

means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman,

on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be

accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely

gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot

become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no

characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based),

inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but,

like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy

tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be

obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O

dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in

truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation

sprang?' (/Ri/g-v. Sa/m/h. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the

cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings

(i/s/vara)[268] of extraordinary power and wisdom.

There are also the following Sm/ri/ti passages to the same effect: 'Do

not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable[269];'

'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions

of the gods know my origin, not the great /ri/shis. For I myself am in

every way the origin of the gods and great /ri/shis' (Bha. Gi. X,

2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage

enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the

sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be

allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be

taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be

understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of

intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for

instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of

dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected

with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves

the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure

Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world;

that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from

Brahman, according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and

effect, &c.[270] The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be

demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He[271], moreover, who merely on the

ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world

would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would

find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became

knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction

of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the

doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes

non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the Sa@nkhya),

would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly

teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.

If, then, on account of difference of character that which is

intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also

which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhana

of the Sa@nkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much

for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on

difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an

intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.

origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation

(without an object).

If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as

sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of

an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the

qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered

as non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence

cannot be acceptable to you--the Vedantin--who maintain the doctrine of

the effect existing in the cause already.

This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of

its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect

previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation

without an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in

'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object the existence of

the effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed

as 'existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its

origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this

effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to

such scriptural passages as, 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere

than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6). In

so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the

cause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the

effect (as after it).--But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as

sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those

qualities)!--True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist

without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning

(of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our

doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.--This

point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the

non-difference of cause and effect.

doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.

The purvapakshin raises further objections.--If an effect which is

distinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts,

absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have

Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of

the world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of

non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties.

As therefore--on your doctrine--the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the

effect is, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and

similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an

omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.--Another

objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions

passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction

there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of

the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the

distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which

are actually observed to exist).--A third objection is that, if we

assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all

works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying

souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest

Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have

obtained final release again appear in the new world.--If you finally

say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even

at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption

will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing

separate from the cause is not possible.--For all these reasons the

Vedanta doctrine is objectionable.

To this the next Sutra replies.

There is nothing objectionable in our system.--The objection that the

effect when being reabsorbed into its cause would inquinate the latter

with its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are

parallel instances,' i.e. because there are instances of effects not

inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are

reabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which

in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do

not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay),

impart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments

impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i.e.

gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold

complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities

to the latter at the time of reabsorption. You (i.e. the purvapakshin),

on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For

reabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back

into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its

individual properties. And[272] that in spite of the non-difference of

cause and effect the effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause

in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under

Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to

the cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated too narrowly

because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would

take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous

to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman

and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not

only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages,

as, for instance, 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6);

'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is

this before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. III,

With regard to the case referred to in the /S/ruti-passages we refute

the assertion of the cause being affected by the effect and its

qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious

superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good

with reference to reabsorption also.--We can quote other examples in

favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by

the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the

highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming

person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they

do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so

the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self

which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and

reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive

three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states,

is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the

rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers

knowing the true tradition of the Vedanta have made the following

declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of

slumber by the beginningless Maya awakes, then it knows the eternal,

sleepless, dreamless non-duality' (Gau/d/ap. Kar. I, 16).

So far we have shown that--on our doctrine--there is no danger of the

cause being affected at the time of reabsorption by the qualities of the

effect, such as grossness and the like.--With regard to the second

objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time

of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no

special reason for the origin of a new world affected with distinctions,

we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case

is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the

soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction;

nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old

state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes

from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, 'All these

creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they

are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a

lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a

mosquito, that they become again' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 2; 3) For just as

during the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious

distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like

the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of

all distinction; so, we conclude, there remains, even after

reabsorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded

on wrong knowledge.--Herewith the objection that--according to our

doctrine--even the finally released souls would be born again is already

disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong

knowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.--The last

alternative finally (which the purvapakshin had represented as open to

the Vedantin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world

should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not

admitted by the Vedantins themselves.--Hence the system founded on the

Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.

Vedanta doctrine) apply to his view also.

The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which

he urges against us, viz. in the following manner.--The objection that

this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference

of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhana being the

cause of the world; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhana

devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses

those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character

being thus admitted, the Sa@nkhya is equally driven to the doctrine that

before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover,

it being admitted (by the Sa@nkhya also) that at the time of

reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction

from the cause, the case of the Sa@nkhya here also is the same as

ours.--And, further, if (as the Sa@nkhya also must admit) at the time of

reabsorption the differences of all the special effects are obliterated

and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed

conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the

different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new

creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them; and if

you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the

admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of

bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the

released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this

conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual

differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply

that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the

pradhana[273].--It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by

the Sa@nkhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against

either only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be

accepted, we are strengthened--by the outcome of the above

discussion--in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real

difficulties[274].

reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus

also there would result non-release.

In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied

on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether

unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on

individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments,

which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by

people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of

the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that, on

account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept

mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this

difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of

recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else; since

we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as

Kapila, Ka/n/ada, and other founders of philosophical schools, have

contradicted one another.

But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our

reasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the

charge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, after all, maintain

that no reasoning whatever is well-founded; for you yourself can found

your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your

assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of

foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise

devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the

whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For

we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain

in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and

the future are uniform.--Further, in the case of passages of Scripture

(apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real

sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense,

can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of

sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also

expresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the /s/astra according to

the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring

clearness in regard to right.--He who applies reasoning not contradicted

by the Veda to the Veda and the (Sm/ri/ti) doctrine of law, he, and no

other, knows the law' (Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 105, 106). And that 'want of

foundation', to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of

reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjectionable arguments

by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments[275]. (No

fear that because the purvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhanta should be

ill-founded too;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man

must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.--For all these

reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against

Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results 'want

of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is

observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there

will result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very

fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on

which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive

abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts;

for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception,

because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as

it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to

inference and the other means of right knowledge.--Or else (if we adopt

another explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the

final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect

knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity,

because it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for

whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged

to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is

called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in

the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of

perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But

that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for

we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as

perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated

alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on

reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be

perfect knowledge?--Nor can it be said that he who maintains the

pradhana to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sa@nkhya) is the best of

all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would

enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.--Nor can we

collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the

past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement)

that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered

perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the

source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly

established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is

founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the

past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of

this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it

perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of

final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore

is, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to

Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and

substance of the world.

persons are explained.

Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedanta-texts

which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the

pradhana being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be

refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported

by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been

adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.--But now some

dull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on

reasoning might be raised against the Vedanta, viz. on the ground of the

atomic doctrine. The Sutrakara, therefore, extends to the latter

objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest

of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is

already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the

atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by either Manu or

Vyasa or other authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i.e.

refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana

doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same,

there is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are the

impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause

of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility

of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped

'otherwise' (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and

Reasoning, and so on.

enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versa) there would

result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction)

may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.

Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of

Brahman being the cause of the world.--Although Scripture is

authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for

instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a

secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of

its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and

arthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when

the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of

right knowledge[276]). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid

outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of

religious duty and its opposite[277].--Hence Scripture cannot be

acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right

knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what

is thus established?' we give you the following instance. The

distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from

ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls,

while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for

instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of

enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence

if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versa.

Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result

from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the

sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only

with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to

exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is

inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be

abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established

distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.

To the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in ordinary

experience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as

ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for

instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea,

although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist,

sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of

conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the

sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and,

again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are

not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also.

The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each

other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And

although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the

unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is

called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered

into it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its

effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the

effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is

divided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts. The

conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment

is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest

cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.

such terms as 'origin' and the like.

The[278] refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set forth on

the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of

enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does

not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of

cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether

and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is

understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i.e. has

no existence apart from the cause.--How so?--'On account of the

scriptural word "origin" and others.' The word 'origin' is used in

connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through

the knowledge of one thing everthing is known; viz. Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4,

'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the

modification (i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name

merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is

clay merely; thus,' &c.--The meaning of this passage is that, if there

is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay[279],

there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars,

dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their

true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist

through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no

such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual

effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far as they are

clay they are true.--This parallel instance is given with reference to

Brahman; applying the phrase 'having its origin in speech' to the case

illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of

effects has no existence apart from Brahman.--Later on again the text,

after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of

Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no

existence apart from them, 'Thus has vanished the specific nature of

burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in

speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Ch. Up. VI, 4,

1).--Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity

of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the 'and others'

of the Sutra. Such texts are, 'In that all this has its Self; it is the

True, it is the Self, thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'This

everything, all is that Self' (/Bri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is

all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25,

2); 'There is in it no diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).--On any other

assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of

one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares).

We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those

parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not

really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of

a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty

steppe--for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment

and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by

its own nature (i.e. apart from the surface of the desert[280])--; so

this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on

has no existence apart from Brahman.--But--it might be objected--Brahman

has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches,

so Brahman possesses many powers and energies dependent on those powers.

Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered

in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so

the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam; so the

clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars

and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release

resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the

element of unity (in Brahman), while the two processes of common worldly

activity and of activity according to the Veda--which depend on the

karmaka/nd/a--may be established in connexion with the element of

manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c.

agree very well.

This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in

the Upanishad) the phrase 'as clay they are true' asserts the cause only

to be true while the phrase 'having its origin in speech' declares the

unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated

by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In

that all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is

asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage

again, 'That is the Self; thou art that, O /S/vetaketu!' teaches that

the embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must

note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied

soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be

accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having

its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does

away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the

idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the

rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent

existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion

of the entire phenomenal world--which is based on the individual

soul--having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But

only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness

would have to be assumed in Brahman, in addition to the element of

unity.--Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only is all

this, how should he see another?' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for

him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole

phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is

non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the

phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain

states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of

Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state.

Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Ch. VI, 16)

that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released,

declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness

is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the

man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called

false-minded[281]? Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes

he who perceives therein any diversity,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares

the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.--Moreover, on

the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result

from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind

of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of

the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the

cognition of manifoldness if both are true?

Other objections are started.--If we acquiesce in the doctrine of

absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c.,

become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of

their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right

idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has

presented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and

prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their

validity depends does not really exist. And further, the entire body of

doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction

of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the

doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the

absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?

These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the

entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as

the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as

the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper

wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the

unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of

effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of

actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on

mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of

and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the

Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself,

there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious

activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that

of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the

moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real

perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent

one.--But how (to restate an objection raised above) can the

Vedanta-texts if untrue convey information about the true being of

Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake

(i.e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water

appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing[282].--This

objection, we reply, is without force (because as a matter of fact we do

see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that

death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines

himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,) and effects (of what

is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a

river take place with regard to a dreaming person.--But, it will be

said, these effects themselves are unreal!--These effects themselves, we

reply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the

dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it

is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from

sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream

such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal,

but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of

them to be unreal likewise.--(We remark in passing that) by this fact of

the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the

waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to

be considered as refuted[283].--Scripture also (in the passage, 'If a

man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish

sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in his

work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such

as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage,

after having declared that from the observation of certain unfavourable

omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues 'if

somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man

kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real

fact, viz. death, is notified.--It is, moreover, known from the

experience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative

instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the

reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result

from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of

the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written

letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the Self are

altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required

for full satisfaction[284]. An injunction as, for instance, 'He is to

sacrifice' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be

effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected; but

passages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be

desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its

object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else

remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be

desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor can it be

maintained that such states of consciousness do not actually arise; for

scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said' (Ch. Up. VII,

18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring

them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the

recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be

objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness,

because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of

ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by

which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity

of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary

life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already

explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of

the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the

previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any

opportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various

But--it may be said--(that would not be a mere assumption, but)

Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on,

declares itself in favour of a Brahman capable of modification; for we

know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo

modifications.--This objection--we reply--is without force, because a

number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brahman,

teach it to be absolutely changeless (ku/t/astha). Such passages are,

'This great unborn Self; undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is

indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'That Self is to be described by

No, no' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/.

Up. III, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being

subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be

ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of

Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the

latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be

predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the

qualification, 'absolutely changeless' (ku/t/astha), precludes this. For

the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes.

And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really

is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.--Moreover,

while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final

release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is

connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification,

passing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares

that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self

leads to a result; for in the passage which begins, 'That Self is to be

described by No, no,' we read later on, 'O Janaka, you have indeed

reached fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then[285] to accept

the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an

independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of

all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as

having no special fruit of its own--as, for instance, the passages about

Brahman modifying itself into the form of this world--is merely to be

applied as a means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does

not bring about an independent result; according to the principle that

whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion with

something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the

latter[286]. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman

undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that)

would undergo corresponding modifications[287] would be inappropriate,

as the state of filial release (which the soul obtains through the

knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.

But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to be

changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which

the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity

leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.--This

objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i.e. those

qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a

world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name

and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we

maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, 'From that

Self sprang ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation,

sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient,

omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhana or any other

principle. That tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not

teach anything contrary to it.--But how, the question may be asked, can

you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the

absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?--Listen how. Belonging to

the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form,

the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either as being (i.e.

Brahman), nor as different from it[288], the germs of the entire expanse

of the phenomenal world, called in /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti the illusion

(maya), power (/s/akti), or nature (prak/ri/ti) of the omniscient Lord.

Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from

scriptural passages such as the following, 'He who is called ether is

the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and

names are contained is Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve

names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, who having

divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)'

(Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (/S/ve.

Up. VI, l2).--Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts

of name and form, the products of Nescience; just as the universal ether

depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the

limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands

in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the

so-called jivas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (vij/n/anatman),

which indeed are one with his own Self--just as the portions of ether

enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether--but are

limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i.e. bodies) produced

from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's

being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the

limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality

none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared,

by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also

says, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands

nothing else, that is the Infinite' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'But when the

Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (B/ri/. Up.

II, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedanta-texts declare that for him who

has reached the state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does

not exist. The Bhagavadgita also ('The Lord is not the cause of actions,

or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action

and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord

receives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance;

hence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gi. V, 14; 15) declares that in

reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the

other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal

world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgita states;

compare B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all

things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that

these worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gi. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord,

O Arjuna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning

round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.'

The Sutrakara also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only

with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding

Sutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the

ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of

effects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).--The view

of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the

devout meditations on the qualified (sagu/n/a) Brahman.

For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the

cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to

exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay

exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads

exist. That it is not a general rule that when one thing exists another

is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a

horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist

only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the

potter exists; for in that case non-difference does not exist, although

the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its

effect[289].--But--it may be objected--even in the case of things other

(i.e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly

depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed

only when fire exists.--We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes

smoke is observed even after the fire has been extinguished; as, for

instance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.--Well,

then--the objector will say--let us add to smoke a certain qualification

enabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind[290] does not

exist unless fire exists.--Even thus, we reply, your objection is not

valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the

non-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ

(buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly[291].

And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.--Or else we

have to read (in the Sutra) 'bhavat,' and to translate, 'and on account

of the existence or observation.' The non-difference of cause and effect

results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of

perception. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for

instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing

called 'cloth,' in addition to the threads, but merely threads running

lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer

threads (the aggregate of which is identical with the grosser threads),

in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our

perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are

ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the

colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Ch. Up. VI, 4); those,

again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is

one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman

(as the ultimate cause of the world; not to pradhana, &c.), we have

already explained.

For the following reason also the effect is to be considered as

non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i.e.

the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual

beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For

in passages like, 'In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which

is' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this was Self,

one only' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the

word 'this' appears in grammatical co-ordination with (the word

denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same

substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another

thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing;

for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is

non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that

the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different

from the cause. As the cause, i.e. Brahman, is in all time neither more

nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in

all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore

the effect is non-different from the cause.

(the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply)

not so, (because the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality

(merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.

But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the

effect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, 'In

the beginning this was that only which is not' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); and

'Non-existent[292] indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).

Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its

This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its

production is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a different

quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which

state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With

reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its

production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with

its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to

the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful

meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the

passage. 'In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that

what is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is--in the

complementary passage, 'That became existent'--referred to by the word

'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'

The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely)

Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or

posterior time.--Hence with reference to the other passage also,

'Non-existing indeed,' &c., the complementary part, 'That made itself

its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute

Non-existence is not meant.--It follows from all this that the

designation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its

production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as

those things which are distinguished by name and form are in ordinary

language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively

applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to

their differentiation.

That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from

the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural

We at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us

that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or

earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain

determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who

wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to

make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which

teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production),

all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all

effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then

should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars

from clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the

asatkaryavadin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of

any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance

has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (ati/s/aya) for some

particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance,

milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay

only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in

return, do you understand by that 'ati/s/aya?' If you understand by it

the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination),

you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause,

and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the

other hand, you understand by the ati/s/aya a certain power of the cause

assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined

effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can

determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause

and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be

different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than

cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the

particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with

the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of

that power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand

and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones,

as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that

the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and

its qualities has to be admitted. Let it then be assumed, the opponent

rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are

not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called

samavaya connexion[293].--If, we reply, you assume the samavaya

connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the

samavaya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which

are connected by samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a

new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and

you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of

connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the samavaya is not

joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from

that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two

terms of the samavaya relation[294].--Well then, the opponent rejoins,

let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion

may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any

further connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also must be

connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the

samavaya connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of

connexion[295].--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are

apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of

the samavaya relation has really no purport.

In what manner again do you--who maintain that the cause and the effect

are joined by the samavaya relation--assume a substance consisting of

parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material

parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken

together or in each particular part?--If you say that it abides in all

parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived,

as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the

organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be

apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides

in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not

apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are

apprehended.--Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the

parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts[296].--In that

case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the

primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those

other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner

indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another

abides there by means of parts different from those of that other

thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of

parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that

kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to

explain how the whole abides in certain given parts we should always

have to assume further parts[297].--Well, then, let us maintain the

second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular

part.--That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one

part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than

Devadatta can be present in /S/rughna and in Pa/t/aliputra on one and

the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several

wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yaj/n/adatta, who, as

being two different persons, may live one of them at /S/rughna and the

other at Pa/t/aliputra.--If the opponent should rejoin that the whole

may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the

cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the

generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual

cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part.

If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be

that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its

parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail.

But such things are not seen to take place.

We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine

that the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the

conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent

and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and

as such requires an agent[298], just as the action of walking does. To

speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction. But if you

deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be

assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken

of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist)

but something else, and again that when the origination of the two

halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but

something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is

originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative)

causes are originated[299].' But as a matter of fact the former sentence

is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that

at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in

existence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is

the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its

obtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something

which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something

else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one

existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To

something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is

moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when

maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for

experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and

houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use,

for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren

woman was king previously to the coronation of Pur/n/avarman' the

declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in

reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere

non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren

woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of

some causal agent, in that case it would be possible also that the

non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the

activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take

place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son

of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never

be.--But, the asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there

follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether

purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in

the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to

bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause

which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as

a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and

it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether

useless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its

origination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration

that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a

purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the

effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something

previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already

because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have

already shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance

merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time

be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another

time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same

substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also

by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c.,

remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and

attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers,

and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on

the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial

beings, because the different states in which they appear are not

separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for

instance a jar, appears only after the cause, for instance the clay, has

undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon

as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this

objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for

instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the

condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no

right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those

cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as,

for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there

spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout)

only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by

becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles

of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession

of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of

visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and

death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes

existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would

also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born

babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.

It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood,

manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are

illegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute

the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only[300].

The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual

origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the

causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be

an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other

weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the

inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that

from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the

inherent cause, there results something else (viz. the effect). And if

(in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say

that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a

certain relative power (ati/s/aya) of the inherent cause; he thereby

would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists

in the cause already.

We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other

substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so

on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to

bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental

cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last

effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes,

and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms

concerning the phenomenal world.

The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that

the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different

from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As

under the preceding Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of

the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sutra

is the one (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That

passage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a

second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being

the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the

beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that

which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the

view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The

circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the

word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its

origination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,'

proves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause.

If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in

its cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause,

and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the

passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c. (VI,

1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the

comprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from-the

As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a

piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it

becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so

long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but

not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded

we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not

different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a

piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i.e.

the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly

apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver,

and so on.--Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded

and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude

that the latter is non-different from the former.

It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different

kinds of vital air--such as pra/n/a the ascending vital air, apana the

descending vital air, &c.--are suspended, in consequence of the breath

being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect

which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects,

such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped.

When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects

also are brought about, in addition to mere life.--Nor must the vital

airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as

something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common

character. Thus (i.e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the

vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be

conceived.--As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and

non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage

that 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived,

what is not known is known' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled[301].

(as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various

faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause

of the world.--If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for

instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent

cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For

Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with

Brahman, as is shown by the passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O

/S/vetaketu!' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7.)--Or else (if we interpret 'the other'

of the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i.e.

Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, 'Having

created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i.e. the

unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in

consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage

also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names

and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates

the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is

not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman

belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an

independent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial

to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death,

old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of

suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for

himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself

absolutely stainless, look on this altogether unclean body as forming

part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its

liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result

in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which

are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created

this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly

appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the

magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which

he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this

world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot

reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be

beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded

from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.

individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate

Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.

The word 'but' discards the purvapaksha.--We rather declare that that

omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition

and freedom, and which is additional to, i.e. different from the

embodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults

specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do

not attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic

nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or

non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its

knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied

Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the

mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator

of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For

scriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be

heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5; 'The Self we

must search out, we must try to understand,' Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1; 'Then

he becomes united with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self

mounted by the intelligent Self,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare

differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and

thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.--And if

it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of

non-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and

non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the

possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel

instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a

jar.--Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of

non-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou,' the

consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state

of the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at

once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong

knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of

the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the

like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil

actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the

non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and

so on, which spring from name and form the presentations of Nescience,

and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once.

The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the

dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in

reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state

in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows

from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we

must search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul;

whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.

objections raised) cannot be established.

As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth,

nevertheless great variety is observed, some being precious gems, such

as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like,

being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at

dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same

ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandalwood and

cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms,

fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces

various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may

contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the

highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections

imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of

the world) cannot be maintained.--Further[302] arguments are furnished

by the fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in

speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream

phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).

instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so

Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is

the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the

observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see

that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and

the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto

by providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs,

wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be

without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing

itself with instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman

is not the cause of the world.

This objection is not valid, because causation is possible in

consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal substance, as in

the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice

respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of

Brahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that

milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent,

viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount

of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat.

If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel

it to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled

by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of

auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is

merely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other

hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus

Scripture also declares, 'There is no effect and no instrument known of

him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed

as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (/S/ve. Up. VI,

8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold

powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.

ordinary experience.

Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have

the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any

extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the

other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed

to their several work only after having provided themselves with a

complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman,

which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any

We reply, 'Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, /ri/shis, and other

beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to

create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without

availing themselves of any extraneous means, by their mere intention,

which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power--a

fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, and pura/n/as;--and as

the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female

crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond

to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman

also may be assumed to create the world by itself without extraneous

Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following

style.--The gods and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel

instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For

the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other

material things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent

Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which,

owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree

of consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of

thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling

intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually

to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being[303]; it rather

wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as

the creeper climbs up the tree.--Hence all these illustrative examples

cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.

To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman

is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters,

&c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the

common attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work

extraneous means (i.e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do

not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no

extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel

instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a

peculiarly conditioned capability which is observed in some one case (as

in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other

to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be

Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one,

without a second, modifying itself without the employment of any

extraneous means, is the cause of the world.--Now, another objection is

raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under

discussion.--The consequence of the Vedanta doctrine, it is said, will

be that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its

effects, because it is not composed of parts. If Brahman, like earth and

other matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it

undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But

Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare,

'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault,

without taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without

body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2);

'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but

knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no'

(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/. Up.

III, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in

Brahman.--As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a

modification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves

a cutting off of Brahman from its very basis.--Another consequence of

the Vedantic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to see'

Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen

without any endeavour, and apart from them no Brahman exists.--And,

finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted

thereby.--If, on the other hand--in order to escape from these

difficulties--we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do

violence to those texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of

parts. Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is

non-eternal.--Hence the Vedantic point of view cannot be maintained in

account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).

The word 'but' discards the objection.--We deny this and maintain that

our view is not open to any objections.--That the entire Brahman

undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of

sacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of

the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from

its effects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of

cause and effect '(That divinity thought) let me enter into these three

divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such

is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him

are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III,

12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to

have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless

sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire

Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union

with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the

passage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of

place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects of

Brahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that

hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of

perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus

be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman

has to be admitted.--Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman

to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just

because Scripture reveals it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the

holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are

authoritative--not the senses, and so on--must be accepted such as the

texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that

not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other

hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such

as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to

difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite

effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere

reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their

objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive

without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers

unfathomable by thought! As the Pura/n/a says: 'Do not apply reasoning

to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above

all material causes[304].' Therefore the cognition of what is

supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.

But--our opponent will say--even the holy texts cannot make us

understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without

parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is

without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its

entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and

persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it

follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected

with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions

'at the atiratra he is to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup,' and 'at the

atiratra he is not to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup') any contradiction

which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional

adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent

on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the

alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing

(like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished)

depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.

No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain

that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of

Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up

into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing

double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality

which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and

form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be

defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the

basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while

in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged,

lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names

and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech

only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without

parts.--Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as

undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such

instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting

instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world;

that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For

in the scriptural passage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no'

(which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result

is stated at the end, in the words 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached

fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).--Hence our view does not involve

any real difficulties.

exist in gods[305], &c.).

Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can

be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its

character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform

creation in the one Self of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in

that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots,

horses, and roads' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too

multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist

in gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their

being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it

is, without divesting it of its character of unity.

(the opponent's) view likewise.

Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhana

implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid

of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhana--is the cause of an

effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is

characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that

doctrine also either that the pradhana as not consisting of parts has to

undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not

consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in

favour of the Sa@nkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhana to be

without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the

three gu/n/as, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhana

forms a whole containing the three gu/n/as as its parts.--We reply that

such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in

hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in

itself without parts[306]. And each gu/n/a by itself assisted merely by

the two other gu/n/as constitutes the material cause of that part of the

world which resembles it in its nature[307].--So that the objection lies

against the Sa@nkhya view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on

which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not

absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts.--If

you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal,

and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhana

to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we

reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of

the world in Brahman.

The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having

originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with

another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination

with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do

not get beyond the first atom.[308] If, on the other hand, you maintain

that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend

against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.

As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised,

the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the

advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.

is seen (from Scripture).

We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to

Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various

powers.--How then--it may be asked--do you know that the highest Brahman

is endowed with various powers?--He is, we reply, endowed with all

powers, 'because that is seen.' For various scriptural passages declare

that the highest divinity possesses all powers, 'He to whom all actions,

all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this,

who never speaks, and is never surprised' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4); 'He who

desires what is true and imagines what is true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1);

'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail')

(Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun

and moon stand apart' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar

absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).

Let this be granted.--Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity

to be without (bodily) organs of action[309]; so, for instance, in the

passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without

mind' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to

produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know

(from mantras, arthavadas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent

beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain

effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of

action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural

passage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?

The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The

transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only,

not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of

one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has

likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of

Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we

assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment

of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands,

hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears'

/S/ve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman although devoid of bodily

organs, possesses all possible capacities.

engaging in any action) having a motive.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause

of the world.--The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the

sphere of this world, 'on account of actions having a purpose.'--We know

from ordinary experience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins

to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an

unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much

less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage

confirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is not

dear that you may have everything; but that you may love the Self

therefore everything is dear' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking

of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various contents, is

certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to

serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate

its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand,

you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of

activity also.--Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent

person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental

aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created

this world without any motive.--That, we reply, would contradict the

omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by

Scripture.--Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an

intelligent Being is untenable.

The word 'but' discards the objection raised.--We see in every-day life

that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no

unfulfilled desires left have no reference to any extraneous purpose;

but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations

in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation

and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose,

merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of

the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own

nature[310], without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither

of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the

Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned.[311]--Although the creation of

this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere

play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we

might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for

sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord,

all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.--Nor can it be said

that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for

Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the

Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember

that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest

reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by

name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at

intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.

reproached with), on account of his regarding (merit and demerit); for

so (Scripture) declares.

In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we

follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in

order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection

against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.--The

Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that

hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would

attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders

eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy;

to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position.

To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion

and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person

acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential

goodness of the Lord affirmed by /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. Moreover, as the

infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form

part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty,

a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman

cannot be the cause of the world.

The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation

and cruelty, "because he is bound by regards." If the Lord on his own

account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation,

he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he

is bound by certain regards, i.e. he has to look to merit and demerit.

Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit

and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for

which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on

as analogous to that of Parjanya, the Giver of rain. For as Parjanya is

the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants,

while the difference between the various species is due to the various

potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the

common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences

between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging

to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot

be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.--And if we

are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with

its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture

declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For

he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do

a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from

these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8)[312]; and, 'A man

becomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 13).

Sm/ri/ti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite

to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so,

for instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha.

and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit

and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on

the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.

But--an objection is raised--the passage, 'Being only this was in the

beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation

there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which

the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to

have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings

subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular

reasoning that work depends on diversity of condition of life, and

diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as

acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen;

but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist,

it follows that the first creation must have been free, from

This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is

without beginning.--The objection would be valid if the world had a

beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are,

like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore

no logical objection to their operation.--To the question how we know

that the world is without a beginning, the next Sutra replies.

is seen (from Scripture).

The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if

it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into

existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter

into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there

would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure

and pain, we should have to acquire in the doctrine of rewards and

punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad

action. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already

been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a

uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of

inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from

action produced by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other

afflicting passions[313]. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter

into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be

formed; so that--on the doctrine of the world having a beginning--we are

led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand,

explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and

sprout, so that no difficulty remains.--Moreover, the fact of the world

being without a beginning, is seen in /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. In the first

place, we have the scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living

Self (jiva)', &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the

embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to

creation, 'the living Self'--a name applying to it in so far as it is

the sustaining principle of the pra/n/as--shows that this phenomenal

world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the pra/n/as

would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied

Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by

a name which depends on the existence of those pra/n/as. Nor can it be

said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the

pra/n/as; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being

already existing, is of greater force than a mere future

relation.--Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the creator formerly

devised (akalpaya) sun and moon (/Ri/. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3), which

intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Sm/ri/ti also declares the

world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor

its end, nor its beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gi. XV, 3). And the

Pura/n/a also declares that there is no measure of the past and the

are present (in Brahman).

The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of

character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward

against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that

the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.

Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to

refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the

foregoing chapter, the purport of which it was to show why his view

should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the

cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world)

are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and

possessing the great power of Maya,--on that account this our system,

founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.

[Footnote 253: The Sm/ri/ti called Tantra is the Sa@nkhya/s/astra as

taught by Kapila; the Sm/ri/ti-writers depending on him are Asuri,

Pa/nk/a/s/ikha, and others.]

[Footnote 254: Mima/m/sa Su. I, 1, 2: /k/odanalaksha/n/osxrtho

dharma/h/. Commentary: /k/odana iti kriyaya/h/ pravartaka/m/ va/k/anam

[Footnote 255: Purushartha; in opposition to the rules referred to in

the preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according

to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.]

[Footnote 256: It having been decided by the Purva Mima/m/sa already

that Sm/ri/tis contradicted by /S/ruti are to be disregarded.]

[Footnote 257: On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare

the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Mueller, vol. ii,

p. xxxviii ff.--As will be seen later on, /S/a@nkara, in this bhashya,

takes the Kapila referred to to be some /ri/shi.]

[Footnote 258: I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive

passages of the Veda.]

[Footnote 259: After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is

not mentioned in /S/ruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is

mentioned there.]

[Footnote 260: In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon'

(nididhyasa) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of

[Footnote 261: The ash/t/akas (certain oblations to be made on the

eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and /s/i/s/ira)

furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Purva Mim. that

Sm/ri/ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on /S/ruti.]

[Footnote 262: But why--it will be asked--do you apply yourself to the

refutation of the Sa@nkhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other

Sm/ri/tis conflicting with the Vedanta views?]

[Footnote 263: I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a

passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic

[Footnote 264: The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of

anubhava; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely

connected with anubhava than /S/ruti is, we have the right to apply

reasoning to /S/ruti.--Ananda Giri comments on the passage from

anubhavavasanam as follows: brahmasakshatkarasya mokshopayataya

pradhanyat tatra /s/abdad api parokshago/k/arad

aparoksharthasadharmyago/k/aras tarkosxntara@ngam iti tasyaiva

balavatvam ity artha/h/. Aitihyamatre/n/a pravadaparamparyamatre/n/a

parokshatayeti yavat. Anubhavasya pradhanye tarkasyoktanyayena tasminn

antara@ngatvad agamasya /k/a bahira@ngatvad antara@ngabahira@ngayor

antara@nga/m/ balavad ity nyayad ukta/m/ tarkasya balavattvam.

Anubhavapradhanya/m/ tu nadyapi siddham ity a/s/a@nkyahanubhaveti. Nanu

Brahmaj/n/adna/m/ vaidikatvad dharmavad ad/ri/sh/t/aphalam esh/t/avya/m/

tat kutosxsyanubhavavasanavidyanivartakatva/m/ tatraha moksheti.

Adhish/th/anasakshatkarasya /s/uktyadj/n/ane

tadavidyatatkaryanivartakatvad/ri/sh/t/e/h/, brahmaj/n/anasyapi

tarkava/s/ad asambhavanadinirasadvara sakshatkaravasayinas

tadavidyadinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nad/ri/sh/t/aphalatety

[Footnote 265: Nirati/s/aya/h/, upajanapayadharma/s/unyatva/m/

nirati/s/ayatvam. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 266: A sentence replying to the possible objection that the

world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be

[Footnote 267: In the case of things commonly considered

non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ,

and on that account remains unperceived; samaste jagati satoszpi

/k/aitanyasya tatra tatranta/h/kara/n/apari/n/amanuparagad anupalabdhir

aviruddha. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 268: On i/s/vara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69,

[Footnote 269: The line 'prak/ri/tibhya/h/ param,' &c. is wanting in all

MSS. I have consulted.]

[Footnote 270: Ananda Giri on the above passage: /s/rutyaka@nkshita/m/

tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udaharati svapnanteti. Svapnajagaritayor

mithovyabhi/k/arad atmana/h/ svabhavatas tadvattvabhavad avastha dvayena

tasya svatosxsa/m/p/ri/ktatvam ato jivasyavasthavatvena nabrahmatvam ity

artha/h/. Tathapi dehaditadatmyenatmano bhavan na

ni/h/prapa/nk/abrahmatety a/s/a@nkyaha sa/m/prasade /k/eti. Sata somya

tada sa/m/panno bhavatiti /s/rute/h/ sushupte

ni/h/prapa/nk/asadatmatvavagamad atmanas tathavidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity

artha/h/. Dvaitagrahipratyakshadivirodhat katham

atmanosxdvitiyabrahmatvam ity a/s/a@nkya tajjatvadihetuna

brahmatiriktavastvabhavasiddher adhyakshadinam atatvavedakaprama/n/yad

avirodhad yuktam atmano xsvitiyabrahmatvam ity aha prapa/nk/asyeti.]

[Footnote 271: Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a

vailaksha/n/ya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire

whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an

intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.]

[Footnote 272: Nanu pralayakale karyadharma/s/ /k/en navatish/th/eran na

tarhi kara/n/adharma api tish/th/eyus tayor abhedat

tatrahananyatveszpiti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 273: For if they are effects of the pradhana they must as such

be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.]

[Footnote 274: And that the Vedanta view is preferable because the

nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.]

[Footnote 275: The whole style of argumentation of the Mima/m/sa would

be impossible, if all reasoning were sound; for then no purvapaksha view

could be maintained.]

[Footnote 276: The following arthavada-passage, for instance, 'the

sacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense;

because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its

literal meaning.]

[Footnote 277: Which are to be known from the Veda only.]

[Footnote 278: Pari/n/amavadam avalambyapatato virodha/m/ samadhaya

vivartavadam a/s/ritya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 279: Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti,

paramarthato vij/n/atam iti sambandha/h/.]

[Footnote 280: D/ri/sh/t/eti kada/k/id dr/ri/sh/t/a/m/ punar nash/t/am

anityam iti yavat.--D/ri/sh/t/agraha/n/asu/k/ita/m/ pratitikalesxpi

sattarahitya/m/ tatraiva hetvantaram aha svarupe/n/eti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 281: In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication,

being compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be

guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.]

[Footnote 282: I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real

effects spring from unreal causes.]

[Footnote 283: Svapnajagraddehayor vyabhi/k/arezpi pratyabhij/n/anat

tadanugatatmaikyasiddhe/s/ /k/aitanyasya /k/a dehadharmatve rutmano

dehadvayatiredkasiddher dehatratmavado na yukta ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 284: As long as the 'vyavahara' presents itself to our mind,

we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness

whereby to account for the vyavahara; but as soon as we arrive at true

knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no longer any

reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.]

[Footnote 285: Tatreti, s/ri/sh/t/yadi/s/rutina/m/ svarthe phatavaikalye

satiti yavat. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 286: A Mima/m/sa principle. A sacrificial act, for instance,

is independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred

texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely

auxiliary to another act.]

[Footnote 287: According to the /S/ruti 'in whatever mode he worships

him into that mode he passes himself.']

[Footnote 288: Tattvanyatvabhyam iti, na hisvaratvena te niru/k/yete

ja/d/ajadayor abhedayogat napi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim arhata/h/

svatantrye/n/a sattasphurtyasambhavat na hi j/ad/am aga/d/anapekshya/m/

sattasphurtimad upalakshyate ja/d/atvabha@ngaprasa@ngat tasmad

avidyatmake namarupe ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 289: So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we

cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of

nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.]

[Footnote 290: For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base

is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.]

[Footnote 291: I.e. (as An. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation

of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of

one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground

of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible

without the consciousness of the other.--Tadbhavanuvidhayibhavatvam

tadbhananuvidhayibhanatva/m/ /k/a karyasya kara/n/ananyatve hetur

dhumavi/s/eshasya /k/agnibhavanuvidhayibhavatvesxpi na

tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhumabhanadhinatvat.]

[Footnote 292: For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth

by non-existing.]

[Footnote 293: Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate

relation, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole

and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.]

[Footnote 294: Samavayasya svatantryapaksha/m/ dushayati

anabhyupagamyamane/k/eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate

ki/m/ tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyagu/n/adina/m/ /k/a.

viprakarsha/h/ syat sa/m/nidhayakabhavad ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 295: A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet

that sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground

on which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined

substances by means of the samavaya relation.]

[Footnote 296: So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we

apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole

thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend

some few of the flowers.]

[Footnote 297: Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha /k/a

yathavayavai/h/ sutra/m/ kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/expi

g/r/ihyate tatha katipayavayavagraha/n/expi bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am

ity artha/h/. Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta

ki/m/ va tadatiriklavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra

yad varttate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamana/m/ drish/l/am

iti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum a/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti. Dvitiyam

dushayati anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya

prak/ri/tavayavino duraviprakarshat tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syad

iti bhava/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 298: I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a

[Footnote 299: Every action, /S/a@nkara says, requires an agent, i.e. a

substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar

exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the

substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence

(for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and

have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative

causes of the jar.]

[Footnote 300: Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada

of this adhyaya.]

[Footnote 301: Because it has been shown that cause and effect are

identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.]

[Footnote 302: Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by

the 'and' of the Sutra.]

[Footnote 303: The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva /k/etana' as

found in some MSS. Other MSS. read /k/etana/h/.]

[Footnote 304: Prak/ri/tibhya iti,

pratyakshad/ri/sh/t/apadarthasvabhavebhyo yat para/m/ vilaksha/n/am

a/k/aryadyupade/s/agamya/m/ tad a/k/intyam ity arta/h/ An. Gi.]

[Footnote 305: This is the way in which /S/a@nkara divides the Sutra;

An. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspo, &c.: atmani /k/eti vyakhyaya vi/k/itra/s/

/k/a hiti vya/k/ash/t/e.']

[Footnote 306: So that if it undergoes modifications it must either

change in its entirety, or else--against the assumption--consist of

[Footnote 307: The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that

the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu/n/as in

combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality

of the different effects could not be accounted for.]

[Footnote 308: As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial

contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is

entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two

atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.]

[Footnote 309: The Sutra is concerned with the body only as far as it is

an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been

disposed of in Sutra 24.]

[Footnote 310: The nature (svabhava) of the Lord is, the commentators

say, Maya joined with time and karman.]

[Footnote 311: This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord

might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and

the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with

Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya naturally tends towards

effects, without any purpose. Bha.

An. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva niv/ri/tter api

darsanad i/s/varasyapi mayamayyam lilayam tatha-bhave vinapi

sa/my/agj/n/ana/m/ sa/m/sarasamu/kkh/ittir ili tatraha na /ke/ti.

Anirva/ky/a khalv avidya paras/yes/varasya /k/a. svabhavo lileti

/kok/yate tatra na pratitikasvabhavayam anupapattir avataratity

[Footnote 312: From this passage we must not--the commentators

say--infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or

demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which

he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common

cause only (as Parjanya does).]

[Footnote 313: Ragadveshamoha ragadayas le /k/a purusha/m/ dukhadibhi/h/

kli/s/yantita kle/s/as tesb/am/ kartneapia/vi/uyanugu/rr/as tabhir

aksbipta/m/ dharmadilaksbilaksha/n/a/m/ kurma tadapekshavidya. An. Gi.]

be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of

the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).

Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of

the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or

refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is incumbent on

thorough students of the Vedanta to refute the Sa@nkhya and other

systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this

purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation

of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the

Vedanta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the

Vedanta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first,

by means of such a determination, established our own position, since

this is a task more important than the refutation of the views

entertained by others.

Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled

to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which

is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is

apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of

nothing but hate and anger.--There is a use, we reply. For there is some

danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sa@nkhya and

similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those

systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative

persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might

therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were

propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in

them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic

But, it might be said, the Sa@nkhya and similar systems have already

been impugned in several Sutras of the first adhyaya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4,

28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are

now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished.

As the Sa@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to

establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages and interpret them

in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have

hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether

fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an

independent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta-texts.

The Sa@nkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.--Just as

jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of

consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so

we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and

animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure,

pain, and dulness[314] have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness

in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together

constitute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is

non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform

modifications[315], in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e.

enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.--The existence

of the pradhana is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as

the limitation of all effects and the like[316].

Against this doctrine we argue as follows.--If you Sankhyas base your

theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent

thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously

produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular

person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses,

palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like--things which according

to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the

avoidance of pain--are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now

look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external

(i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling

(the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the

other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the

different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs,

and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look,

we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even

form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent

principle like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent

things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to

possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and

similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if

worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhana also (when

modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent

principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause

(of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those

attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as

clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such

as potters, &c.[317] Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter

into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary,

are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent

cause exists.--For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of

the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a

non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.--The word

'and' (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana

cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of

endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and

inward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and

dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states,

while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a

different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the

operative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the

sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing

to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences

exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it

pleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].--(Turning to the next

Sa@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the

limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all

inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things,

because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that

some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the

conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the

three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and

Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several

antecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].--Further[323], it is

impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for

assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for

their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in

the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence

Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by

which it is produced.--The three gu/n/as, passing out of the state of

equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and

superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of

particular effects.--Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a

non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in

clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe

that clay and the like, and chariots--which are in their own nature

non-intelligent--enter on activities tending towards particular effects

only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c.

in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is

seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the

world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity

without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.

But, the Sa@nkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the

part of mere intelligent beings.--True; we however see activity on the

part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they

are in conjunction with intelligent beings.--But, the Sa@nkhya again

objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an

intelligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent

thing.--Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to

that in which it is actually observed (as the Sa@nkhya says), or to that

on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin

avers)?--We must, the Sa@nkhya replies, attribute activity to that in

which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its abode)

are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand,

is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The[324]

existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are

the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the

inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies

and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this

very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is

observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists

consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.--Hence

activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.

To all this we--the Vedantins--make the following reply.--We do not mean

to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in

which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from

an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present

and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of

burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar

material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not

due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not

exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when

fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the

Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the

movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of

intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.--But--an objection will be

raised--your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising

moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which

is pure intelligence.--A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of

motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid

of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of

sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the

eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present,

the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself

unmoving, move the universe.--If it finally be objected that (on the

Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence

of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply

that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the

fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists

of name and form presented by Nescience.--Hence motion can be reconciled

with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the

doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.

that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).

Well, the Sa@nkhya resumes, listen then to the following instances.--As

non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the

nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own

nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind, so the pradhana also,

although non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature

merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.

This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of

both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely

non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and

milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers.

Scriptural passages, moreover (such as 'He who dwells in the water and

within the water, who rules the water within,' B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 4;

and, 'By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the

East,' &c., B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world

which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and

water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our

general principle[325] cannot be used to show that the latter is too

wide.--Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her

calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in

addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move

either with absolute independence--for its flow depends on the declivity

of the soil and similar circumstances--or independently of an

intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in

all cases.--If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 24 as

contradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely

shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place

in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a conclusion

which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all

effects depend on the Lord.

beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)

The three gu/n/as of the Sa@nkhyas when in a state of equipoise form the

pradhana. Beyond the pradhana there exists no external principle which

could either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from

activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves

to--nor restrains from--action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no

relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself

into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and

non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, on the other hand, are not contrary

to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being

connected with the power of illusion (maya).

like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist

elsewhere (but in the female animal).

Let this be (the Sa@nkhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c.

independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by

their own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhana also transforms

itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know

that grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we

reply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive some

such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our

liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such

thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered

to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the

transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind.

To this we make the following reply.--The transformation of the pradhana

might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that

grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to

admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 'Because

it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is

eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either

uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special

cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of

entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able

to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no

instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men,

others result from divine action only[326]. The fact, however, is that

men also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk

from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant

supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more

milk from her.--For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the

pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.

is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a

purpose (on the part of the pradhana).

Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sa@nkhya's) belief,

should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that

the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open

to an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the

spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to

anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding

principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your

doctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of

man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not

indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark

that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible

purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final

release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to

the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or

pain)[327]? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for

release[328].--If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be

purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of

release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of

sounds, &c.[329]--If both, then, on account of the infinite number of

the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)[330], there would be

no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire

be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana; for

neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can

feel any desire.--If, finally, you should assume the pradhana to be

active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on

account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to

the pradhana) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the

creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than

the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to

an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place[331].--It

is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its

activity for the purposes of the soul.

man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also

(the difficulty is not overcome).

Well then--the Sa@nkhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by

parallel instances--let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the

power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the

back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter

move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul

moves the pradhana.--Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine

from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an

abandonment of your old position, according to which the pradhana is

moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no

moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana? A

man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the

like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot

possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves

the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for

from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of

motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to

the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the

adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and

the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.--The pradhana then

being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third

principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we

attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being

seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul),

the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final

release.--Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the

different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the

pradhana's part) have to be considered[332].--The highest Self, on the

other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the

Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature,

and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Maya and is thus

superior (to the soul of the Sa@nkhyas).

principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three

For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is

not possible.--The condition of the pradhana consists in the three

gu/n/as, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in

a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of

mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu/n/as cannot

possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby

they would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute

independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the

gu/n/as, the production of the great principle and the other

effects--which would acquire for its operative cause a non-balanced

state of the gu/n/as--is impossible.

force) on account of the (pradhana) being devoid of the power of

But--the Sa@nkhya resumes--we draw another inference, so as to leave no

room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/n/as to

be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since

there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the

characteristics of the gu/n/as from those of their effects, presuming

that their nature must be such as to render the production of the

effects possible. Now the gu/n/as are admitted to be of an unsteady

nature; hence the gu/n/as themselves are able to enter into the relation

of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.

Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were

founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world,

&c., remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the

power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sa@nkhya

should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the

primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since

the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world

would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.--Moreover,

if the gu/n/as were capable of entering into the relation of mutual

inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two things would

happen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on

account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in

that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an

operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine

would again be open to the objection stated before[333].

its contradictions.

The doctrine of the Sa@nkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions.

Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven[334]. In some

places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed

from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from

self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs,

sometimes of one only[335]. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts

/S/ruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and

Sm/ri/ti, based on /S/ruti, is well known.--For these reasons also the

Sa@nkhya system is objectionable.

Here the Sa@nkhya again brings a countercharge--The system of the

Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it

does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes

suffering[336] are different classes of things (and thereby renders

futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and

suffering beings). For those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of

everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the

two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which

suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of

beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self,

it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches

perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering,

loses all its meaning. For--to adduce a parallel case--a lamp as long as

it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving

heat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with

its waves, ripples, foam, &c.[337], we remark that there also the waves,

&c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently,

although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the

state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of

waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and

light.--That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers

constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from

ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general

point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired[338] are

understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not

essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state

of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the

object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would

already essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter

state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for

instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter

never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if

the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.

(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire

and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of

desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and

would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this

is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), 'object of desire' and

'desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation

exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the

object of desire are separate.--The same holds good with regard to what

is not desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person

An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person,

an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with both one person

enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of

the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of

aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, 'object of

aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term

'causes of suffering,' while by the term 'sufferer' we understand the

soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e.

the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes

of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta

teaches), it follows that final release is impossible.--But if, on the

other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the

possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion

of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.

All this reasoning--we, the Vedantins, reply--is futile, because on

account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the

causes of suffering, and the sufferer cannot exist (in the Self).--Our

doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes

suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the

same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject.

But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If

fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and

light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself

since it is one only; how can the one unchangeable Brahman enter with

reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and

sufferer?--Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed

(which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?--That, we reply, is

not difficult to see[339]. The living body which is the object of the

action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of

suffering (burning).--But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and

as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent

body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the

destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless

to seek for means to make it cease.--But it is likewise not observed, we

reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and

suffers pain.--Nor would you (the Sa@nkhya) also assume that the

affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can

you admit[340] a real connexion of the soul and the body, because

through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach

to the soul[341]. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how

then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer

and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain

that the sattva-gu/n/a is that which suffers, and the gu/n/a called

passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the

intelligent principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these

two[342]. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because

it leans towards[343] the sattva-gu/n/a, we point out that the

employment of the phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the soul does not

If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to

the phrase 'as it were[344].' For the amphisbena also does not become

venomous because it is 'a serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor

does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You

must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of

sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit,

that, then my (the Vedantic) doctrine also is free from objections[345].

But perhaps you (the Sa@nkhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on

the part of the soul) is real[346]. In that case, however, the

impossibility of release is all the more undeniable[347], especially as

the cause of suffering (viz. the pradhana) is admitted to be

eternal.--And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that,

although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and

of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet

suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the

two--which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the

non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul--and that hence, when

that reason no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an

absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes

possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that

on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu/n/a, called

Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.

And as[348] there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and

sinking of the influence of the particular gu/n/as, there is also no

fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the

conjunction of soul and pradhana (i.e. non-discrimination); hence the

disjunction of the two is uncertain, and so the Sa@nkhyas cannot escape

the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine.

To the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being

impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges

to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject

and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of

effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the

other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as

it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it.

Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhana to be the

cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory.

We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the

upholders of Brahman.--The Vai/s/eshikas argue as follows: The qualities

which inhere in the substance constituting the cause originate qualities

of the same kind in the substance constituting the effect; we see, for

instance, that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not

observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of

cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelligent Brahman is

assumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence

inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case,

and consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the

world.--This reasoning the Sutrakara shows to be fallacious, on the

ground of the system of the Vai/s/eshikas themselves.

II. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long

originate from the short and the atomic.

The system of the Vai/s/eshikas is the following:--The atoms which

possess, according to their special kind[349], the qualities of colour,

&c., and which are of spherical form[350], subsist during a certain

period[351] without producing any effects[352]. After that, the unseen

principle (ad/ri/sh/ta/), &c.[353], acting as operative causes and

conjunction constituting the non-inherent cause[354], they produce the

entire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic

compounds. At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the

simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when

two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities

belonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour, &c., produce a

corresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality,

however, of the simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce

corresponding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of

extension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (a/n/utva)

and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a

quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c.,

inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the

quaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities

of minuteness and shortness. For it is admitted that the forms of

extension belonging to quaternary compounds are not minuteness and

shortness, but bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens[355] when

many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary

compound combine to produce new effects.

Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary compounds are

produced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are

big and long, but not anything spherical; or as from binary compounds,

which are minute and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which

are big and long, not minute and short; so this non-intelligent world

may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which

you--the Vai/s/eshika--cannot, on your own principles, object.

Here the Vai/s/eshika will perhaps come forward with the following

argumentation[356]. As effected substances, such as binary compounds and

so on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the

causal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz.

sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects.

The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary

to intelligence owing to which the intelligence inherent in the cause

should not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For

non-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely

its negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel

one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.

This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of

sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce

corresponding effects, so it is with intelligence also; so that the two

cases are parallel so far. Nor can the circumstance of the effects being

engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of

sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to themselves; for the

power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another

form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance

produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon

only (i.e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again,

can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on

originating other forms of extension[357], and therefore do not

originate forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own;

for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other

causes; as the Sutras of Ka/n/abhuj (Ka/n/ada) themselves declare

(Vai/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 9, 'Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in

the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation;'

VII, 1, 10, 'The contrary of this (the big) is the minute;' VII, 1, 17,

'Thereby length and shortness are explained[358]').--Nor, again, can it

be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like

effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are

supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not

standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new

quality is originated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same

relation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which

they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not

originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of

sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with

regard to intelligence[359].

Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction

(sa/m/yoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a class

different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows

that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes

from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last

argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz.

Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction)

as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain

the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general.

Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to

be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.

Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a

substance (Vai/s/. Sut. IV, 2, 2, 'On account of the conjunction of

things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body

is not composed of five elements'). Just as the conjunction which

inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not

perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five

elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible,

would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is

perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here

conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.--The origin of

effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already

treated of under II, 1; 6.--Well then, this being so, the matter has

been settled there already (why then is it again discussed

here?)-Because, we reply, there we argued against the Sa@nkhya, and at

present we have to do with the Vai/s/eshika.--But, already once, before

(II, 1, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was

simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not

simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sa@nkhya are

equally valid against the Vai/s/eshika?)--Because here, we reply, at the

beginning of the examination of the Vai/s/eshika system we prefer to

discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of

the Vai/s/eshikas.

in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence

absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).

The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the

cause of the world.--This doctrine arises in the following manner. We

see that all ordinary substances which consist of parts as, for

instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with

them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunction

co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the

general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from

those substances with which it is connected by the relation of

inherence, conjunction cooperating. That thing now at which the

distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of

division into minuter parts is the atom.--This whole world, with its

mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is

composed of parts it has a beginning and an end[360]; an effect may not

be assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the

world. Such is Ka/n/ada's doctrine.--As we observe four elementary

substances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind),

we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the

limit of subdivision into minuter parts cannot be divided themselves;

hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms

only; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the

pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the

time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms.

This motion which is due to the unseen principle[361] joins the atom in

which it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are

produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are produced

fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world

originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the

qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the

qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.--Such,

in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka/n/ada.

This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.--It must be

admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require

action (motion) to bring about their conjunction; for we observe that

the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action

again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which

it is brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original

motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is

assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen

causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion

could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at

the time, impossible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a

quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For

the quality of the soul called endeavour originates when the soul is

connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same

reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and

the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world

has taken place, and cannot therefore be the causes of the original

action (by which the world is produced).--If, in the second place, the

unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the

atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in

the soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the cause of motion

in the atoms, because it is non-intelligent. For, as we have shown above

in our examination of the Sa@nkhya system, a non-intelligent thing which

is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act

or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle

of the ad/ri/sh/t/a because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has

not yet arisen[362]. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is

supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the

atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you

say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected

with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of

connexion[363], continuity of action, as there is no other restricting

principle.--Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original

action cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action,

conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place;

there being no conjunction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the

formation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.

How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be

imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial

conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place,

and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be

contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place

between substances having parts (prade/s/a). If the latter, it would

follow that the atoms are composed of parts.--Let then the atoms be

imagined to consist of parts.--If so, imagined things being unreal, the

conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the

non-inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes

effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate.

And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms

leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause

of such motion; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action

could take place leading to their separation, since for that occurrence

also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen

principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect

enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to

bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to

effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither

conjunction nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither

creation nor pralaya of the world.--For these reasons the doctrine of

the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.

infinitum results from parity of reasoning.

You (the Vai/s/eshika) admit that a binary compound which originates

from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with

them by the relation of inherence; but on that assumption the doctrine

of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, 'because

parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary

compound which is absolutely different from the two constituent atoms is

connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavaya), so

the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two

things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to

connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For

this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence

would have to be assumed and so on ad infinitum.--But--the Vai/s/eshika

is supposed to reply--we are conscious of the so-called samavaya

relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists,

not as either non-connected with them or as depending on another

connexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and

again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into

a regressus in infinitum.--Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it

would involve the admission that conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also as being

eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya,

not require another connexion[364]. If you say that conjunction does

require another connexion because it is a different thing[365] we reply

that then samavaya also requires another connexion because it is

likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does

require another connexion because it is a quality (gu/n/a), and samavaya

does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference)

the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both

cases[366], and not that which is technically called 'quality' is the

cause (of another connexion being required)[367].--For these reasons

those who acknowledge samavaya to be a separate existence are driven

into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the

impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire

series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can

be accounted for.--For this reason also the atomic doctrine is

Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either essentially

active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there

being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is

possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be

permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially

non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could

take place. Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory.

If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to

depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the

ad/ri/sh/t/a being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent

activity would result; or else the ad/ri/sh/t/a and so on not being

taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent

non-activity on the part of the atoms.--For this reason also the atomic

doctrine is untenable.

Vai/s/eshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.

Let us suppose, the Vai/s/eshikas say, all substances composed of parts

to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached

beyond which the process of disintegration cannot be continued. What

constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent),

belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c.,

and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its

colour, form, and other qualities.

This fundamental assumption of the Vai/s/eshikas we declare to be

groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and

other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and

permanency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause,

they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that

whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to

their cause, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is

gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non permanent;

and the threads again are non-permanent and gross compared to the

filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the

Vai/s/eshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to

which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which

Ka/n/ada gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, 1, 1, 'that which

exists without having a cause is permanent') does not apply at all to

the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be

considered as having a cause.--The second reason also which Ka/n/ada

brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, 1, 4, 'the

special negation implied in the term non-eternal would not be

possible[368]' (if there did not exist something eternal, viz. the

atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms; for

supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a

negative compound such as 'non-eternal' is impossible. Nor does the

existence of the word 'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose the

permanency of atoms; for there exists (as we Vedantins maintain) another

permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of

anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being

used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and

matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge.--The

third reason also given in the Vai/s/. Sutras (IV, 1, 5) for the

permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we

explain that Sutra to mean 'the non-perception of those actually

existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,' it would follow

that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent[369]. And if we

tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of

the Sutra as given above) the qualification 'there being absence of

(originating) substances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause

would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that

reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sutra IV, 1,

5 would be a useless restatement.--Well, then (the Vai/s/eshika might

say), let us understand by 'Nescience' (in the Sutra) the impossibility

of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in

addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the

destruction of the causal substance; which impossibility involves the

permanency of the atoms[370].--There is no necessity, we reply, for

assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of

those two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it

were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the

conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a

causal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a

qualified state after having previously existed free from

qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected

substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the

hardness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire[371].--Thus there

would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c., the

opposite of what the Vai/s/eshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic

doctrine cannot be maintained.

Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is

gross; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine; fire has colour

and touch, and is finer yet; air is finest of all, and has the quality

of touch only. The question now arises whether the atoms constituting

the four elements are to be assumed to possess the same greater or

smaller number of qualities as the respective elements.--Either

assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we assume that

some kinds of atoms have more numerous qualities, it follows that their

solid size (murti) will be increased thereby, and that implies their

being atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place

without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations

concerning effected material bodies.--If, on the other hand, we assume,

in order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, that there is no

difference in the number of their qualities, we must either suppose that

they have all one quality only; but in that case we should not perceive

touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour, and

touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects have for their

antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or else we must suppose all

atoms to have all the four qualities; but in that case we should

necessarily perceive what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in

water, smell and taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.--Hence

on this account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be

persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.

While the theory of the pradhana being the cause of the world has been

accepted by some adherents of the Veda--as, for instance, Manu--with a

view to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and

so on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of

authority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded

entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.

There are, moreover, other objections to the Vai/s/eshika doctrine.--The

Vai/s/eshikas assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter

of their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality,

particularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be

absolutely different from each other, and to have different

characteristics; just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another.

Side by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts

the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of

depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just

as ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being

absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the

qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from substance, cannot

depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on

substance; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is

present, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and,

according to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms

and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for

instance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the

object of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative

would involve the acceptation of the Sa@nkhya doctrine[372] and the

abandonment of the Vai/s/eshika standpoint.--But (the Vai/s/eshika may

say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on

it.--True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire

from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and

quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are

conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the

substance is in each case cognised by means of the quality; the latter

therefore has its Self in the substance. The same reasoning applies to

action, generality, particularity, and inherence.

If you (the Vai/s/eshika) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not

non-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because

substances and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to

exist without the other (ayutasiddhi[373]); we point out that things

which are ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or

non-separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these

alternatives agrees with Vai/s/eshika principles. For the first

alternative contradicts your own assumptions according to which the

cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads

only, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as

its white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the

threads. So the Vai/s/eshika-sutras say (I, 1, 10), 'Substances

originate another substance and qualities another quality.' The threads

which constitute the causal substance originate the effected substance,

viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour,

&c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine

is clearly contradicted by the assumption of substance and quality being

non-separate in place.--If, in the second place, you explain

ayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for

instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be

ayutasiddha.--And if, finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in

character,' it is impossible to make any further distinction between the

substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being

identical with substance.

Moreover, the distinction which the Vai/s/eshikas make between

conjunction (sa/m/yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist

separately, and inherence (samavaya) as being the connexion of things

which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause

which exists before the effect[374] cannot be said to be incapable of

separate existence. Perhaps the Vai/s/eshika will say that his

definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya is the

connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate

existence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two

terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be

connected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that

the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if

the Vai/s/eshika admits that the effect may exist previous to its

connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of

separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and

cause conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated.[375]

And[376] just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the connexion in

which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands

with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.--although no motion has

taken place on the part of the effected substance--so also the connexion

of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not samavaya.

Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavaya or

sa/m/yoga, apart from the things which it connects. If it should be

maintained that sa/m/yoga and samavaya have such an existence because we

observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names

and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same

thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered

in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one

only forms the object of many different names and notions according as

he is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is

thought and spoken of as man, Brahma/n/a learned in the Veda, generous,

boy, young man, father, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again,

one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with,

spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand,

&c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted

as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas

and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which however do not prove

themselves to be separate entities.--Things standing thus, the

non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities

would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from

the fact of their non-perception.--Nor, again[377], does the

circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the

things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we

have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations

to other things, be conceived and denoted in different ways.

Further[378], conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul,

and the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that

conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If

the Vai/s/eshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may

be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark

that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the

result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive

rule that only such and such non-existing things--whether contradictory

to reason or not--should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions

depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once

allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a

further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories

assumed by the Vai/s/eshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we

could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this

transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living

beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the

released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.

Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which

consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms

by an intimate connexion (sa/ms/lesha) any more than they can thus be

connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not

exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance,

between wood and varnish[379].

Let it then be said (the Vai/s/eshika resumes) that the samavaya

relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which

abides and that which forms the abode--which relation actually exists

between the effected substance and the causal substance--is not

possible.--That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence;

for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the

relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only

when the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness

can be established. For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the

separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in

the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their

doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the

cause[380].--Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite

extension), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we

acknowledge regions of space[381], whether those be six or eight or ten,

and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the

Vai/s/eshika doctrine of the indivisibility and permanency of the

atoms.--If the Vai/s/eshika replies that those very parts which are

owing to the existence of the different regions of space are his

(indestructible) atoms; we deny that because all things whatever,

forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are

capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached.

Earth--which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the grossest

thing of all--undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following

next which belong to the same class as earth; so does the binary

compound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest

thing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i.e. matter) with

earth, &c. The objection (which the Vai/s/eshika might possibly raise

here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of

their parts[382], we have already disposed of above, where we pointed

out that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the

melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is

destroyed in consequence of those substances being rendered liquid by

their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the

while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their

passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In

the same way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely

in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance,

and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there

taking place any conjunction of parts.

It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak

arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare

the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the

authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others.

Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a

regard for their own spiritual welfare.

(there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).

The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the Vai/s/eshikas cannot

be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called

semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic[383]). That the more thorough

doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of

being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.

That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the

difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or

else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of

Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the

opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists,

sarvastitvavadin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only

is real (Idealists, vij/n/anavadin); and the opinion of those who

maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists,

/s/unyavadin[384]).--We first controvert those who maintain that

everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is

either element (bhuta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is

either mind (/k/itta) or mental (/k/aitta). The elements are earth,

water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye

and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three

elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of

atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of

fire hot, those of air mobile.:--The inward world consists of the five

so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the

group of knowledge (vij/n/anaskandha), the group of feeling

(vedanaskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (samj/n/askandha), and

the group of impressions (sa/m/skaraskandha)[385]; which taken together

constitute the basis of all personal existence[386].

With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.--Those

two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two

different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the

elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the

aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on

Bauddha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the

aggregates are brought about. For the parts constituting the (material)

aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhijvalana) of

intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about

previously[387]. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent

intelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord,

which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and

skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that

would imply their never ceasing to be active[388]. Nor can the cause of

aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e. the

alayavij/n/ana-pravaha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter

must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as

not different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and

then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedantins; or

non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot

exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion

of the atoms[389]. (And in the latter case we are not further advanced

than before.)--For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot

be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the

stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.

through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality;

we say 'No,' because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin

(of the immediately subsequent links).

Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature

either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the

formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane

existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality[390] of

Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining

The series beginning with Nescience comprises the following members:

Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six,

touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief,

lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like[391]. All these terms

constitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha

system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover,

all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the

followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming

uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like

water-wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies

and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on

could not take place.

This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it

merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of

the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation

of the aggregates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above

that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the

existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby

that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence

require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause

for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown--when

examining the Vaijeshika doctrine--that the formation of aggregates

cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and

individual souls in which the ad/ri/sh/t/a abides[392]; how much less

then are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not

connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and

that which abides in them (the ad/ri/sh/t/a).--Let us then assume (the

Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of

the aggregate.--But how--we ask--can they be the cause of that without

which--as their abode--they themselves are not capable of existence?

Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sa/m/sara the aggregates

succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and

so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have

to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another

aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may

produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body

could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the

infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned

into an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which

consequences would be contrary to your system.--Moreover, that for the

purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your

doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves

itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final

release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself

only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being

desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as

permanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that

would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.--There may

therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series

consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent

enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the

existence of aggregates.

on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases

We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal

relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account

for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they

cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members

of the series to which they belong.

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit

that when the thing existing in the second moment[393] enters into being

the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission

it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of

cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or

has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence,

cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.--Let it then be

said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full

development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.--That

also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence

exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected

with a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of universal

momentariness).--Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity

constitute its causal energy.--That assumption also is fruitless,

because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not

imbued with the nature of the cause (i.e. in which the nature of the

cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the

cause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha

doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus

necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general

non-permanency.--Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and

effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the

effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all

cases[394].--Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which

the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing's own form or another

state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these

alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the

first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing,

it would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and

'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).--Let then,

secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in

consequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may denote

the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is

called thing.--In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with

three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so

that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be

abandoned.--Let then, as the third alternative, origination and

cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo

is from a horse.--That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the

conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with

origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would

be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a

thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are

attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.--Hence

we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle;

otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the

former momentary existence, as having already been merged in

non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.--Perhaps now the

Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no

cause.--That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted

by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate

when in conjunction with four kinds of causes[395]. Moreover, if

anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to

prevent that anything might originate at any time.--If, on the other

hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary

existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point

out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and

so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things[396]

are momentary merely.

not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete)

The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on

constantly, assume that 'whatever forms an object of knowledge and is

different from the triad is produced (sa/m/sk/ri/ta) and momentary.' To

the triad there mentioned they give the names 'cessation dependent on a

sublative act of the mind,' 'cessation not dependent on such an act,'

and 'space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely

negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive

characteristics. By 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the

mind,' we have to understand such destruction of entities as is preceded

by an act of thought[397]; by 'cessation not so dependent' is meant

destruction of the opposite kind[398]; by 'space' is meant absence in

general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three

non-existences 'space' will be refuted later on (Sutra 24), the two

other ones are refuted in the present Sutra.

Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and

cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on account of

the absence of interruption.' For both kinds of cessation must have

reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the

single members constituting the series.--The former alternative is

impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members

of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that

the series cannot be interrupted[399].--The latter alternative is

likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any

momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely

undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence),

since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states

through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence[400]. And

in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after

having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual

observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues

to exist without any interruption.--For these reasons the two kinds of

cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the

Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto,

must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with

its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative

would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction

takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve

the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'[401]. As

therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine

must be declared unsatisfactory.

non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two

other kinds of non-entity).

We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be

devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two

(viz. prati-sa/m/khyavirodha and aprati) cannot be shown to be such; we

now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, aka/s/a).

With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is

non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of

space no less than in the case of the two so-called non-entities treated

of in the preceding Sutras. That space is a real thing follows in the

first place from certain scriptural passages, such as 'space sprang from

the Self.'--To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as

to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real

existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we

observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the

other qualities.--Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the

absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow

that while one bird is flying--whereby space is occupied--there would be

no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you

should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence

of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the

absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity,

viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering

bodies[402].--Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of

space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the

Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, 'On

what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following

question occurs, 'On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied

that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this

statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a

positive entity, not a mere negation.--Further, there is a

self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three

kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they

are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are

eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-eternity can be

predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of

attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to

which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such

as jars and the like are, not a mere undefinable negation.

The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would

have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdh/ri/)

also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance

which is consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can

take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the

perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not

remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious

state expressed in the sentences, 'I saw that thing, and now I see this

thing,' if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the

consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the

observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every

one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state

of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be,

'_I_ remember; another person made the observation.' But no such state

of consciousness does arise.--When, on the other hand, such a state of

consciousness does arise, then everybody knows that the person who made

the original observation, and the person who remembers, are different

persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, 'I

remember that that other person saw that and that.'--In the case under

discussion, however, the Vaina/s/ika himself--whose state of

consciousness is, 'I saw that and that'--knows that there is one

thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the

remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past

perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is

hot and gives light.

As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and

subsequent remembrance, the Vaina/s/ika has necessarily to abandon the

doctrine of universal momentariness. And if he further recognises all

his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong

to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all

his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how

can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a

momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of

the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the

similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being

momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on

two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal

momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able

mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense

when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he

admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity

of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one

entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of

universal momentariness.--Should it be said that the cognition 'this is

similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the

apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute

this by the remark that the fact of different terms--viz. 'this' and

'that'--being used points to the existence of different things (which

the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which

similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with

the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to

that' would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of

'similarity' only.--Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something

perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by

philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the

contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince

others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and

such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it

as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who

make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being

cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in

recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were

formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit

that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise

whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be

made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject

never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it

rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which

yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that

sensation.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be

being observed.

The system of the Vaina/s/ikas is objectionable for this reason also

that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven

to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is

expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the

manifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the

cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant

springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has

ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from

the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at

once, as then no specification would be required[403]. Hence, as we see

that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have

been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from

To this Bauddha tenet we reply, '(Entity does) not (spring) from

non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring

from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless,

since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence

of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind

as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence

is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of

reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of

origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced

from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if

non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency,

we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns

of hares, &c.--a thing certainly not actually observed.--If, again, it

should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having

special distinctions--just as, for instance, blueness and the like are

special qualities of lotuses and so on--we point out that in that case

the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the

non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no

case non-existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like

the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.--Further, if existence

sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with

non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely

positive entities distinguished by their various special

characteristics. Nor[404] does any one think that things of the nature

of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the

like; but everybody knows that things of the nature of clay are the

effects of clay only.--The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a

cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo

destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is

false; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are

always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes of

effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a

destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take

place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as

the cause of the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier

condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent

particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole

undergoes decomposition).--Hence as we see on the one hand that no

entities ever originate from nonentities such as the horns of a hare,

and on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as

gold and the like the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from

non-existence has to be rejected.--We finally point out that, according

to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the

four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the

atoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful

assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly

perplex the mind of every one?

ends) in the case of non-active people also.

If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive

people also would obtain their purposes, since 'non-existence' is a

thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman

even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves

even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too lazy to

weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end

finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody

would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the

heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is

absurd and not maintained by anybody.--Thus the doctrine of the

origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.

account of (our) consciousness (of them).

There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various

objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external

world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting

for the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those

Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vij/n/ana)

exist.--The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed

propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of

his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but

it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions

alone are real.

According to this latter doctrine the process, whose constituting

members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the

result of knowledge[405], is an altogether internal one, existing in so

far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external

things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with

the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire

process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from

consciousness, we reply that we base our doctrine on the impossibility

of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be

either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But

atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it

being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms.

Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as

pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as

different nor as non-different from the atoms[406].--In the same way we

can show that the external things are not universals and so on[407].

Moreover, the cognitions--which are of a uniform nature only in so far

as they are states of consciousness--undergo, according to their

objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the

mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a

jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the

part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that

the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this

admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is

determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external

things becomes altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our

always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of

knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality

identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the

other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially

distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being

conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain

that there are no outward things.--

Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The

ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage

and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although

there is all the while no external object; hence we conclude that the

ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are likewise

independent of external objects; for they also are simply ideas.--If we

be asked how, in the absence of external things, we account for the

actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained

from the impressions left by previous ideas[408]. In the beginningless

sa/m/sara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and

effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again

produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason

for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas

is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows,

moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both

(the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there

presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental impressions,

without any external object; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any

variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental

impressions.--Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things

To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply.--The

non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are

conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are

conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it

be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we

are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words

of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its

approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward

thing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man

who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction

avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?--If the Bauddha

should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object

but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of

consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement

he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the

outward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be

accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody

when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only,

but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of

their perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears

also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external

things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an

internal object of cognition appears like something external. For they

practically accept the general consciousness, which testifies to the

existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to

refute it they speak of the external things as 'like something

external.' If they did not themselves at the bottom acknowledge the

existence of the external world, how could they use the expression 'like

something external?' No one says, 'Vish/n/umitra appears like the son of

a barren mother.' If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our

consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us

as something external, not like something external.--But--the Bauddha

may reply--we conclude that the object of perception is only like

something external because external things are impossible.--This

conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility

of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or

non-operation of the means of right knowledge; while on the other hand,

the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not

to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities.

Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of

proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things

are, according to their nature, apprehended by all the instruments of

knowledge; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the

ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or

non-difference from atoms?--Nor, again, does the non-existence of

objects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the

objects; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms

of the objects, and the objects are actually apprehended as

external.--For the same reason (i.e. because the distinction of thing

and idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea

and thing has to be considered as proving only that the thing

constitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical.

Moreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of

cloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies

are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness; just as when we

see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two

perceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the

generic character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one

permanent factor (from the two--or more--varying factors) is proved

throughout by the two varying factors, and vice versa the difference of

the latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one

(permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view

is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a

jar; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct

while the jar is one and the same; in the same way as when conscious of

the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell

and taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.

Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away

as soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot

apprehend--or be apprehended by--each other. From this it follows that

certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld;

so the doctrine that ideas are different from each other; the doctrine

that everything is momentary, void, &c.; the doctrine of the distinction

of individuals and classes; the doctrine that a former idea leaves an

impression giving rise to a later idea; the doctrine of the distinction,

owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and

non-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release (depending on absence

and presence of right knowledge)[409].

Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit

that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that

we are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a

luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so; we

reply that by maintaining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make

yourself guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns

itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and

altogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing

by means of the idea different from the thing! Indeed a proof of

extraordinary philosophic insight!--It cannot, moreover, be asserted in

any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our

consciousness; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its

own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea

is to be apprehended by something different from it, that something also

must be apprehended by something different and so on ad infinitum. And,

moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cognition is of an

essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further

cognition is uncalled for; for as they are both equally illuminating the

one cannot give light to the other.--But both these objections are

unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no

necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the

idea (is conscious of the idea), there results no regressus ad

infinitum. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially

different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation

of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witnessing

Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.--Moreover, if you

maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in

need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that

ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge,

and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert

that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks

manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit

your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea

itself implies consciousness; we reply that, as observation shows, the

lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent

furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea

also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only

through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object

that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely

express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is

self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the

attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on

(while our Self is one and permanent).--We thus have proved that an

idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render

waking state) are not like those of a dream.

We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the

Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious

in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just

as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike.--The two sets of ideas,

we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the

difference of their character. They differ as follows.--The things of

which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking

consciousness. 'I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man;

no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so

the false idea arose.' In an analogous manner the things of which we are

conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like,

are negated by our ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other

hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and

the like, are never negated in any state.--Moreover, the visions of a

dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are

acts of immediate consciousness; and the distinction between remembrance

and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by every one as being

founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a

man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but

merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the

two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the

inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere

consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness; for we certainly cannot

allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly

evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying

what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to

demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those

ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having

certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But

if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter's

own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having

certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt

to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its

having attributes in common with water. And the difference of nature

between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown.

Bauddha view, on account of the absence of perception (of external

We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety

of ideas can be explained from the variety of mental impressions,

without any reference to external things, and remark that on your

doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do

not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental

impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived.

How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things

were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental

impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad infinitum,

sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish

your position.--The same argument, i.e. the one founded on the

impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external

things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground

of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that

ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We

rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to

establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. 'the

perception of external things is admitted to take place also without

mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not admitted to

originate independently of the perception of external

things.'--Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and

modifications cannot, as experience teaches, take place unless there is

some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such

a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot

be cognised through any means of knowledge.

cannot be the abode of mental impressions).

If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition

(alayavij/n/ana[410]) assumed by you may constitute the abode of the

mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being

admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of

impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions

(prav/ri/ttivij/n/ana). For unless there exists one continuous principle

equally connected with the past, the present, and the future[411], or an

absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable

to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to

mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other

hand, you declare your alayavij/n/ana to be something permanent, you

thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavij/n/ana as well as everything

else being momentary.--Or (to explain the Sutra in a different way) as

the tenet of general momentariness is characteristic of the systems of

the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward

against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the

principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the

We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which

maintains the (momentary) reality of the external world, and the

doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of

Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i.e. that absolutely

nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and

therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose

existence is guaranteed by all the means of knowledge, cannot be denied,

unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could

impugn its existence)--for a general principle is proved by the absence

of contrary instances.

No further special discussion is in fact required. From whatever new

points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its

probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in

sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and

hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of

life are mere folly.--Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually

contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external

world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself

made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent

assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound

absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly

confused.--So that--and this the Sutra means to indicate--Buddha's

doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard

for their own happiness.

thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).

Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the

Gymnosophists (Jainas).

The Jainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (jiva),

non-soul (ajiva), the issuing outward (asrava), restraint (sa/m/vara),

destruction (nirjara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)[412].

Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul

and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under

these two.--They also set forth a set of categories different from the

two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called astikayas

('existing bodies,' i.e. categories), viz. the categories of soul

(jiva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space

(aka/s/a). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful

ways[413].--To all things they apply the following method of reasoning,

which they call the saptabha@nginaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not;

somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and

is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is

and is not and is indescribable.

To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions

as that of unity and eternity[414].

This doctrine we meet as follows.--Your reasoning, we say, is

inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to

say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and

non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just

as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the

same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many

and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in

the words 'they either are such or not such' results in a cognition of

indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt

is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than

one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny

this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive

nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative

predications 'somehow it is,' 'somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a

definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion

and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are

not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the

knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how

can the Tirthakara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can

his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether

indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is

known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation.

Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents

does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a

madman.--Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the

five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are

five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of

view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it

logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are

so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are

described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction.

And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are

ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not

ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being

ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that

imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the

opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like

a sober, trustworthy person.--If you further maintain that the heavenly

world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or

non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied

in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of

gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows

from your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so on, whose nature you

claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from

all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute

indetermination.--As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being

and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories--being excluding

non-being and vice versa non-being excluding being--the doctrine of the

Arhat must be rejected.--The above remarks dispose likewise of the

assertions made by the Jainas as to the impossibility of deciding

whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality,

permanency or non-permanency, separateness or norn-separateness, and so

on.--The Jaina doctrine that aggregates are formed from the atoms--by

them called pudgalas--we do not undertake to refute separately as its

refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given

in a previous part of this work.

non-universality of the Self.

We have hitherto urged against the Jaina doctrine an objection resulting

from the syadvada, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory

attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it

would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not

omnipresent.--The Jainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size

as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite

extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar

things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of

different size, it might happen that the soul of a man--which is of the

size of the human body--when entering, in consequence of its former

deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not

be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being

relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient

room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to

the successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old

age.--But why, the Jaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as

consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing

compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?--Do you, we ask

in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul

may occupy the same place or not?--If you do not admit it, it follows

that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of

limited dimensions.--If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the

space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle

only, the extension of all the particles together will remain

inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of

the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body of limited

size contains an infinite number of soul particles.

Well the, the Jaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the

soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw

from it whenever it enters a small body.--To this hypothesis the next

Sutra furnishes a reply.

acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c.

Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be

satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive

accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve

the soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually

being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of

parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is

liable to change it follows that it is non-permanent, like the skin and

similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the Jaina doctrine

of bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the

soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of

works and sunk in the ocean of sa/m/sara, rises when its bonds are

sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is

freed from the encumbering clay[415].'--Moreover, those particles which

in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and

cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the

body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently

remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine

which are the permanent and which the temporary parts.--We have further

to ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the

soul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it.

They cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter the elements;

for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence

of some other, general or special, reservoir of

soul-particles.--Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul

would be of indefinite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and

departing is itself indefinite.--On account of all these and similar

difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns

attach themselves to, and detach themselves from, the soul.

The Sutra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sutra

has proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be

permanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its

limitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that

although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent,

just as the stream of water is permanent (although the water continually

changes). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of

the stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth

and so on, are non-permanent.--To this rejoinder our Sutra replies that

if the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general

void, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with

the soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the Jaina view

the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no

difference (of size, at any time).

Moreover, the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size

of the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows

also that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be

permanent[416], and that hence there is no difference between the three

sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies

of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter

into bigger and smaller bodies.--Or else (to explain the Sutra in a

somewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is

permanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also

is permanent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the

same size--whether minute or infinite--and not of the varying size of

its bodies.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be

set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.

inappropriateness (of that doctrine).

The Sutrakara now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine,

according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as

he is the general ruler.--But how do you know that that is the purport

of the Sutra (which speaks of the Lord 'without any

qualification')?--From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher

himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord

is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the

present Sutra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general,

the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory,

and the Sutrakara would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore

must assume that the purport of the present Sutra is to make an

energetic attack on the doctrine of those who maintain that the Lord is

not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause

of the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedantic tenet of the

unity of Brahman.

The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedanta are of

various nature. Some taking their stand on the Sa@nkhya and Yoga systems

assume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the

pradhana and of the souls, and that pradhana, soul, and Lord are of

mutually different nature.--The Mahe/s/varas (/S/aivas) maintain that

the five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain,

were taught by the Lord Pa/s/upati (/S/iva) to the end of breaking the

bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa/s/upati is, according to them,

the Lord, the operative cause.--Similarly, the Vai/s/eshikas and others

also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow

the operative cause of the world.

Against all these opinions the Sutra remarks 'the Lord, on account of

the inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the

ruler of the pradhana and the soul should be the cause of the world, on

account of the inappropriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is

supposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low,

intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows

that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of

us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming

that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of

the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical

see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be

considered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is

not removed by the consideration that the works of living beings and the

resulting dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no

beginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual

interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series

is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is,

moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyayikas themselves that

'imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action'

(Nyaya Sutra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they

be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else,

are impelled to action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted

that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by

an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the

Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives

only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with

pity).--Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that

you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it

follows that he must be devoid of all activity.

with the souls and the pradhana).

Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the

further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhana and the souls

cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a

certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be

conjunction (sa/m/yoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhana and

the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be

inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the

abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other

connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from

the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not

settled as yet[417].--How, then, it may be asked, do you--the

Vedantins--establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord

and the world)?--There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the

connexion we assume is that of identity (tadatmya). The adherent of

Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the

basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets

throughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other hand,

who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances

furnished by experience, may be expected to maintain only such doctrines

as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that

Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be

used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedantin; for that

would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord

being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of

Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.--For

all these reasons the Sa@nkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid

of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on

the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.

The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis,

for the following reason also.--Those philosophers are obliged to assume

that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just

as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be

admitted; for the pradhana, which is devoid of colour and other

qualities, and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account

of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence

cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.

is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the

pradhana in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the

other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not

objects of perception.

This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the

organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels

pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs).

But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c.

caused by the pradhana. If the analogy between the pradhana and the

bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is

affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.

Or else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a different way.

Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of

countries, are never without some material abode, i.e. a body; hence, if

we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of

earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve

as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to

the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not

previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid

of a material substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires

a material substrate.--Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord

possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even

previously to creation).--This assumption also will not do; for if the

Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary

transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.

or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the

following reason also.--They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of

infinite duration, and likewise that the pradhana, as well as the

individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord

either defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself, or

does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under

discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhana, the souls, and

the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of

finite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of

definite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist.

The numerical measure of pradhana, souls, and Lord is defined by their

constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must

likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is

omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one[418]. From among this

limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa/m/sara, that

means their sa/m/sara comes to an end, and their subjection to the

samsara comes to an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so

there will finally be an end of the entire sa/m/sara and the sa/m/sara

state of all souls. But the pradhana which is ruled by the Lord and

which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by

sa/m/sara. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for

the Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer

any objects. But if the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, all have an

end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a

beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general

void.--Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions,

maintain the second alternative, i.e. that the measure of the Lord

himself, the pradhana, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.--But

that also is impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet

granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.

For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers,

according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears

individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas

cannot be accepted).

We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that

the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative

cause of the world. We are now going to refute the doctrine of those

according to whom he is the material as well as the operative

cause.--But, it may be objected, in the previous portions of the present

work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i.e. a Lord who is the material,

as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on

the basis of Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that Sm/ri/ti,

in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then should

we aim at controverting the doctrine stated?--It is true, we reply, that

a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the

Vedanta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy; another

part of the system, however, is open to objection, and that part we

intend to attack.

The so-called Bhagavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat)

Vasudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and

that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (vyuha), as

Vasudeva, Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vasudeva denotes the

highest Self, Sa@nkarsha/n/a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind

(manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (aha@nkara). Of these four

Vasudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three

others are the effects.--The believer after having worshipped Vasudeva

for a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana),

procuring of things to be offered (upadana), oblation (ijya), recitation

of prayers, &c. (svadhyaya), and devout meditation (yoga), passes beyond

all affliction and reaches the highest Being.

Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the

doctrine that Naraya/n/a, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the

highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself

in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as 'He is

onefold, he is threefold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the

highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the

inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being

which appears in the Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential

approach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well

from Sm/ri/ti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the

doctrine that Sa@nkarsha/n/a springs from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from

Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from

Vasudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sa@nkarsha/n/a,

i.e. the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would attach

to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imperfections which belong

to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the

highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by

entering into its cause.--That the soul is not an originated thing, the

teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhagavata

hypothesis is unacceptable.

The Bhagavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that

observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the

like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman.

But the Bhagavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul

termed Sa@nkarsha/n/a, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal

organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent

another instrument, viz. the aha@nkara termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines

cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with

any scriptural passage in their favour.

&c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the

objection raised in Sutra 42).

Let us then--the Bhagavatas may say--understand by Sa@nkarsha/n/a, and

so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e.

powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of

rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength,

valour, glory. All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a

substratum (not sprung from pradhana), without any imperfections. Hence

the objection urged in Sutra 42 does not apply.

Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the

'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of

origination, can be established.--Do you, in the first place, mean to

say that the four individual Lords, Vasudeva, and so on, have the same

attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self?--If so, you

commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the

work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby

against your own principle, according to which there is only one real

essence, viz. the holy Vasudeva.--Or do you perhaps mean to say that

from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing

equal attributes?--In that case the objection urged in Sutra 42 remains

valid. For Sa@nkarsha/n/a cannot be produced from Vasudeva, nor

Pradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the

attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of

any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect

requires some superiority on the part of the cause--as, for instance, in

the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than

the effect)--and that without such superiority the relation is simply

impossible. But the followers of the Pa/nk/aratra do not acknowledge any

difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between

Vasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of

Vasudeva, without any special distinctions. The forms of Vasudeva cannot

properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a

blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme

Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhagavata system,

with reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers.

Eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory

are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place

spoken of as Selfs, holy Vasudevas, and so on.--Moreover, we meet with

passages contradictory of the Veda. The following passage, for instance,

blames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas

/S/a/nd/ilya studied this /s/astra.'--For this reason also the

Bhagavata doctrine cannot be accepted.

[Footnote 314: The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness,

the three constituent elements (gu/n/a) of the pradhana. Sa. Ka. 12,

[Footnote 315: Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sa. Ka.

[Footnote 316: The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sa.

Ka. 15: Sa. Sutras I, 189 ff.]

[Footnote 317: If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause

from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance,

that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember

that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an

intelligent being, viz. the potter.]

[Footnote 318: As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring

therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and

effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhana.]

[Footnote 319: And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the

[Footnote 320: Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sa@nkhya

hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain,

&c.--'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then

sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in

summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything

but sandal.--And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought,

on the Sa@nkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by

camels but by men also.' Bha.]

[Footnote 321: Sa/m/sargapurvakatvaprasa@nga iti gu/n/ana/m/

sa/m/s/ri/sh/t/anekavastuprak/ri/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 322: For they limit one another.]

[Footnote 323: To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of

cause and effect' (Sa. Ka. 15).]

[Footnote 324: The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how

the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of

perception.--Pratyakshatvabhave katham atmasiddhir ity asa@nkya anumanad

ity aha, prav/ri/ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya /k/etanasya na

pravr/i/ttya/s/rayateti dar/s/ayitum evakara/h/. Katham anumanam ity

apekshaya/m/ tatprakara/m/; su/k/ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha/n/ya/m/

pra/n/adimattvam. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the

influence of intelligence.--Sadhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sadhyavati

pakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyapy

upalaksha/n/am, anpanyaso na vyabhi/k/arabhumin ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of grass

into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the

cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the

omniscient Lord is active. Bha.]

[Footnote 327: Anadheyati/s/ayasya

sukhadukhapraptiparihararupati/s/aya/s/unyasyety artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature

cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims--ex

hypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]

[Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or

[Footnote 330: T/ri/tiyes'pi katipaya/s/abdadyupalabdhir va

samastatadupalabdhir va bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva

mukti/h/ syad iti manvano dvitiya/m/ pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 331: The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sa/m/saranu/kkh/edat; the

Bhamati's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad

d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edat.]

[Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the

pradhana's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for

the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]

[Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadadikaryotpadayoga/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are

looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]

[Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for

buddhi, aha@nkara, and manas.]

[Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which

literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the

context has necessitated its retention in some places.--The sufferers

are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the

[Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly

essential; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with

its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away

while the substance remains.]

[Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of

[Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the

Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there

can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in

the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]

[Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience

[Footnote 341: And that would be against the Sa@nkhya dogma of the

soul's essential purity.]

[Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place

apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]

[Footnote 343: Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti

/s/a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fictitious

[Footnote 345: The Sa@nkhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta

doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from

ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things

causing suffering.--The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to show that on

the Sa@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable,

and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the

product of Nescience.]

[Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called

[Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive

knowledge on which--according to the Sa@nkhya also--release depends.]

[Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the

conjunction of soul and pradhana may come to an end when the influence

of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]

[Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire,

[Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the

specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms

themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small

spheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 20.]

[Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all

the atoms are isolated and motionless.]

[Footnote 352: When the time for a new creation has come.]

[Footnote 353: The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.]

[Footnote 354: The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are

the constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those

atoms, the operative causes the ad/ri/sh/ta/ and the Lord's activity

which make them enter into conjunction.]

[Footnote 355: I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the

effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the

number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).]

[Footnote 356: In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance

of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental

Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 357: I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.]

[Footnote 358: The first of the three Sutras quoted comprises, in the

present text of the Vai/s/eshika-sutras, only the following words,

'Kara/n/abahutva/k/ /k/a;' the /k/a of the Sutra implying, according to

the commentators, mahattva and pra/k/aya.--According to the

Vai/s/eshikas the form of extension called a/n/u, minute, has for its

cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms

from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.--The form of

extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva,

i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting

'big' thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for

instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In

other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to

pra/k/aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskara on Vai/s/. Sut. VII, 1,

[Footnote 359: I.e. if the Vai/s/eshikas have to admit that it is the

nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also

may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the

non-intelligent world.]

[Footnote 360: Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which

consists of parts.]

[Footnote 361: Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms

with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.--Ad/ri/sh/t/apeksham

ad/ri/sh/t/avatkshetraj/n/asa/my/ogapeksham iti yavat. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 362: According to the Vai/s/eshikas intelligence is not

essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when

the soul is joined to an internal organ.]

[Footnote 363: The soul being all-pervading.]

[Footnote 364: Which is inadmissible on Vai/s/eshika principles, because

sa/m/yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by

[Footnote 365: Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction.

The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires

another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each

other in the way of conjunction.]

[Footnote 366: Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sa/m/yoga

from the terms which they connect.]

[Footnote 367: Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya

relation to their substrates.]

[Footnote 368: Our Vai/s/eshika-sutras read 'pratishedhabhava/h/;' but

as all MSS. of Sa@nkara have 'pratishedhabhava/h/' I have kept the

latter reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation:

Karyam anityam iti karye vireshato nityatvanishedho na syad yadi

kara/n/eszpy anityatvam atozs/n/una/m/ kara/n/ana/m/ nityateti

[Footnote 369: Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary

aggregates, the so-called trasare/n/us, constituting the minima

perceptibilia.]

[Footnote 370: As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated

[Footnote 371: This according to the Vedanta view. If atoms existed they

might have originated from avidya by a mere pari/n/ama and might again

be dissolved into avidya, without either disintegration or destruction

of their cause taking place.]

[Footnote 372: The Sa@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as

being the pradhana in various forms.--There is no need of assuming with

Govindananda that by the Sa@nkhya of the text we have to understand the

[Footnote 373: Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina/s/yad apara/s/ritam

evavatish/th/ate tav ayutasiddhau yathavayavavayavinau.]

[Footnote 374: The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya.]

[Footnote 375: If the effect can exist before having entered into

connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no

longer samavaya but sa/m/yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental

Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 376: This clause replies to the objection that only those

connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be

considered conjunctions.]

[Footnote 377: A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the

permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent

existence of the connexion.]

[Footnote 378: It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into

sa/m/yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/m/yoga of the soul

with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that

sa/m/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.]

[Footnote 379: Ekasambandhyakarsha/n/e yatra

sambandhyantarakarsha/n/a/m/ tatra sa/m/slesha/h/, sa tu savayavana/m/

jatukash/th/adina/m/ d/ri/sh/t/o na tu niravayavai/h/ savayavanam, ato

dvya/n/ukasya savayavasya niravayavena parama/n/una sa nopapadyate.

Brahmavidyabh.]

[Footnote 380: In answer to the question how, in that case, the

practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause

and the effect is accounted for.]

[Footnote 381: For they must in that case have a northern end, an

eastern end, &c.]

[Footnote 382: And that on that account the atoms which he considers as

the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.]

[Footnote 383: Because according to their opinion difference of size

constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of

size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of

old and the continual origination of new substances.]

[Footnote 384: The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken

exclusively from the commentaries on the /S/a@nkarabhashya, and no

attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts

of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on

the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of

the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.--The Nihilists are the Madhyamikas; the

Idealists are the Yoga/k/aras; the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhashikas

together constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account

given of those sects in the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a.--Buddhasya hi

madhyamika-yoga/k/ara-sautrantika-vaibhashikasamj/n/akas /k/atvara/h/

/s/ishya/h/. Tatra buddhena prathama/m/ yan prati sarva/m/ /s/unyam ity

upadish/t/a/m/ te madhyamikas te hi guru/n/a yathokta/m/ tathaiva

/s/raddhaya g/ri/hitavanta iti k/ri/tva napak/ri/sh/t/a/h/ puna/s/ /k/a

taduktasyarthasya buddhyanusare/n/akshepasyak/ri/tatvan

notk/ri/sh/t/abuddhaya iti madhyamika/h/. Anyais tu /s/ishyair guru/n/a

sarva/s/unyatva upadish/t/e j/n/anatiriktasya sarvasya /s/unyatvam astu

nameti guruktir yoga iti bauddai/h/ paribhashitopeta/h/ tad upari /k/a

j/n/anasya tu /s/unyatva/m/ na sa/m/bhavati tathatve

jagadandhyaprasa@ngat sunyasiddher apy asa/m/bhava/k/ /k/eti buddhamate

a/k/aratvena paribhashita akshepos'pi k/ri/ta iti yoga/k/ara/h/

vij/n/anamatrastitvavadina/h/. Tadanataram anyai/h/ /s/ishyai/h/

pratitisiddhasya katha/m/ /s/unyatva/m/ vaktu/m/ /s/akyam ato j/n/anavad

vahyarthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, para/m/ tu so

s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tatha@ngik/ri/tyaiva/m/ /s/ishyamatim

anus/ri/tya kiyatparyanta/m/ sutra/m/ bhavishyatiti tai/h/ p/ri/sh/t/am

atas te sautrantika/h/. Anye punar yady aya/m/ gha/t/a iti pratitibalad

vahyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasya eva pratiter aparokshatvat sa katha/m/

parokshos'to vahyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti bhasha viruddhety akshipann

atas te vaibhashika/h/.]

[Footnote 385: The rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects,

colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here

re-appear as /k/aittika on account of their connexion with thought.

Their objects likewise are classed as /k/aittika in so far as they are

perceived by the senses.--The vij/n/anaskandha comprises the series of

self-cognitions (ahamaham ity alayavj/n/anapravaha/h/), according to all

commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a,

the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things

(savikalpaka/m/ nirvikalpaka/m/ /k/a prav/ri/ttivij/n/anasamj/n/itam).--

The vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samj/n/askandha

comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a/s/va

ityadi/s/abdasamjalpitapratyaya/h/, An. Gi.; gaur a/s/va ityeva/m/

namavi/s/ish/t/asavikalpaka/h/ pratyaya/h/, Go. An.; sa/m/j/n/a

yaj/n/adattadipadatadullekhi savikalpapratyayo va, dvitiyapakshe

vij/n/anapadena savikalpapratyayo na grahy/h/, Brahmavidyabh.). The

sa/m/skaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and

adharma.--Compare also the Bhamati.--The vij/n/anaskandha is /k/itta,

the other skandhas /k/aitta.]

[Footnote 386: It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as

well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (ksha/n/ikatva),

the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground

controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.]

[Footnote 387: Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence

of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.]

[Footnote 388: In consequence of which no release could take place.]

[Footnote 389: The Brahmavidyabhara/n/a explains the last clause--from

ksha/n/ikatva/k/ /k/a--somewhat differently: Api /k/a parama/n/unam api

ksha/n/ikatvabhyupagaman melana/m/ na sambhavati, parama/n/una/m/

melana/m/ parama/n/ukriyadhinam, tatha /k/a svakriya/m/ prati

parama/n/una/m/ kara/n/atvat kriyapuraksha/n/e parama/n/ubhir bhavyam

kriya /s/rayataya kriyaksha/n/eszpi tesham avasthanam apekshitam eva/m/

melanakshaneszpi, nahi melana/s/rayasyabhave melanarupa prav/ri/ttir

upapadyate, tatha /k/a sthiraparama/n/usadhya melanarupa prav/ri/tti/h/

katha/m/ tesham ksha/n/ikatve bhavet.--Ananda Giri also divides and

translates differently from the translation in the text.]

[Footnote 390: The kara/n/atvat of /S/a@nkara explains the pratyayatvat

of the Sutra; karya/m/ praty ayate janakatvena ga/kkh/ati.]

[Footnote 391: The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations

of the terms of this series.--The following is the substance of the

comment of the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a: Nescience is the error of

considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure,

&c.--Impression (affection, sa/m/skara) comprises desire, aversion, &c.,

and the activity caused by them.--Knowledge (vij/n/ana) is the

self-consciousness (aham ity alayavij/n/anasya v/ri/ttilabha/h/)

springing up in the embryo.--Name and form is the rudimentary flake--or

bubble-like condition of the embryo.--The abode of the six

(sha/d/ayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which

the latter is the abode of the six senses.--Touch (spar/s/a) is the

sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.--Feeling (vedana)

the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.--Desire

(t/ri/sh/n/a) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to

shun the painful ones.--Activity (upadana) is the effort resulting from

desire,--Birth is the passing out from the uterus.--Species (jati) is

the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.--Decay

(jara).--Death (mara/n/am) is explained as the condition of the creature

when about to die (mumursha).--Grief (/s/oka) the frustration of wishes

connected therewith.--Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that

account.--Pain (du/h/kha) is such pain as caused by the five

senses.--Durmanas is mental affliction.--The 'and the like' implies

death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from

[Footnote 392: Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain:

A/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv iti bhokt/ri/vi/s/esha/n/am

ad/ri/sh/t/a/s/rayeshv ity artha/h/.--The Brahrma-vidyabhara/n/a says:

Nityeshv a/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv a/n/ushv abhyupagamyamaneshu

bhokt/ri/shu /k/a satsv ity anvaya/h/. A/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv ity

asyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity artha/h/.--And with regard to the

subsequent a/s/raya/s/rayi/s/unyeshu: a/s/raya/s/rayitva/s/unyeshu,

aya/m/ bhava/h/, sthireshu parama/n/ushu yadanvaye parama/n/una/m/

sa/m/ghatapatti/h/ yadvyatireke /k/a na tad upakarakam upakarya/h/

parama/n/ava/h/ yena tatk/ri/to bhoga/h/ prarthyate sa tatra karteti

grahitu/m/ /s/akyate, ksha/n/ikeshu tu param/n/ushu

anvayavyatirekagrahasyanekaksha/n/asadhyasyasa/m/bhavan

nopakaryopakarakabhavo nirdharayitu/m/ /s/akya/h/.--Ananda Giri remarks

on the latter: Ad/ri/sh/t/a/s/rayakart/ri/rahityam aha/s/rayeti. Another

reading appears to be a/s/aya/s/raya/s/unyeshu.]

[Footnote 393: Bauddhana/m/ ksha/n/apadena gha/t/adir eva padartho

vyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta/h/ ka/sk/it ksha/n/o nama halosti.

Brahmavidyabh.]

[Footnote 394: And whereupon then could be established the difference of

mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material

causes such as clay, &c.?]

[Footnote 395: These four causes are the so-called defining cause

(adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the

immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause

(alambanapratyaya).--I extract the explanation from the

Brahmavidyabhara/n/a: Adhipatir indriya/m/ tad dhi /k/akshuradirupam

utpannasya j/n/anasya rupadivishayata/m/ niya/kkh/ati niyamaka/s/ /k/a

lokedhipatir ity u/k/yate. Sahakari aloka/h/.

Samanantarapratyaya/h/purvaj/n/anam, bauddhamate hi

ksha/n/ikaj/n/anasa/m/tatau purvaj/n/anam uttaraj/n/asya karana/m/ tad

eva /k/a mana ity u/k/yate. Alambana/m/ gha/t/adi/h/. Etan hetun pratiya

prapya /k/akshuradijanyam ity adi.]

[Footnote 396: Sa/m/skara iti, tanmate purvaksha/n/a eva hetubhuta/h/

sa/m/skaro vasaneti /k/a vyavahriyate karya/m/ tu tadvishayataya

karmavyutpattya sa/m/skara/h/, tatha /k/a karyakara/n/atmaka/m/ sarva/m/

bhavarupa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/n/artha/h/. Brahmavidyabhara/n/a.]

[Footnote 397: As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the

intention of doing so.]

[Footnote 398: I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.--Viparita

iti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/adina/m/ yuktya sadhyamanoku/s/alair

avagantum a/s/akya/h/ sukshmo vina/s/opratisa/m/khyanirodha/h/.

[Footnote 399: A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of

causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary

existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to

produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter

alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since

the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp.

Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha). And the non-existence of the last link

would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]

[Footnote 400: Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the

form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of

the powder into which the potsherds are ground.--Analogously we infer

that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of

water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some

[Footnote 401: The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]

[Footnote 402: What does enable us to declare that there is

avara/n/abhava in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore

is something real.]

[Footnote 403: If the cause were able, without having undergone any

change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the

effects of which it is capable.--Cp. on this point the

Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 404: This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a

general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and

that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from

non-existence.]

[Footnote 405: According to the vij/n/anavadin the cognition specialised

by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour

is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is

consciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so

far as it is power is mana, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of

that power it is pramat/ri/, knowing subject.]

[Footnote 406: If they are said to be different from the atoms they can

no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different

from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of

gross non-atomic bodies.]

[Footnote 407: Avayavavayavirupo vahyosrtho nasti /k/en ma bhud

jativyaktyadirupas tu syad ity a/s/rankyaha evam iti. Jatyadina/m/

vyaktyadinam /k/atyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasa@ngad atyantabhinnatve

tadvadevatadbhavad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhedavaj

gativyaktyadibhedosxpi nastity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 408: Vasana, above translated by mental impression, strictly

means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the

present actual idea.]

[Footnote 409: For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas

which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in

addition to the transitory ideas.]

[Footnote 410: The vij/n/anaskandha comprises vij/n/anas of two

different kinds, the alayavij/n/ana and the prav/ri/ttivij/n/ana. The

alayavij/n/ana comprises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer

to the ego; the prav/ri/ttivij/n/ana comprises those ideas which refer

to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas

of the latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the

antecedent ideas of the former class.]

[Footnote 411: Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents

itself to consciousness is not non-existent.]

[Footnote 412: Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects

of their enjoyment; asrava is the forward movement of the senses towards

their objects; sa/m/vara is the restraint of the activity of the senses;

nirjara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works

constitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the soul, after

bondage has ceased, to the highest regions.--For the details, see

Professor Cowell's translation of the Arhata chapter of the

Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 413: Cp. translation of Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha, p. 59.]

[Footnote 414: And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.]

[Footnote 415: Cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha translation, p. 58.]

[Footnote 416: The inference being that the initial and intervening

sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul,

like its final size.]

[Footnote 417: The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and

the pradhana and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world

considered as the effect of the pradhana acted upon by the Lord; for

that the world is the effect of the pradhana is a point which the

Vedantins do not accept as proved.]

[Footnote 418: I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the

omniscient Lord knows its measure.]